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Abstract 
The first chapter uses regression based event-study analysis to examine the response of 
the 30-year mortgage rate to the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing (QE) announcements in 
zero lower bond period. A total of 35 QE announcements from 2008 to 2015 are selected in 
reference to previous literature and my own discretion. Each announcement is then identified by a 
certain type and in a QE round. After model validation, the best-fitting IGARCH model with 
skewed t distribution is used to measure the QE announcement effects on daily changes of the 30-
year mortgage rate, the 30-year Treasury rate and the spread between them. Abnormal returns 
(changes), cumulative abnormal returns and their long-run values of the mortgage rate for each 
announcement within 1-day, 3-day and 5-day event windows are calculated and reported. In event 
windows, announcements suggesting the start of a new round of QE reduced the mortgage rate 
tremendously, while the effects of further news conveying a continuation of the current QE policy 
diminished. Announcements of an increase in mortgage-backed security purchases decreased the 
mortgage rate more than the Treasury rate and reduced the credit risk of holding mortgage 
securities over Treasury securities. Two robustness checks find that the shocks of macro-
economy and mortgage rate determinants were trivial in influencing abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns of the mortgage rate on average, and the results do not change so 
much if the model is controlling for the 10-year Treasury rate instead of the 30-year Treasury 
rate. 
The second chapter studies the same topic as the first chapter by utilizing the bivariate 
structural VAR model with recursive restrictions. In the VAR, both the mortgage rate change and 
the Treasury rate change are endogenous variables, and the QE event dummies are exogenous 
variables. I find that the responses of the mortgage rate are similar to the results of GARCH model 
in Chapter 1 with 1-day and 3-day event windows. In addition, the aggregate effects of QE events 
iii 
in different rounds of QE are in line with the results in Chapter 1. Again, the conclusion of the MBS 
purchase events reducing the mortgage rate more than Treasury rate still holds. From the impulse 
response analysis, I find that the Treasury rate responds faster to a QE announcement shock than 
the mortgage rate, this evidence proves the necessity of longer event windows and a recursive 
relationship between the Treasury rate and the mortgage rate. 
The third chapter analyzes the effects of the monetary policy on the stock price in China. 
As suggested by existing literature, there are four major monetary policy instruments used by the 
People’s Bank of China, they are the 7-day repo rate, the 1-year benchmark lending rate, the M2 
and the total loan. I run Structural VARs with respect to these four instruments and find the impulse 
responses of the Shanghai A-share stock index to the monetary policy shocks. I use two different 
restriction schemes- the short-run Cholesky restrictions and the short-run and long-run combined 
restrictions for identification. After comparing the results, I conclude that the latter restriction 
method leads to the better estimation than the former one. In general, a contractionary monetary 
policy shock cuts the stock price, appreciates the Chinese currency, reduces the output gap, injects 
deflation and shrinks the commodity price gap. In additional, the “price puzzle” found in the US 
economy also exists in China. 
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Chapter 1: The Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative 
Easing Announcements on the U.S. Mortgage Market: An 
Event-Study Analysis 
1. Introduction
Unconventional monetary policy instruments have been widely employed by central banks 
in major developed economies (i.e., U.S., U.K., Euro Area and Japan) since the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. Among those instruments, Quantitative Easing (QE) was most widely used by central banks 
and discussed by researchers. According to the Bank of England, QE “is an unconventional form 
of monetary policy where a Central Bank creates new money electronically to buy financial assets, 
like government bonds.” In the U.S., during the zero lower bound (ZLB) period1, the Federal 
Reserve Bank (Fed) frequently implemented several rounds of QE such as Large-scale Asset 
Purchases (LSAP) and Operation Twists 2  (OT). Although the types and quantities of assets 
purchased by the Fed were not the same during each round, the aim for the Fed’s QEs was that by 
increasing the prices and decreasing the yields of government and agency assets through the Fed’s 
purchases, investors were more willing to buy private assets. Therefore, better liquidity and less 
credit constraints were achieved in the market. Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) were among 
the securities purchased by the Fed and thus the yields of MBSs and mortgage rates were expected 
to be reduced in the course of QEs. Former Chairman of the Fed Ben Bernanke said in his Jackson 
Hole Speech on August 31, 2012: “The QE program… has been linked to substantial reductions in 
MBS yields and retail mortgage rates”.   
1 ZLB period started at the end of 2008 when Fed reduced the federal funds rate to be in the range of 0 to 
0.25 percent, and concluded at late 2015 when Fed decided to increase the federal funds rate to be in the 
range of 0.25 to 0.5 percent. 
2 Also known as Maturity Extension Program (or MEP). 
2 
 
While transmission channels of QE announcements to the financial market and QE 
announcement effects on asset prices in general are broadly studied, few researchers have looked 
into the mortgage market and changes of the mortgage rate. Of those few, VAR model is most 
commonly used to estimate the co-movement of mortgage rates and other asset yields, but the 
effects of QE announcements on mortgage rates on the event day or in an event window have not 
been investigated until this paper. There are two reasons for using the event study approach. First, 
the short event window around an event captures only the QE announcement shock and eliminate 
other shocks. Second, the effect of a single event can be estimated instead of considering all the 
events as the same type. 
In previous studies using event study methods, the traditional 2-step approach instead of 
the regression 1-step approach is used3, and the time periods of those researches do not cover all 
the Fed’s QE announcements.  My study is unique in the sense that I focus on using regression-
based event study to account for the effect on mortgage rates of each individual QE announcement. 
Other than the traditional OLS regression in event studies, the serial correlation and conditional 
heteroscedasticity within data series are well treated by using the generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model when estimating the announcement effects. 
Furthermore, my data set spans from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2015 which includes all 
the Fed’s QE announcement events during the ZLB period. 
In my study, the event dates are generalized from the dates of announcements which 
indicated changes from previous QE policies (i.e., QE shocks). These announcements include the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements, testimonies, the Fed Chairman’s 
speeches and minutes released. Similar selecting criteria for event dates are exploited by Wright 
(2012) and Rogers et al. (2014). By regressing daily changes of the 30-year mortgage rate on event 
                                                          
3 Detailed explanation of these two methods of event study are discussed in section 2.2. 
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dummies and identifying the appropriate autoregressive and moving average (ARMA) and 
GARCH specifications, I find abnormal returns4 (ARs) of the mortgage rate on event days. For 
comparison purpose, I also regress changes of the 30-year treasury rate and changes of the 
mortgage-treasury rate spread on event dummies. Three different event window sizes (i.e., 1-day, 
3-day and 5-day) are used and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the mortgage rate in event 
windows are calculated and reported. The results show that generally QE announcements of 
increase in asset purchases put downward pressure on both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate5. 
Specifically, the announcements near the start of a new round of QE are associated with large and 
significant ARs and CARs of the mortgage rate. Moreover, higher ARs and CARs of the mortgage 
rate were found in early QE rounds (QE1 and QE2) than in later rounds (OT and QE3), which is in 
line with an existing study (i.e., Meaning and Zhu, 2011) claiming that QE shocks are more 
effective in the early periods than later. 
Viewing that impacts of QE announcements on the mortgage rate might vary according to 
different announcement types (i.e., increase or decrease purchases), assets to be purchased (i.e., 
MBSs, Treasury securities or both) and distinct rounds of QE (i.e., QE1, QE2, OT and QE3), I 
group the announcements and rerun the regressions. The unexpected announcements of increase in 
MBS purchases shocked the mortgage rate downward more than the Treasury rate on average, 
which led to the shrinking spread between these two rates and decreased risk of holding mortgage 
securities over Treasury bonds. 
To check the model robustness, two macroeconomic indicators (i.e., the Unemployment 
rate and CPI) and two mortgage rate determinants (i.e., Case-Shiller Home Price Index and also 
                                                          
4 In this paper, “return” means the change of interest rates instead of the percentage change. I use “return” 
other than “change” to be consistent with the existing literature on event studies. 
5 Without notation, the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate indicate the 30-year mortgage rate and the 30-
year Treasury rate correspondingly in this paper. 
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Unemployment rate) from the studies of Hancock and Passmore (2011, 2012, 2015) are added into 
the regressions. Since these variables are highly suspected to affect the mortgage rate and 
contaminate the QE announcement effects, I treat them as additional control variables and run 
regressions. The results are similar to the ones of model without including those three controls. 
Since the 10-year treasury rate is widely regarded as the risk-free benchmark of the 30-year 
mortgage rate (e.g., Patrabansh et. al, 2014), I replace the 30-year Treasury rate with the 10-year 
Treasury rate as a control variable in my model and find that the results do not change much.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 1 gives the background and introduction. 
Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 describes the data sources and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 shows the event study methodology and model selection. Section 5 discusses 
the results. Section 6 analyzes the case when QE events are grouped by the type of announcements 
and the round of QE. Section 7 demonstrates two robustness checks and section 8 concludes the 
findings. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Previous Literature on QE Announcement Effects on Interest Rates and Asset Prices 
A large amount of literature focuses on estimating the direct effects of QE announcements 
on decreasing long-term interest rates and on cutting term premia. Wright (2012) estimates a VAR 
model with daily data to access the Fed’s QE effects on various long- term interest rates. He 
concludes that the interest rates have higher variance during QE announcement days than the 
variance during no announcement days. Although QE shocks had effects on both long-term interest 
rates and corporate bond yields, the effect decayed fast. He also claims that the monetary policy 
surprises had smaller effects on private sector rates than on Treasury yields. Jarrow and Li (2012) 
evaluate the effects of Fed’s QEs (i.e., QE1 and QE2) on US term premia of interest rates by using 
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the arbitrage-free term structure model. They find that QE can affect the long-term bond yields 
which are averages of forward rates over a bond’s maturity. Li and Wei (2012) estimate effects of 
QE1, QE2 and OT on US term premia by using the similar model as Jarrow and Li (2012). They 
conclude that QE1, QE2 and MEP combined result in a decrease of about 100 basis points on the 
10-year treasury yield. 
Some researchers try to find the relationship of QE announcements and credit risks. 
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013) utilize the “identification-through-heterogeneity” approach by 
Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004) to conclude that QE announcements lead to 
significant reduction of risks for overall investment- and speculative-grade corporate credits. Albu, 
Lupu, Calin and Popovici (2014) consider the CDS rate as the credit risk indicator and incorporate 
the GARCH model to obtain abnormal returns and squared abnormal returns within a 41-day 
window around QE announcements (i.e., 20 days before the QE event and 20 after). They find that 
the Fed’s QE announcements decreased abnormal returns of the CDS rate in some countries like 
Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Austria and Russia, while increased in other countries such as Poland, 
Hungary and Ukraine.  
Hancock and Passmore (2011) evaluate effects of the Fed’s MBS purchase program in 
2008 (part of QE1) on mortgage rates and MBS yields. They discuss the determinants of mortgage 
rates and MBS yields, and regress these two variables on their determinants respectively to estimate 
the signs and significances. Further, they regress changes of the Freddie Mac 30-year FRM on 
changes of the mortgage rate components over the MBS purchase program period and the following 
period to conclude that the program did put downward pressure on mortgage rates. Hollifield (2011) 
comments on Hancock and Passmore (2011) and points out two drawbacks in their research which 
represent a nonlinear relationship between MBS yields and their determinants, and endogenous 
right-hand side regression variables to the Fed’s MBS purchase program. Hancock and Passmore 
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(2012) extend the data to include QE2 and OT, modify the determination models of mortgage rates 
and MBS yields, and model the relation between these two variables. After regressing residuals 
from regression of the MBS yield on the Fed asset holding proxy, excess reserve proxy and controls, 
they conclude that the “portfolio rebalancing” channel and “excess reserves” channel of QE are 
jointly effective but work in opposite directions6. Hancock and Passmore (2015) use a co-integrated, 
error- correction model to estimate the “stock” and “flow” effects7 of the Fed’s QE on MBS yields 
and mortgage rates. Different from their previous research, they account for the separate QE rounds 
(QE1, QE2, OT and QE3) by defining a dummy for each round. They conclude that the “portfolio 
rebalancing” channel is a more important consideration for QE transmission than other channels. 
They also indicate that the “stock” effect dominates the “flow” effect of the Fed’s QE on MBS 
yields and mortgage rates. 
Di Maggio et al. (2016) use micro-level mortgage market data to analyze the interest rate 
movements and the origination volumes of assets in different rounds of QE. They find that the 
interest rates and origination volumes depend on the segmentation of the market and the types of 
assets purchased. Mortgage rates decreased in larger magnitude in QE1 than in QE2 since the Fed 
only purchased Treasury bonds in QE2, and “purchases of GSE-guaranteed MBSs in QE1 increased 
GSE-eligible mortgage originations more than the origination of GSE-ineligible mortgages.” 
 
2.2 Previous Literature on Event Studies 
The event study methodology has been widely used by researchers to evaluate effects of 
                                                          
6 They observe that an increase in the Fed asset holdings corresponding to the increased demand for MBSs 
increased MBS prices, decreased MBS yields and decreased mortgage rates. On the other hand, additional 
excess reserves created by QE in the banking system decreased MBS prices, increased MBS yields and 
increased mortgage rates. 
7 The stock effect means the effect of increases in the Fed’s asset holdings, while the flow effect means the 
effect of QE announcements as we focus on in this paper. 
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economic events on asset prices. Dolley (1933) firstly uses event study to measure effects of stock 
splits on stock prices. During the 1930s and 1960s, event study estimation is refined by several 
researchers, including Myers and Bakay (1948), Baker (1956,1957,1958), Ashley (1962), Ball and 
Brown (1968), and Fama et al. (1969).  
Generally, there are two approaches to event studies. The traditional 2-step approach 
involves predicting the normal return by using various regression models and then calculating the 
abnormal return (AR) as the difference between the actual return and the predicted normal return 
(Fama et al., 1969). The regression 1-step approach incorporates regression models where the 
regression coefficient of an event dummy is regarded as the event effect (a.k.a., abnormal return 
due to the event) on the event date (Gibbons, 1980). Karafiath (1988) proves that the same results 
can be generated by using either approach. Ongena et al. (2003) use the regression approach event 
study to examine the distressed bank announcement effects on stock prices of related firms. Further, 
Mckenzie et al. (2004) introduces the GARCH (1,1) extension to regression analysis in event 
studies. They compare OLS, GARCH (1,1) and GARCH (1,1) with Student’s t distributed error 
term to conclude that although these three models are all powerful enough to find significant ARs, 
the third approach is most powerful in terms of small levels of abnormal performance.  
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) generalize the previous literature and write a chapter 
of event study analysis focusing on the traditional approach in their book. They define the AR of a 
security (i.e., the actual return minus the normal return which is estimated by models) over the 
event window as the effect of earnings announcement on firm’s equity value. They suggest that 
normal returns can be calculated by using “constant mean return model”, “market model”, 
“economics model” and other models. In addition to testing the significance of individual ARs, 
they also aggregate the ARs within one event window to find cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
and standardized CAR (SCAR). By testing the significance of CARs, the overall inferences for the 
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event of interest can be drawn. A recent comprehensive analysis of traditional event study is done 
by Kothari and Warner (2007). They claim that recently two main changes in the event study 
methodology include using more frequent data (daily or intraday) and sophistication of estimating 
and testing ARs. They review and generalize different aggregating and testing methods of ARs, 
and they also mention cross-correlation issue and suggest solutions. 
On the basis of Gibbons (1980), Binder (1985) proposes the multivariate regression model 
(MVRM) strategy to gauge the event effect on asset prices if there are N assets to be considered. 
He argues that MVRM method does better estimation when “the event occurs in the same calendar 
period for every firm” to avoid violation of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) residuals 
than using the first approach (Fama et al., 1969). He also indicates five different tests (i.e., Rao’s, 
F, Wald, Log Likelihood Ratio and LM tests) to examine the joint significance of regression 
coefficient estimates. To account for contemporaneous correlation and overlapping event issues of 
cross-sectional average CARs, Ongena et al. (2003) and Degrys et al. (2009) suggest using 
bootstrapped regression residuals to generate distribution of estimates (ARs).  
CARs calculated by both event study approaches can be treated as dependent variables in 
analyzing other factors affecting their magnitudes. Ongena and Roscovan (2013) combine the 
market model and regression approach to investigate the bank loan announcement effects on 
borrower stock returns. They calculate ARs and CARs for stock returns of 985 firms which 
announced a loan agreement with a bank during 1980 and 2003 by adjusting five different event 
window sizes. They further regress the CARs on the bank origin variable and other controls to find 
effects of the bank origin on bank specified CARs during bank loan announcements days. Li and 
Ongena (2015) combine the market model and traditional approach to find the ARs and CARs of 
borrower stocks during bank loan announcement days by adjusting seven different event window 
sizes. Then they regress CARs on the financial crisis dummy and other controls to find differences 
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in CARs corresponding to bank loan announcements before and during financial crisis.   
 
2.3 Previous Literature Analyzing QE Announcement Effects Using Event Studies 
Some researchers incorporate event studies to analyze QE effects. Swanson (2011) uses 
event studies to examine the QE announcement effects on Treasury yields during OT in the 1960’s 
and QE2. Using the regression approach, Glick and Leduc (2012) consider the first principal 
component of yield changes of 2-, 5-, 10- and 30- year U.S. bond futures in a 2-hour window 
(Wright, 2012) as the Fed’s QE announcement shock and employ event studies to analyze QE 
announcement effects on financial market. Patrabansh et al. (2014) apply the traditional event study 
method to show how the 10-year Treasury yield responded to the Fed’s QE announcement. They 
created imbalanced event windows of different sizes to analyze the pre-event and after-event 
changes of the Treasury yield. 
Kozicki, Santor and Suchanek (2015) use both traditional and regression approaches of 
event studies to analyze the Fed’s LSAP announcement effects on commodity prices and 
international spillovers. For regression approach, they regress the commodity returns on event 
dummies and other explanatory variables and they also model the regression residuals by GARCH 
(1,1) to account for conditional heteroscedasticity. For traditional approach, they incorporate 
“constant mean return model” and “market model” to find ARs. By using both approaches, they 
find the same results: LSAP announcements did not lead to higher commodity prices in general but 
appreciated the commodity exporters’ currencies and brought gains to their stock markets. 
There are drawbacks of using event study to identify QE shocks. Foerster and Cao (2013) 
argue that QE effects are still uncertain for multiple reasons: (1) Few observations; (2) Isolating 
the impact of QE is difficult; (3) Market expectations toward QE announcements are uncertain. 
They also suspect that the conventional event study will understate the QE effects since it only 
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captures the immediate response instead of the long-run effects and it ignores the expectation of a 
QE announcement that may alter interest rates before the time window. They carry out a survey 
and measure the news coverage and interest search to conclude that the expectation of QEs exerts 
downward pressure on interest rates prior to the announcements which is consistent with their 
hypothesis. 
 
3. Data 
The 30-year fixed mortgage rate (FRM) is used in this paper since it is the most widely-
used yield in the United States for financing a single-family house. Specifically, the mortgage rate 
is daily overnight 30-year US home mortgage national average from Bankrate. As an indicator of 
long-term debts, the 30-year FRM is intensively affected by its benchmark- 30-year Treasury rate8 
which is found at U.S. Treasury’s website. For reference, I also find daily Freddie Mac 30-year 
current coupon yield from Bloomberg. The data sample used in my study are from January 2, 2008 
to December 31, 2015 which covers the whole Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)9 period. However, as a 
comparison to the period before ZLB, I plot these three data series for a longer period from January 
3, 2000 to December 31, 2015 in Figure 1. 
From Figure 1, we can see that the correlations between two of these three series are high. 
Before QE period, all three series stayed in high levels. Then they all tumbled during the initiation 
of QE1, QE2 and OT, rallied to relatively high levels when OT ended, and were gradually declining 
in QE tapering. During each QE round, the rates dropped sharply when additional purchase 
programs were announced. There is a clear evidence that QE announcements had influences on 
                                                          
8 10-year Treasury rate is regarded as the benchmark by some researchers, we show that using either the 
10-year or 30-year Treasury rate in our research will create similar results in robustness check part. 
9 I only use data from ZLB period for regression analysis in this paper. If a longer period is used, the 
conventional monetary policy tool would be effective and bias the results. 
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long term interest rates. 
Although the MBS current coupon yield and the Treasury rate were always below mortgage 
rate, the spreads between two of the three were changing largely over time during QE. As we know, 
the mortgage rate- Treasury rate spread can be decomposed into the mortgage rate-MBS yield 
spread and the MBS yield- Treasury rate spread. The mortgage rate- Treasury rate spread is the 
measure of investor’s gross risk compensation of holding mortgages (e.g., prepayment risk and 
default risk) over Treasury bonds. The first component, the mortgage rate- MBS yield spread, 
reflects banks’ origination costs, servicing costs, prepayment risk and credit risk of mortgages. The 
second component, the MBS yield- Treasury rate spread, indicates the credit risk of holding MBSs 
instead of government securities (usually risk-free for US). Figure 2 illustrates the time series of 
three spreads in QE period. 
From the top graph of Figure 2, we can observe that the mortgage rate -Treasury rate spread 
was soaring up before QE1 and then plummeted down to a low level at about 50 basis point during 
QE1. Then the spread went up after QE1, moved down to a historical low at about 30 basis point 
during QE2 and rose up to around 100 basis point after QE2 and before OT. During OT and QE3 
periods, the spread was moving within a range of 50 to 120 basis point. The spread swelled again 
and then went down to around 100 basis point after QE3. As shown in the graph, the spread (or 
gross mortgage risk) was reduced after QE announcements, and the announcements in QE1 were 
more effective than those in later QEs. 
From the mid and bottom graphs of Figure 2, we notice that although the two spread 
components followed the similar trend as the mortgage rate- Treasury rate spread during QE1 and 
QE2, they were varying differently during OT and QE3. The mortgage rate- MBS yield spread 
moved up during OT, peaked when OT and QE3 coexisted, and then dropped to a steady level until 
the end of QE3. In comparison, the MBS yield- Treasury rate spread was declining during OT, 
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troughed when OT and QE3 coexisted, and then went up until the end of QE3. Moreover, the MBS 
yield was below the Treasury rate as negative MBS yield- Treasury rate spread existed for most of 
the time during QE period. That being said, the credit risk of the MBS was fairly low during the 
QE period and was even lower than the Treasury bond. 
In this paper, however, I only focus on the mortgage rate, the Treasury rate and the spread 
between them10. The summary statistics for all data series used in this paper are reported in Table 
1. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 QE Announcement Dates for Event Study 
There are several sources from which I extract QE announcement events, these sources 
include announcements after the FOMC meetings, the Fed testimonies, the Fed Chairman’s 
speeches, the Press Conference Reports and the Fed minutes released. Since there is no official 
version of QE announcement events timeline published by the Federal Reserve, I could only 
identify the events from previous literature. There is a consensus among previous researchers 
(Gagnon et al., 2011; Woodford, 2012; Giannone and Altavilla, 2015; Diana and Hancock, 2015; 
Glick and Leduc, 2015; Hattori et al., 2016) that there were a total of 13 QE announcements during 
QE1 and QE2. These include 10 FOMC announcements and three Bernanke’s Speeches from 
November 25, 2008 to November 3, 2010. I include all 13 events during QE1 and QE2 in this paper. 
For OT (a.k.a. MEP) period, I identify three events mentioned in Bowman et al. (2015) and Borrallo 
et al. (2015), and one event mentioned in Diana and Hancock (2015). Among these four events, 
two hinted the possible OT program and the other two were official announcements of launching 
                                                          
10 The MBS yield is highly volatile and has a tick frequency, event study based on daily data might have 
issues. 
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OT. For QE3, I combine the events used in Bowman et al. (2015) and Diana and Hancock (2015) 
and delete one “irrelevant” event11 to a total of four events. For the QE tapering period, the first 
four events are taken from Giannone and Altavilla (2015), three of which indicated the decreasing 
pace of asset purchases and one was the official announcement of tapering. I update the data to 
include another 10 events concerning stepwise QE tapering procedure by using my own discretion12 
until the end of QE program on October 29, 2014. In all, a sample of 35 events are used in this 
paper. 
An announcement is identified as a QE announcement based on two criteria. One is that 
the announcement should mention the QE program, either an indication of launching a new round 
of QE or the detail for types and quantities of asset the Fed planned to purchase. Another is that the 
announcement should contain news to the market, which means the announcement should not say 
the same thing about QE as the last QE announcement did. All 35 events in my study satisfy both 
criteria and are reported in Table 2. 
 
4.2 Event Window, OLS Regression and Issues 
I measure the effect of QE announcements on the mortgage rate by employing the event-
study analysis in terms of regressions. I choose three different event window sizes (i.e., 1-day, 3-
day and 5-day)13 for each of the 35 events in my sample and run regressions according to each 
window size. Specifically, a 1-day window only identifies the event day on which there was a QE 
                                                          
11 The announcement on March 20, 2013 is considered irrelevant to QE since it only remarked the 
improved economic and labor market conditions. It was treated as an unconventional monetary policy 
announcement (i.e., forward guidance) in Bowman et al. (2015), but should not be regarded as a QE 
announcement here. 
12 My discretion is based on 2 criteria discussed in the next paragraph. 
13 As is common in event studies (identification arises from the exact time an event occurs), longer-term 
event windows are not considered in my study. In the long term, other news will also affect the mortgage 
rate. 
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announcement; A 3-day window consists of one pre-event day, the event day and one post-event 
day; A 5-day window is comprised of two pre-event days, the event day and two post-event days. 
Since I focus on how QE announcement affects the change from t-1 to t other than level of 
variables at t, changes (i.e., the first differences) of variables are used in regressions. After running 
augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test on levels and changes of variables (i.e., 30-year mortgage 
rate, 30-year Treasury rate, and the spread between these two), I conclude that the changes of these 
variables are covariance stationary and not over differenced. The test results can be found in Table 
A1 in Appendix. 
Instead of finding the abnormal return (AR) as the difference between the observed and 
predicted return in the traditional way with non-overlapping event windows, I use the regression-
based event study methodology to allow for overlapping event windows14. The coefficient of the 
event dummy corresponding to event k on day t  is the abnormal return15 of mortgage rate denoted 
as ktAR . I run four different regressions and adjust for three different event window sizes (5-day, 
3-day and 1-day). The four regressions are 
 1,0 1,1 1 1,'t t t tMR TR D         ,  (1) 
 2,0 2 2,'t t tMR D      ,  (2) 
 3,0 3 3,'     t t tTR D , (3) 
 4,0 4 4,'t t tSpread D      , (4) 
where tMR is the change of 30-year mortgage rate from day t-1 to day t, tTR is the change of 
                                                          
14 From the data, the windows for event on 11/25/2008 and the one on 12/1/2008 overlapped. 
15 Usually return means the percentage change of a variable, here I name change of rate as return since 
mortgage and Treasury rates are already in percent. Also, since “abnormal return” is widely used by 
researchers doing event studies, it is used in this paper instead of “abnormal change” to avoid confusions. 
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30-year Treasury rate from day t-1 to day t, and tSpread is the change of spread between 30-year 
mortgage rate and Treasury rate from day t-1 to day t. The Spread measures the perceived riskiness 
of holding mortgages over Treasury bonds (i.e., the risk premium). tD is a 1L column vector of 
event dummies taking value 1 on that day and 0 on other days. L equals to 35 for 1-day window, 
105 for 3-day window and 175 for 5-day window. Equation (1) indicates a market model 
regression16 in which the change of the mortgage rate ( tMR ) is regressed on the change of the 
market rate ( tTR ) and a set of daily event dummies ( tD ). The vector of coefficients 1  measure 
the daily abnormal returns of the mortgage rate on day t. Equation (2) is a constant mean return 
regression which is not controlling for the change of the market rate ( tTR ). This regression can 
be regarded as a robustness check for regression of equation (1). Equation (3)17 estimates the 
relation between tTR and tD , and equation (4) combines tMR  and tTR  as one dependent 
variable. 
For 5-day and 3-day window cases, I add up the abnormal return ( ktAR ) for each day t  
from an event window of event k  to get the cumulative abnormal return ( kCAR ), which can be 
expressed as 
 
2
1
t
k kt
t t
CAR AR

 , (5) 
where 1t  and 2t  represent the lower and upper bounds of days in an event window. For 1-day 
window, kCAR is the same as kAR .  
                                                          
16 The name “market model regression” can be found in Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009). 
17 A constant mean return regression is preferred to a market model regression here because there is no 
single reference series (market rate) that simulates or determine the Treasury rate. The same reason applies 
to equation (4). 
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There are issues for OLS regression-based event study. If I use time series data of interest 
rates, the error terms of regression might be serially correlated and heteroskedastic. Also, due to 
the relatively short time period, the error terms might not be normally distributed (Makenzie et al., 
2004). A more sophisticated model should be developed to account for these concerns.  
 
4.3 ARMA and GARCH determination 
To see the possible serial correlations of dependent variables in four regressions (equation 
(1) to (4)) and determine the lag length of autoregressive (AR) terms18 in the mean models if serial 
correlations are found, I plot the autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function 
(PACF) of tMR ,  tTR  and tSpread  with a maximum of 20 lags in Figure 3, Panel A. 
Although ACF and PACF are insignificant at most of the lags, there are significant values of ACF 
and PACF at several lags. The negative serial correlations for the first few lags indicate that the 
standard errors of coefficients for lagged variables are fairly big. High PACF of tMR  at lag 4, 7, 
10 and 12 and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) both suggest AR(7), AR(10) or AR(12)19. 
Although AR(7) has greater AIC than the other two, I still pick it as the favorite model for tMR  
to avoid the “overfitting” problem (Enders, 200920) in an ARMA model with long lags. Similarly, 
AIC selects AR(5) and AR(6) models to fit  tTR and tSpread .  
After the mean models are determined, I check GARCH and ARCH errors by plotting ACF 
and PACF of the squared residuals in mean models fitting tMR ,  tTR  and tSpread  in Figure 
                                                          
18 Moving Average (MA) terms are not included in the mean model for the reason that the error terms 
capture QE announcement effects and including MA terms would contaminate those effects when we 
estimate the full models later. Also, AR terms are simpler and sufficient enough to solve serial correlation 
in our model. 
19 AIC for these 3 models are -6263.059, -6266.326 and -6269.069 accordingly. 
20 He argues that long lags of ARMA are due to “idiosyncrasies” in a particular sample which are not 
actually capturing the data-generating process. 
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3, Panel B. The graphs show that the mean models for all three data series exhibit significant 
evidence of GARCH and ARCH errors. To find the appropriate lag length of GARCH and ARCH 
and distribution of errors, I start from GARCH(1,1) with a standard normal distribution 
(GARCH(1,1)-N) to estimate the error term for each of the three mean models. The detailed model 
selection processes are reported in Table 3.   
In the case of error terms in AR(7) fitting tMR , although the parameter estimates of 
GARCH(1,1)-N are all significant, the p-value of Ljung-Box test on squared standardized residual 
at the first lag is 0.03115 which indicates GARCH effects and insufficiency of GARCH(1,1)-N. 
Then I increase the lag length of GARCH and ARCH, and compare different GARCH(p,q) models. 
Except for GARCH(1,2)-N, the models with other combination of lag lengths show either 
insignificant parameter estimates or are suspected to over-fit the data. Thus, GARCH(1,2)-N is the 
next model I am interested in, the result of which is shown in the first column of Table 3, Panel A.  
To test the normality, I plot the quantile of standardized residuals against the quantile of a standard 
normal distribution in Figure 4, Panel A and find that the points are off the 45-degree line at both 
ends, which indicates a fatter tailed distribution. Then GARCH(1,2) with a t distribution 
(GARCH(1,2)-t) is estimated and the result is reported in the second column of Table 3, Panel A. 
From the result, the degree of freedom of t-distribution is as low as 3.673 and Pearson Goodness-
of-Fit test shows that t-distribution is better fitted than normal distribution. 
Since there is a high probability of negative returns than positive returns of the mortgage 
rate during QE period, the distribution of error terms might skew to the left. I then estimate GARCH 
model assuming a skewed t distribution21 (GARCH(1,2)-skewed t) and report the result in the third 
column of Table 3, Panel A. We can see that both Pearson Goodness-of-fit test and AIC are in favor 
                                                          
21 First introduced by Theodossiou (1998), skewed t is an extension to general t distribution when the 
distribution of the data has both excess kurtosis and skewness. 
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of GARCH(1,2)-skewed t, and the distribution of errors skews to the left with a skewness22 of 1.079. 
We observe that the summation of parameter estimates in variance equation is close to one23, which 
suggests a unit root in GARCH process. To deal with this issue, I employ IGARCH(1,2)-skewed t 
model and the result is found in the fourth column of Table 3, Panel A. Although AIC increases 
from -3.466 to -3.450, IGARCH is still favored since the restriction on coefficients24 in IGARCH 
boosts the AIC (Engle and Bollerslev, 1986). Furthermore, the Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plot in 
Figure 4, Panel A shows that points mostly drop along the 45-degree line for standardized errors in 
IGARCH(1,2)-skewed t model. 
In case of variance reflecting the risk, I also perform GARCH in mean model and report 
the result at the last column of Table 3, Panel A. The risk premium parameter estimate is 0.063 and 
insignificant, which suggests that the variance term should not show up in the mean equation.  
To measure the possible leverage effect25 within tMR , the Engle-Ng Sign Bias Test
26 (Engle and 
Ng, 1993) is then performed. Since no leverage effect is found at the conventional significance 
level, the EGARCH or TGARCH models are ruled out. In conclusion, AR(7)-IGARCH(1,2)-
skewed t model is appropriate and sufficient in estimating tMR .  
Follow the same strategy, I conclude that AR(5)-IGARCH(1,1)-skewed t and AR(6)-
                                                          
22 The skewness of 
,i te is the third moment of the standard score of ,i te . The distribution of ,i te is left-
skewed when skewness is a positive number. 
23 The 3 parameter estimates in variance equation are 0.162, 0.248 and 0.584, the sum of which is 0.994. 
24 IGARCH sets constant term to 0 and restrict the summation of coefficients to 1. 
25 Leverage effect means “unexpected drop in price (i.e., here is  tMR ) increases predictable volatility 
more than an unexpected drop in price of similar magnitude” (Engle and Ng, 1993).  
26 Engle-Ng test sign bias test is based on the regression 
2
1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1(1 )t t t t t t te a b S b S b S  
  
          , 
where 2te is the standardized residual ( /t t  ) from GARCH model, 1tS

 is a dummy variables taking the 
value 1 if 1t  is negative and 0 otherwise, and t is the error term. Sign bias, negative sign bias or positive 
sign bias exists when 1b , 2b or 3b is significantly different from 0 respectively. Joint effect exists when the 
hypothesis of 1 2 3 0b b b   is rejected. 
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IGARCH(1,1)-skewed t are the best models in fitting  tTR  and tSpread respectively. The 
determination processes of these two models are reported in Table 3, Panel B and C, and the QQ 
plots of standardized errors are found in Figure 4, Panel B and C.  
To see if the models are adequate, I plot the standardized residuals and squared 
standardized residuals of three models fitting tMR ,  tTR  and tSpread in Figure 5. From the 
figure, we can observe that ACF and PACF at all lags are close to one and insignificant, which 
indicate that both serial correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity are well controlled. 
 
5. Results 
The regression results are reported in Table 4, 5 and 6 for 1-day, 3-day and 5-day event 
window cases. I report abnormal returns (ARs) on event days for 1-day window case and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in event windows for 3-day and 5-day window cases. The 
ARs for calculating CARs are not reported in Table 5 and 6 but can be found in Appendix, Table 
A2 and A3. Most of the ARs in 1-day window and CARs in 3-day and 5-day windows for the same 
event followed the similar signs and significances with few exceptions. The magnitudes of CARs 
in 3-day and 5-day windows were not always greater than those of ARs on event days for the same 
event, which suggests the high volatility of ARs within an event window. Generally, it is regarded 
that negative AR and CAR of mortgage rate were found when a new or expansion of MBS purchase 
was announced, while positive AR and CARs of mortgage rate were found when an end date or 
tapering of MBS purchase was announced. However, we find more interesting results when we 
look at QE announcement effects event by event.   
Large and negative ARs and CARs of the mortgage rate were found during the days when 
new rounds of QE or QE tapering were hinted, the effects from any further news conveying a 
continuation of the current QE policy dwindled. For example, when QE1 was first announced on 
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11/25/2008 for purchasing GSE debts and MBSs, ARs and CARs of both the mortgage rate and the 
Treasury rate were significantly negative for all three window sizes. Specifically, ARs of the 
mortgage rate and the Treasury rate were -0.121 percent and -0.166 percent on event day, while 
CARs of them were -0.149 and -0.199 percent in 3-day window. For other QE events followed27, 
AR and CARs were all negative but in smaller magnitudes. On 5/22/2013, when Bernanke 
remarked the potential tapering of asset purchases during his speech, ARs of mortgage rate and 
Treasury rate went to 0.068 and 0.074 percent on that day, while CARs of them were 0.120 and 
0.052 percent in 5-day window. For other QE tapering events followed28, AR and CARs were all 
positive but in smaller magnitudes. Significant ARs and CARs were also found in other 
announcement dates suggesting new rounds of QE29. 
Although macroeconomic news effects on both the mortgage rate and Treasury were not 
significant on average when modeled into the regressions in robustness check part 7.1, a few 
macroeconomic news largely deviating from market expectation on the same days of QE events 
pollute the announcement effects of Treasury rate more than those of mortgage rate. For example, 
when Bernanke mentioned additional QE “should further action” on 8/27/2010, there was supposed 
to be downward pressure for both Treasury rate and mortgage rate. However, AR on event day and 
CAR in 3-day window of mortgage rate were significant and negative at -0.175 and -0.127 percent, 
while those of Treasury rate were significant and positive at 0.165 and 0.030 percent. Only when I 
increase the window size to 5-day, the CARs of both mortgage rate and Treasury rate switch to be 
negative. The significant and positive AR and CARs of Treasury rate can be attributed to a better-
                                                          
27 Events on 1/28/2009 and 3/18/2009. Events on 12/1/2008 and 12/16/2008 are not counted since they both 
focused on Treasury bond purchases. 
28 Events on 6/19/2013 and 12/18/2013. 
29 They are 8/27/2010 for QE2, 8/9/2011 for OT, 8/22/2012 for QE3. 
21 
 
than-expected report on U.S. economic growth by Department of Commerce30, which did not affect 
mortgage rate that much. 
Market expectations before QE announcements had strong effect on both mortgage and 
Treasury rate on event days. For example, the Fed on 9/13/2012 announced an increase in purchases 
of MBSs, though public expected the purchase to be mix of the two31. On the event day, a significant 
and negative AR of mortgage rate at -0.046 percent coexisted with an insignificant and positive AR 
of Treasury rate at 0.047 percent, while CARs of the mortgage rate in 3-day and 5-day windows 
were -0.080 and -0.045 percent compared to CARs of the Treasury rate at 0.265 and 0.230 percent. 
The convergence of mortgage rate and Treasury rate also lead to negative AR on event day at -
0.104, and CARs in 3-day and 5-day windows of spread at -0.272 and -0.208. Another good 
example is associated with a QE event being widely anticipated. On 11/3/2010, the Fed officially 
announced the purchase of $600 billion of longer term Treasury bonds which was supposed to put 
downward pressure on 30-year Treasury rate. However, market expected the Fed’s purchase about 
$750 billion Treasury bonds on QE2 and the purchase amount announced was actually lower than 
expected (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). AR on event day and CARs in 3-day and 
5-day event windows of Treasury rate were all significant and positive for this event. Although 
mortgage rate seemed to be producing positive AR and CARs following Treasury rate, the AR and 
CARs of mortgage rate after controlling for change of Treasury rate were insignificant and negative 
at -0.055, -0.014 and -0.029. Again, on 6/20/2012 when market had already predicted the extended 
OT program given weak economic data32, the AR and CARs were not consistent. On 12/12/2012, 
since the purchase of Treasury securities was widely expected by investors33, AR and CARs of 
                                                          
30 Department of Commerce reported real GDP growth of 1.6% in second quarter of 2010, which was 
higher than the consensus value of 1.3%. 
31 See Bloomberg article 9/13/2012. 
32 See Bloomberg article 6/20/2012. 
33 See Bloomberg article 12/12/2012. 
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Treasury rate were all positive and significant at 0.08, 0.124 and 0.100.  
If no other events happened on the same day, an unexpected QE event of increase in MBS 
purchases shocked the mortgage rate more than Treasury rate, while an unexpected QE event of 
increase in Treasury purchases shocked the Treasury rate more than the mortgage rate34. For 
instance, on 12/1/2008, when Bernanke mentioned possible longer-term Treasury bond purchases, 
there was a tremendous downward pressure for Treasury rate but not so much for mortgage rate. 
AR on event day and CAR in 3-day window of Treasury rate were significant at -0.166 and -0.342 
percent, while those of mortgage rate were both insignificant at 0.011 and 0.005 percent. The 
different signs in AR or CAR of mortgage rate and Treasury rate lead to large and positive AR and 
CAR of spread. The similar results applied to 3/18/2009 when the Fed officially announced 
Treasury bond purchase in QE1, 8/10/2010 when the Fed announced to reinvest principal payments 
from MBSs in Treasury bonds, 9/21/2011 when the Fed announced to purchase long-term and sell 
same amount of short-term Treasury bonds, and 9/13/2012 when the Fed announced the additional 
purchase of MBSs in QE3. 
After comparing ARs and CARs for different window sizes, I find that the signs and 
magnitudes of ARs and CARs were not consistent for a few events. When market took days after 
the QE announcement to absorb the news or the news had been already priced in the days leading 
up to the announcement, significant CARs and insignificant ARs would be found for that event 
(e.g., events on 8/12/2009 and 7/15/2014). When the effect of QE announcement was transitory, 
insignificant CARs and significant ARs would be found for that event (e.g., events on 12/12/2012 
and 7/30/2014). 
Since there are right hand side lagged dependent variables in all four regressions (i.e., 
                                                          
34 An exception is the first QE announcement on 11/25/2008 which announced only MBS purchase, but 
both mortgage rate and treasury rate had significantly large and negative ARs and CARs. 
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equation (6)- (9)), the announcement effects on dependent variables will last into the future through 
them. In long run, the total AR of the mortgage rate can be calculated from equation (6) by  
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and total CAR (TCAR) of the mortgage rate by 
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TARs and TCARs of treasury rate and spread could also be derived by similar strategy. Since both 
TARs and TCARs are non-linear transformations of regression parameters, I incorporate Delta 
Method35 to find the asymptotic standard errors for them. Table 7 reports the estimates and standard 
errors of TARs for 1-day window and TCARs for 3-day and 5-day window in 4 regressions. 
From Table 7, TAR and TCARs for the same event had smaller magnitudes than AR and 
CARs, while the signs and significances did not vary so much. That being said, although the long 
run effects of QE announcement on the mortgage rate and the spread shrunk in long run, the 
directions of long run effects stayed the same as short run effects. The muted long run effects are 
due to the negative autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations within the data series as we found 
earlier. Moreover, the long run effects were less volatile than short run effects since the standard 
errors of TAR and TCARs for the same event decreased compared to those of AR and CARs. 
Next, I aggregate the ARs across all events in each round of QE to find the cumulative 
effects of announcements. Table 8 reports the cumulative effects for 1-day, 3-day and 5-day 
                                                          
35 The Delta Method estimates the standard errors of 1st order Taylor expansion of ( )f  , which can be 
expressed as ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )TSE f f Cov f       . In the equation, ( )f  is a transformation of regression 
parameter vector  and ( )f  is the gradient of ( )f  . Here, ( )f  is TAR or TCAR. 
24 
 
window cases from my estimation and the ones from other studies, and Figure 6 displays these 
cumulative effects on graphs. There is a general agreement that QE announcements had sizeable 
effect on lowering long-term Treasury rates and mortgage rates (MBS yields in other studies). In 
addition, my estimation is consistent with other studies that cumulative effects on both the mortgage 
rate and the Treasury rate were greater in QE1 than in other rounds of QE. However, the magnitudes 
of the effects in QE1 in my study were only half of those in other studies36. The evidence suggests 
that event studies using OLS without controlling for the serial correlation and the conditional 
heteroscedasticity within the data series overestimate the QE announcement effects on interest rates 
in general. 
I also find that, other than in QE3, the spread between the mortgage rate and the Treasury 
rate increased around days of announcements cumulatively in all rounds of QE. It is known that 
the purpose of the Fed’s purchases of MBSs was to reduce the yield spread, which in turn lessened 
the credit spread for mortgage securities. However, the effects for events of different types cannot 
be observed and compared directly from accumulative effects during each round of QE as shown 
in Figure 6. In that sense, we have a reason to distinguish the announcements by type of asset the 
Fed announced to purchase and estimate their different influences on the mortgage rate and the 
Treasury rate. 
 
6. Events Grouped by Announcement Type and QE Round 
6.1 Regressions with Grouped Event Dummies 
In order to generalize QE announcement effects on the mortgage rate, I next group all QE 
                                                          
36 The cumulative abnormal returns of the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate for 1-day window in my 
study were -23 and -54 basis points, while those in other studies were all around -100 basis points. 
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events37 by type of asset purchased (i.e., the MBSs, the Treasury Securities or Both as shown in 
Table 2, Column 6), increase or decrease of purchase (i.e., as shown in Table 2, Column 6), and 
round of QE (i.e., QE1, QE2, OT, QE3 and tapering as shown in Table 2, Column 2). Dummy 
variables are created with value 1 on days of grouped event and 0 on other days. For example, the 
dummy variable “QE1_MBS_Increase” has value 1 on the days when Fed announced increase of 
MBS purchases during QE1 and 0 on other days. I replace the individual event dummies in equation 
(6) to (9) by the new dummies and run four regressions. The regression results for 1-day, 3-day and 
5-day windows are reported in Table 9, Panel A, B and C. 
Consistent with the result in Part 5, the events of increase in MBS purchases reduced the 
mortgage rate more than the Treasury rate, while the events of increase in Treasury purchases 
reduced the Treasury rate more than the mortgage rate on event days or in event windows38. From 
Table 9, Panel A, on event days of increase in MBS purchases in QE1 and QE3, ARs of the 
mortgage rate were large and negative at -0.095 and -0.046 percent, while ARs of the Treasury rate 
were small and positive at 0.004 and 0.047 percent. In longer window cases from Table 9, Panel B 
and C, CARs of the mortgage rate were significantly negative at -0.166 and -0.079 percent for 3-
day window, and -0.115 and -0.042 percent for 5-day window, while CARs of the Treasury rate 
were small or even positive at -0.018 and 0.264 percent for 3-day window, and 0.220 and 0.230 
percent for 5-day window. On the other hand, large and negative ARs and CARs of the Treasury 
rate were found during events of increase in Treasury purchases, but the mortgage rate was not 
significantly affected. For example, the AR on event day and CARs in 3-day and 5-day event 
                                                          
37 A total of 31 events are in the sample at this part. Event on 8/27/2010 is excluded since it is contaminated 
by better Economy report on the same day. Event on 11/3/2010, 6/20/2012 and 12/12/2012 are excluded 
given that these 3 events were well expected by the market. The descriptions of these four events can be 
found in Part 5. In fact, many of other researchers do the same thing by excluding those four events in their 
studies. After the deletion, my sample of events is consistent with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011), Bowman et al. (2015) and Borrallo et al. (2016) as discussed in the footnote under Table 8. 
38 ARs and CARs of mortgage rate I use here are from regressions controlling for Treasury rate. 
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windows of the Treasury rate for events of increase in Treasury purchases in QE1 were large and 
negative at -0.223, -0.358 and -0.651 percent, while those of the mortgage rate were minute or 
event positive at 0.010, 0.004 and -0.049 percent. The similar results apply to events of increase in 
Treasury purchases in other rounds of QE39 as well. 
Because of the different responses of the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate for these two 
types of events, the mortgage-Treasury rate spread moved to different directions. Generally, the 
spread narrowed during events of increase in MBS purchases, while the spread widened during 
events of increase in Treasury purchases. In the 5-day window case, CARs of the spread were -
0.318 and -0.208 percent for events of increase in MBS purchases in QE1 and QE3 respectively. 
In contrast, CARs of spread were 0.505, 0.083 and 0.279 percent for events of increase in Treasury 
purchases in QE1, QE2 and OT correspondingly. The similar results were found by using 1-day or 
3-day window sizes. In other words, the credit risk of holding MBSs over Treasury securities were 
reduced when the Fed announced to increase purchases of MBSs only, while the risk was 
intensified when Fed announced to increase purchases of Treasury securities only. 
The events of decrease in MBS purchases and decrease in Treasury purchases were not 
quite consistent with increased purchases. Although the event of decrease in MBS purchases in 
QE1 lead to positive ARs and CARs of both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate, the AR on 
event day and CARs in 3-day and 5-day event windows of the mortgage rate were all less than 
those of the Treasury rate. Moreover, CARs of the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate were both 
negative in 3-day and 5-day windows for event of decrease in Treasury purchases in QE1. 
QE Tapering events enhanced both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate, however, the 
effects were limited. The AR on the event day and CARs in 3-day and 5-day windows of the 
mortgage rate for tapering events were only 0.006, 0.021 and 0.032 percent, while those of the 
                                                          
39 Events of only increasing Treasury purchases happened in QE2 and OT periods too. 
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Treasury rate stayed as low as 0.008, 0.009 and 0.000 percent. As I showed in Part 5, although 
significant and positive AR on the event day and CARs in 3-day and 5-day windows of the 
mortgage rate and the Treasury rate existed during first few events in tapering period, the 
insignificant and smaller AR and CARs during latter events diluted the average effects of tapering 
events. 
 
6.2 Evolution of CARs for Grouped QE Events 
To see how the mortgage rate, the Treasury rate and the spread moved on each day in a 5-
day event window of grouped events, the evolutions of CARs in a 5-day event window are shown 
in Figure 7. 
Generally speaking, Figure 7 shows us that during QE events targeting at both MBS and 
Treasury purchases (i.e., in QE1, OT and QE3), the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate decreased 
either on event days or one day after event days. The decrease of the Treasury rate was larger in 
magnitude than the decrease of the mortgage rate which is in accordance to Wright’s (2012) finding 
of smaller effects on private sector rates than on Treasury yields of QE shocks. Moreover, on 
average the mortgage-Treasury rate spread expanded on event days and then narrowed the days 
after. 
From Figure 7, Panel A, during events of increase in MBS purchases (i.e., in QE1 and 
QE3), the mortgage rate declined considerably on event day and one day after the event day. 
Specifically, CARs of the mortgage rate one day after the event day slumped to -0.14 and -0.06 
percent for events in QE1 and QE3 respectively. However, from Figure 7, Panel C, during the same 
event, the Treasury rate increased on event day and one day after the event. Specifically, CARs of 
the Treasury rate one day after the event day surged to 0.19 and 0.29 percent for events in QE1 and 
QE3. 
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In contrast, from Figure 7, Panel A, during events of in increase Treasury purchases (i.e., 
in QE1, QE2 and OT), the mortgage rate barely declined or even rose up a bit on event day and 
days after the event day. CARs of the mortgage rate one day after the event day remained 0.00, -
0.02 and -0.01 percent for events in QE1, QE2 and OT respectively. In contrast, from Figure 7, 
Panel C, during the same event, the Treasury rate dropped sharply on the event day and after. CARs 
of the Treasury rate one day after the event day collapsed to -0.61, -0.13 and -0.50 percent for 
events in QE1, QE2 and OT. The evidence strongly supports the previous conclusion that events 
of increase in MBS purchases lowered the mortgage rate more than the Treasury rate, while events 
of increase in Treasury purchases lowered the Treasury rate more than the mortgage rate around 
event days. 
Again, from Figure 7, Panel D, the mortgage-treasury rate spread went down largely after 
increases in MBS purchases and went up generally after increases in Treasury purchases. The 
graphs show significant and negative CARs at -0.31 and -0.29 percent one day after the event day 
for events of MBS purchases in QE1 and QE3, while significant and positive CARs at 0.55, 0.06 
and 0.38 percent one day after the event day for events of Treasury purchases in QE1, QE2 and OT. 
The result is in line with the previous conclusion from regression analysis that announcements of 
increase in MBS purchases lessened the credit risk of holding mortgages over Treasury securities, 
while announcements of increase in Treasury security purchases augmented the risk. 
Part 6.1 shows that the tapering announcements had limited effects on the mortgage rate 
and the Treasury rate. This result also applies to here that the CARs of both rates were trending up 
by small magnitudes. The new evidence observed from Figure 7 is that the upward movement of 
the mortgage rate after tapering announcements was more persistent than that of the Treasury rate, 
which boosted the spread and increased the risk of holding mortgages over Treasury securities. 
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7. Robustness Checks 
7.1 Adding More Controls into the Model 
I check if my model is better fitted by adding more control variables. First, macroeconomic 
surprises are thought to have impact on interest rate. Thornton (2013) and Patrabansh et al. (2014) 
mention the abnormal changes of Treasury rate were attributed to both QE announcements and 
macroeconomic news. However, Altavilla and Giannone (2015) show that the effects of 
macroeconomic shock were “marginal” on average and the estimation results did not change so 
much with the inclusion of surprise components40. I pick unexpected changes of log(CPI) and 
unexpected changes of the unemployment rate (UER) to identify macroeconomic surprises41. 
Second, shocks to the determinants of mortgage rates and MBS yields might affect the 
mortgage rate. Hancock and Passmore (2011, 2012, 2015) propose some determinants of mortgage 
rates and MBS yields, from which I select the control variables by using two criteria. One is that 
the variables selected should not be significantly affected by QE announcements. The other one is 
that the variables should contain news about mortgage rates. Only two variables they proposed are 
in line with these two standards which are Case-Shiller Home Price Index (HPI) and unemployment 
rate (UER). From Hancock and Passmore (2011, 2012), HPI measures the costs of origination and 
servicing. Along with UER, they both reflect the credit risk of mortgage.  
Although the values of three control variables (i.e., ln( )CPI , ln( )HPI  and UER ) 
are monthly reported, the data are identified with respect to the dates they are announced. Since all 
three variables do not have unit root42, I use ARMA models to estimate the expected values of them. 
                                                          
40 They claim that since only important events are considered, the effect of which were tremendous and 
take over macroeconomic news within the event window. 
41 Unexpected change of GDP growth is another indicator of macroeconomic surprises. However, it is hard 
to estimate since quarterly GDP growth rate would be revised several times in a long time span by Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (or U.S. Department of Commerce). 
42 Dickey-Fuller unit root test results are found in Appendix, Table A1. 
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Then the unexpected part of these three variables equals to the value of original data minus the 
expected value. Based on AIC, the best models fitting ln( )CPI , ln( )HPI  and UER  are 
ARMA(3,2), ARMA(2,0) and ARMA(1,5) respectively43.  
Next, I run the four regressions as equation (6) to (9) by adding ln( )tCPI , ln( )tHPI ,
tUER , 1ln( )tCPI  , 1ln( )tHPI  , 1tUER  , 2ln( )tCPI  , 2ln( )tHPI  , 2tUER  to the right 
hand side of equations with 1-day, 3-day and 5-day windows. From the results, I find that values 
and significances of ARs and CARs with controls are similar to what I found without controls for 
all three window sizes. For that reason, I only report the coefficient estimates of these newly added 
control variables in the regressions for 5-day window44 in Table 10. From the table, most of the 
coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant and have small magnitudes and standard errors. 
Specifically, one unit change of control variables only accounts for less than 0.05 percent change 
of each dependent variable. In conclusion, the effects of control variables identifying 
macroeconomic shock and determining mortgage rate are trivial, thus we are not worried about not 
including them in the model. 
 
7.2 Using 10-year instead of 30-year Treasury Rate 
Since most of the 30-year mortgages are paid off or refinanced within 10 years, the 10-year 
Treasury rate is widely regarded as the risk- free rate determining the 30- year mortgage rate rather 
than the 30-year Treasury rate which is used in my model. In the period of our interest from 
1/1/2008 to 12/31/2015, the correlation between the 30-year mortgage rate and the 10-year 
Treasury rate is 0.912, which is greater than the correlation between the 30-year mortgage rate and 
                                                          
43 All 3 ARMA models are sufficient. From Appendix, Figure A1 and Figure A2, we can see that the ACF 
and PACF of residuals in 3 models for all lags are insignificant. 
44 Similar studies using 1-day and 3-day window sizes are done and result in the similar outcomes as the 
ones without including these 3 determinants in the models, and we don’t report the results in this paper. 
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the 30-year Treasury at 0.807. 
To compare the results, I replace the 30-year Treasury rate with the 10-year Treasury rate 
in equation (6) and run the regression to find ARs and CARs of the 30-year mortgage rate for 
grouped events. CARs of mortgage rates from regressions controlling for the 10-year and 30-year 
Treasury rate separately are reported for comparison in Table 11. 
There is no major difference between the results of regressions controlling for the 10-year 
Treasury rate and the 30-year Treasury rate. Both the value and standard error of CAR for same 
grouped events were similar in magnitude except for events of increase in Treasury purchases in 
QE1 and increase in both purchases in OT. In fact, CARs for these two grouped events were 
insignificant and had small values in terms of both regressions with different controls. 
Some authors (Sirmans et al., 2015) propose that the 10-year LIBOR swap rate is superior 
to the 10-year Treasury rate as determination. I replace the 30-year Treasury rate by the 10-year 
swap rate in my model and find that the results do not vary so much both statistically and 
economically. In conclusion, it is not much different between choosing the 10-year and 30-year 
Treasury rate as control in my model. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper uses event study methodology to estimate the effects of the Fed’s QE 
announcements on the 30-year mortgage rate. Due to overlapping event windows and short 
estimation periods, I incorporate regression based event study to find abnormal returns (ARs) of 
the mortgage rate, the Treasury rate and the spread between them. In viewing the serial correlation 
and conditional heteroscedasticity in the data series, I apply autoregressive model with IGARCH 
errors following skewed t distribution to run the regressions. 1-day, 3-day and 5-day windows are 
adjusted for different regressions and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and total CARs 
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(TCARs) for each case are calculated. 
I find that although the QE announcements suggesting the start of a new QE round or 
tapering affected the mortgage rate enormously, the effects from further news conveying a 
continuation of the current QE policy diminished. Only a few macroeconomic news which were 
largely different from the market expectation on the same day of a QE event obscured the QE 
announcement effect on the Treasury rate, but did not shadow the QE announcement effect on the 
mortgage rate so much. If the market expectation was in the same direction as a QE announcement, 
the effect of this announcement on the mortgage rate would be minimized and vice versa. Signs 
and magnitudes of AR and CARs for the same event might not be confirmative if the announcement 
effect was transitory or the news had already been priced into mortgage rate before the 
announcement day. The calculation of TCARs tells us that although long run effects of QE 
announcements were less than short run effects, they did not fade away too much. I also find that 
event studies without controlling for serial correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity within 
data series overemphasize the QE effects on interest rates in general. 
After grouping QE events by the announcement type and the QE round, I conclude that the 
mortgage rate decreased more than the Treasury rate and the spread narrowed during the events of 
increase in MBS purchases. Meanwhile, the Treasury rate decreased more than the mortgage rate 
and the spread expanded during the events of increase in Treasury security purchases. Again, 
although QE tapering events had limited effects on both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate on 
average, they boosted the credit risk of holding mortgage assets instead of Treasury bonds. 
Finally, the inclusion of the shocks to macro-economy and mortgage rate determinants in 
the model does not change the results too much. In addition, using the 10-year Treasury rate or the 
10-year swap rate as the risk-free benchmark instead of the 30-year Treasury rate in the model will 
lead to similar results. 
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Several possible extensions are left for future works. First, the market expectation or the 
surprise element of QE announcements can be added into the model for better predicting. Second, 
asymmetric event windows (e.g., (-3, 0) or (0, 3)) can be chosen for event studies to account for 
different cumulative responses of the mortgage rate before and after the event day. 
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Tables and Graphs 
 
Figure 1: Historical Mortgage and Treasury Rates 
This figure shows the time series of the 30-year Mortgage Rate, the 30-year Treasury Rate and the 30-year Freddie Mac MBS current 
coupon yield from January 3, 2000 to December 31, 2015. The periods of different QE rounds are marked in the graph. 
 
Source: Bloomberg and U.S. Treasury. 
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Figure 2: Three Spreads in QE Periods 
The three graphs below show the time series of the mortgage rate- Treasury rate spread, the 
mortgage rate- MBS yield spread and the MBS yield- Treasury rate spread respectively. 
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Table 1: Summary of Data 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper. All the rates are in percentage and the indices are in level. 
The changes of rates are also reported. The sample period spans from 1/1/2008 to 12/31/2015. 
 Obs. Frequency Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
30-year Mortgage Rate 1998 Daily 4.52 4.34 0.75 3.36 6.51 0.65 -0.38 
30-year Treasury Rate 1998 Daily 3.63 3.61 0.67 2.25 4.85 0.08 -1.34 
10-year Treasury Rate 1998 Daily 2.72 2.63 0.71 1.43 4.27 0.24 -1.14 
Freddie Mac 30-year MBS 
Current Coupon 
1998 Daily 3.674 3.438 0.959 1.522 6.177 0.680 -0.121 
Consumer Price Index 96 Monthly 225.859 227.196 8.892 211.398 238.302 -0.131 -1.497 
Case-Shiller House Price Index 96 Monthly 155.62 148.02 14.85 137.08 184.03 0.45 -1.34 
Unemployment Rate 96 Monthly 7.57 7.75 1.63 4.90 10.00 -0.15 -1.35 
Change of 30-year Mortgage 
Rate 
1997 Daily 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.25 0.24 0.18 3.53 
Change of 30-year Treasury 
Rate 
1997 Daily 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.32 0.28 -0.02 1.42 
Change of 10-year Treasury 
Rate 
1997 Daily 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.51 0.24 -0.18 2.97 
Change of Freddie Mac 30-year 
MBS Current Coupon 
1997 Daily -0.001 -0.004 0.076 -0.497 0.440 -0.162 5.602 
 
Note: Data of the 30-year mortgage rates and the Freddie Mac 30-year MBS current coupon yield come from Bloomberg; Data of the 30-
year Treasury rate and the 10-year Treasury rate come from the U.S. Department of Treasury; Data of the consumer price index, the Case-
Shiller house price index and the unemployment rate come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Table 2: The Federal Reserve Bank’s Quantitative Easing (QE) Announcements 
This table reports the QE announcement events ordered by event date. There are 35 events in 
total, and each of them is assigned to a certain QE program, an event type and an event group. 
“Increase”, “Decrease” and “Com” tell us if the event is about increasing asset purchases, 
decrease asset purchases or only a communication to the market. 
Date Program Event Announcement Group 
11/25/2008 QE1 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “will purchase $100 billion in 
GSE debt and $500 billion in GSE MBS.” 
MBS_Increase 
12/1/2008 QE1 
Bernanke 
Speech 
He stated Fed “could purchase longer-term 
Treasury or agency securities.” 
T_Increase 
12/16/2008 QE1 FOMC Meeting 
The Fed cut federal funds rate target from 
1% to 0-0.25%, was “ready to expand its 
purchases of agency debt and MBSs as 
conditions warrant”, and suggested of 
extending QE to Treasury purchases. 
Both_Increase 
1/28/2009 QE1 FOMC Meeting 
The Fed was ready to expand the quantity 
and duration of MBS purchases. 
MBS_Increase, 
3/18/2009 QE1 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “will purchase up to an 
additional $750 billion of agency MBSs with 
a total of $1.25 trillion, up to $100 billion 
agency debt this year with a total of $200 
billion and up to $300 billion longer-term 
Treasury securities over the next six 
months.” 
Both_Increase 
8/12/2009 QE1 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “decided to gradually slow the 
pace” of Treasury purchases. 
T_Decrease 
9/23/2009 QE1 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “will gradually slow the pace” of 
MBS purchases. 
MBS_Decrease 
11/4/2009 QE1 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “will purchase a total of $175 
billion of agency debt” instead of $200 
billion. It also “will gradually slow the pace 
of its purchases of agency debt and MBSs 
and these transactions will executed by the 
end of first quarter of 2010.” 
MBS_Decrease 
8/10/2010 QE2 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “will keep constant the Fed’s 
holdings of securities … by reinvesting 
principal payments from agency debt, agency 
MBSs in longer-term Treasury securities.” It 
also “will continue roll over Treasury 
securities holdings.” 
T_Increase 
8/27/2010 QE2 
Bernanke 
Speech 
He suggested additional QE “should further 
action prove necessary.” 
T_Increase 
9/21/2010 QE2 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “is prepared to provide 
additional accommodation if needed.” 
T_Increase 
10/15/2010 QE2 
Bernanke 
Speech 
Bernanke commented the drawbacks of large 
scale asset purchases. 
T_Decrease 
11/3/2010 QE2 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “intends to purchase a further 
$600 billion of longer term Treasury 
securities by the end of second quarter of 
2011, at a pace of about $75 billion per 
month.” 
T_Increase 
8/9/2011 OT FOMC Meeting The FOMC “is prepared adjust those Both_Increase 
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(securities) holdings as appropriate.” 
8/26/2011 OT 
Bernanke 
Speech 
He announced “employ its tools … to 
promote a stronger economic recovery.” 
Both_Increase 
9/21/2011 OT FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “intends to purchase, by the end 
of June 2012, $400 billion of Treasury 
securities with remaining maturities of 6 
years to 30 years and sell an equal amount of 
Treasury securities with remaining maturities 
of 3 years or less”. 
T_Increase 
6/20/2012 OT FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC decided to “continue through the 
end of the year its program to extend average 
maturity of its holdings of securities.” 
T_Increase 
8/22/2012 OT/QE3 
FOMC Minutes 
Released 
FOMC members “judged that additional 
monetary accommodation would likely be 
warranted fairly soon.” 
Both_Increase 
8/31/2012 OT/QE3 
Bernanke 
Speech 
He remarked about unconventional monetary 
policy tools. 
Both_Increase 
9/13/2012 OT/QE3 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “will purchase additional agency 
MBSs at a pace of $40 billion per month”, 
along with OT will together increase 
“holdings of longer-term securities by about 
$85 billion each month through the end of 
the year.” 
MBS_Increase 
12/12/2012 OT/QE3 FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “will purchase longer—term 
Treasury securities after OT is completed at 
the end of the year, initially at a pace of $45 
billion per month.” 
T_Increase 
5/1/2013 Tapering FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “is prepared to increase or reduce 
the pace of its purchase.” 
Tapering 
5/22/2013 Tapering 
Bernanke 
Speech and 
testimony 
He remarked about a potential “step down” 
in the pace of asset purchases. 
Tapering 
6/19/2013 Tapering 
Bernanke’s 
Press 
Conference 
He said “If the incoming data are broadly 
consistent with this forecast, … be 
appropriate to moderate the monthly pace of 
purchases later this year.” 
Tapering 
12/18/2013 Tapering FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “Beginning in January … will 
add to its holdings of agency MBSs … $35 
billion rather than $40 billion per month, 
long-term Treasury securities … $40 billion 
rather than $45 billion per month.” 
Tapering 
1/29/2014 Tapering FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “Beginning in February … will 
add to its holdings of agency MBSs … $30 
billion rather than $35 billion per month, 
long-term Treasury securities … $35 billion 
rather than $40 billion per month.” 
Tapering 
3/19/2014 Tapering FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “Beginning in April … will add 
to its holdings of agency MBSs … $25 
billion rather than $30 billion per month, 
long-term Treasury securities … $30 billion 
rather than $35 billion per month.” 
Tapering 
4/30/2014 Tapering FOMC Meeting The FOMC “Beginning in May … will add Tapering 
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to its holdings of agency MBSs … $20 
billion rather than $25 billion per month, 
long-term Treasury securities … $25 billion 
rather than $30 billion per month.” 
5/7/2014 Tapering 
Yellen 
Testimony 
She said “further measured reductions in 
asset purchases were appropriate.” 
Tapering 
6/18/2014 Tapering FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “Beginning in July … will add to 
its holdings of agency MBSs … $15 billion 
rather than $20 billion per month, long-term 
Treasury securities … $20 billion rather than 
$25 billion per month.” 
Tapering 
7/15/2014 Tapering 
Yellen 
Testimony 
She said “will make further measured 
reductions in the pace of asset purchases at 
upcoming meetings.” 
Tapering 
7/30/2014 Tapering FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “Beginning in August … will 
add to its holdings of agency MBSs … $10 
billion rather than $15 billion per month, 
long-term Treasury securities … $15 billion 
rather than $20 billion per month.” 
Tapering 
8/22/2014 Tapering Yellen Speech 
She said “we have reduced our pace of asset 
purchases and expect to complete this 
program in October.” 
Tapering 
9/17/2014 Tapering FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “Beginning in October … will 
add to its holdings of agency MBSs … $5 
billion rather than $10 billion per month, 
long-term Treasury securities … $10 billion 
rather than $15 billion per month.” 
Tapering 
10/29/2014 Tapering FOMC Meeting 
The FOMC “decided to conclude its asset 
purchase program this month.” It is also 
“maintaining its existing policy of 
reinvesting principal payments from its 
holdings of agency debt and agency MBSs in 
agency MBSs and of rolling over maturing 
Treasury securities at auction.” 
Tapering 
 
Note:  The event on 8/27/2010 coincided with the better economy report released by Department 
of Commerce on the same day. Events on 11/3/2010, 6/20/2012 and 12/12/2012 were well 
anticipated by the market.
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Figure 3: Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) of 
Data Series and Squared Residuals 
Panel A: ACF and PACF of tMR ,  tTR  and tSpread  
ACF and PACF of these three data series are shown in the top row and bottom row respectively. 
 
 
Panel B: ACF and PACF of Squared Residuals in ARMA models fitting tMR ,  tTR  and 
tSpread  
ACF and PACF of squared residuals are shown in the top row and bottom row respectively. The 
mean models fitting tMR ,  tTR  and tSpread are AR(7), AR(5) and AR(6) accordingly. 
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Table 3: GARCH Model Selection for tMR ,  tTR  and tSpread  
The parameter estimates in mean model and variance model are reported. The p-values are shown 
in the table for Ljung-Box Test, ARCH-LM Test, Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Test and Engle-Ng 
Sign Bias Test. For Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Test, the number of bins is determined by 
2
binning method (i.e., if n>=35, bins=largest integer below 1.88n0.4) (D’Agostino and Stephens, 
1987) which is about 40 in this case. The best GARCH models after selection are highlighted. 
Panel A: GARCH Model Selection for tMR  with Mean Model of AR(7) 
 
GARCH(1,2)-
N 
GARCH(1,2)-
t 
GARCH(1,2)-
skewed t 
IGARCH(1,2)-
skewed t 
GARCH(1,2)-
skewed t in 
Mean 
Ljung-Box Test on 
Standardized Residuals 
     
Q(1) 0.824 0.878 0.697 0.567 0.713 
Q(23) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Q(39) 0.537 0.429 0.352 0.464 0.371 
Ljung-Box Test on 
Squared Standardized 
Residuals 
     
Q(1) 0.239 0.643 0.596 0.231 0.566 
Q(8) 0.561 0.508 0.539 0.574 0.529 
Q(14) 0.424 0.427 0.446 0.420 0.420 
ARCH-LM Test      
Lag(4) 0.236 0.233 0.248 0.506 0.249 
Lag(6) 0.549 0.626 0.636 0.693 0.635 
Lag(8) 0.472 0.507 0.526 0.666 0.511 
Mean Equation      
Intercept -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.004** 
2
t      0.063 
1tMR   0.015 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
2tMR   -0.021 -0.028 -0.032 -0.031 -0.033 
3tMR   -0.037 -0.044** -0.045** -0.048** -0.045** 
4tMR   -0.043* -0.044** -0.045** -0.046** -0.046** 
5tMR   -0.024 -0.027 -0.026 -0.025 -0.028 
6tMR   0.013 0.013 0.015 0.013 0.013 
7tMR   -0.035 -0.039* -0.040* -0.042** -0.041** 
Variance Equation      
Intercept 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***  0.000*** 
2
1t   0.123*** 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.108*** 0.165*** 
2
1t   0.401*** 0.246* 0.248* 0.274** 0.247* 
2
2t   0.469*** 0.582*** 0.584*** 0.618*** 0.584*** 
Distribution of Std. 
Error 
     
Skewness   1.079*** 1.076*** 1.088*** 
D.O.F. of t-distribution  3.673*** 3.780*** 4.662*** 3.743*** 
Pearson Goodness-of-
Fit, Bin(40) 
1.004×10-
26*** 
1.140×10-
4*** 
0.004*** 6.643×10-5*** 0.024** 
Quality of Model      
Log Likelihood 3357.023 3471.073 3474.639 3456.585 3475.447 
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AIC -3.350 -3.463 -3.466 -3.450 -3.466 
BIC -3.316 -3.427 -3.427 -3.416 -3.424 
Engle-Ng Sign Bias 
Test 
     
Sign Bias 0.193 0.108 0.142 0.195 0.141 
Negative Sign Bias 0.116 0.052* 0.065* 0.056* 0.061* 
Positive Sign Bias 0.059* 0.142 0.114 0.150 0.094* 
Joint Effect 0.099* 0.115 0.113 0.116 0.092* 
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Panel B: GARCH Model Selection for  tTR  with Mean Model of AR(5) 
 
GARCH(1,1)-
N 
GARCH(1,1)-
t 
GARCH(1,1)-
skewed t 
IGARCH(1,1)-
skewed t 
GARCH(1,1)-
skewed t in 
Mean 
Ljung-Box Test on 
Standardized Residuals 
     
Q(1) 0.862 0.997 0.997 0.944 0.999 
Q(14) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Q(24) 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000 
Ljung-Box Test on 
Squared Standardized 
Residuals 
     
Q(1) 0.621 0.583 0.630 0.671 0.612 
Q(5) 0.627 0.626 0.637 0.595 0.640 
Q(9) 0.547 0.512 0.550 0.458 0.551 
ARCH-LM Test      
Lag(3) 0.215 0.261 0.230 0.212 0.238 
Lag(5) 0.255 0.250 0.260 0.200 0.266 
Lag(7) 0.275 0.248 0.280 0.180 0.282 
Mean Equation      
Intercept -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
2
t
      0.047 
1tTR   -0.033 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 
2tTR   -0.052** -0.048** -0.042* -0.043* -0.043* 
3tTR   -0.019 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
4tTR   -0.037 -0.041* -0.039* -0.039* -0.039* 
5tTR   -0.046** -0.044* -0.042* -0.041* -0.042* 
Variance Equation      
Intercept 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  0.000** 
2
1t   0.048*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 
2
1t   0.943*** 0.948*** 0.945*** 0.957*** 0.945*** 
Distribution of Std. 
Error 
     
Skewness   1.084*** 1.072*** 1.084*** 
D.O.F. of t-distribution  16.559*** 16.296*** 15.990*** 16.075*** 
Pearson Goodness-of-
Fit 
Bin(40) 
0.006*** 0.008*** 0.670 0.917 0.128 
Quality of Model      
Log Likelihood 2896.057 2902.287 2905.072 2899.951 2905.243 
AIC -2.891 -2.897 -2.898 -2.895 -2.898 
BIC -2.866 -2.869 -2.868 -2.870 -2.864 
Engle-Ng Sign Bias 
Test 
     
Sign Bias 0.495 0.574 0.498 0.624 0.577 
Negative Sign Bias 0.199 0.199 0.207 0.501 0.230 
Positive Sign Bias 0.786 0.835 0.755 0.441 0.821 
Joint Effect 0.621 0.612 0.627 0.742 0.663 
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Panel C: GARCH Model Selection for tSpread  with Mean Model of AR(6) 
 
GARCH(1,1)-
N 
GARCH(1,1)-
t 
GARCH(1,1)-
skewed t 
IGARCH(1,1)-
skewed t 
GARCH(1,1)-
skewed t in 
Mean 
Ljung-Box Test on 
Standardized Residuals 
     
Q(1) 0.834 0.958 0.949 0.952 0.963 
Q(17) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Q(29) 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
Ljung-Box Test on 
Squared Standardized 
Residuals 
     
Q(1) 0.296 0.346 0.343 0.185 0.349 
Q(5) 0.586 0.621 0.623 0.145 0.638 
Q(9) 0.814 0.834 0.836 0.262 0.848 
ARCH-LM Test      
Lag(3) 0.461 0.486 0.485 0.988 0.473 
Lag(5) 0.761 0.765 0.766 0.582 0.782 
Lag(7) 0.924 0.926 0.926 0.753 0.934 
Mean Equation      
Intercept -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
2
t      -0.071 
1tSpread   -0.220*** -0.227*** -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.229*** 
2tSpread   -0.060** -0.054** -0.055** -0.056** -0.056** 
3tSpread   -0.041* -0.031 -0.031 -0.030 -0.031 
4tSpread   -0.047** -0.050** -0.051** -0.053** -0.051** 
5tSpread   -0.090*** -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.074*** -0.076*** 
6tSpread   -0.070*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057** -0.057*** 
Variance Equation      
Intercept 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000**  <0.001** 
2
1t   0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.051*** 0.070*** 
2
1t   0.915*** 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.949*** 0.922*** 
Distribution of Std. 
Error 
     
Skewness   1.026*** 1.030*** 1.023*** 
D.O.F. of t-distribution  6.867*** 6.892*** 7.259*** 6.898*** 
Pearson Goodness-of-
Fit 
Bin(40) 
3.672×10-4 0.349 0.551 0.863 0.867 
Quality of Model      
Log Likelihood 2874.944 2919.45 2919.744 2912.944 2920.747 
AIC -2.869 -2.913 -2.912 -2.907 -2.912 
BIC -2.841 -2.882 -2.879 -2.879 -2.876 
Engle-Ng Sign Bias 
Test 
     
Sign Bias 0.086* 0.127 0.149 0.128 0.090* 
Negative Sign Bias 0.712 0.666 0.693 0.542 0.615 
Positive Sign Bias 0.067* 0.123 0.132 0.155 0.110 
Joint Effect 0.240 0.375 0.410 0.412 0.309 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Figure 4: Quantile and Quantile (QQ) Plots of Standardized Residuals 
In each graph, the quantile of standardized residuals is plotted against the quantile of a theoretical 
distribution as indicated.  
Panel A: QQ Plots of standardized residuals in tMR  model 
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Panel B: QQ Plots of standardized residuals in  tTR  model 
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Panel C: QQ Plots of standardized residuals in tSpread  model 
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Figure 5: Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) of 
Standardized Residuals and Squared Standardized Residuals after Adjusting for 
Autocorrelation and GARCH Errors 
The time series models estimating tMR ,  tTR  and tSpread are AR(7)-IGARCH(1,2)-skewed t, 
AR(5)-IGARCH(1,1)-skewed t and AR(6)-IGARCH(1,1)-skewed t. 
Panel A: ACF and PACF of Standardized Residuals 
The upper row shows ACF of standardized residuals for three models estimating tMR ,  tTR  and 
t
Spread respectively, while the bottom row shows PACF. 
 
Panel B: ACF and PACF of Squared Standardized Residuals  
The upper row shows ACF of squared standardized residuals for three models estimating tMR , 

t
TR  and 
t
Spread  respectively, while the bottom row shows PACF. 
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Table 4: Abnormal Returns (ARs) in 1-day Windows 
We run four regressions (equation (6) to (9)) with 1-day event window. The value and standard 
error (SE) of AR on each QE event day are reported. Coefficient estimates and SEs of control 
variables and GARCH in regressions are also reported.  
 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Mortgage Rate(Not 
Controlling for Treasury 
Rate) 
Treasury Rate Spread 
 Estimate/AR SE Estimate/AR SE Estimate/AR SE Estimate/AR SE 
Mean Model         
Intercept -0.001*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
11/25/2008 -0.121** 0.048 -0.165*** 0.052 -0.166* 0.095 0.002 0.079 
12/1/2008 0.011 0.046 -0.053 0.044 -0.220** 0.093 0.205*** 0.076 
12/16/2008 0.039 0.043 0.008 0.040 -0.127 0.091 0.129* 0.077 
1/28/2009 -0.066 0.043 -0.012 0.043 0.214*** 0.078 -0.225*** 0.078 
3/18/2009 0.064** 0.028 -0.005 0.026 -0.239*** 0.072 0.202*** 0.076 
8/12/2009 -0.027 0.031 -0.001 0.038 0.085 0.073 -0.068 0.054 
9/23/2009 0.051* 0.030 0.055 0.034 0.006 0.064 0.054 0.052 
11/4/2009 0.026 0.035 0.047 0.037 0.083 0.054 -0.050 0.055 
8/10/2010 0.043** 0.018 0.044* 0.022 -0.013 0.062 0.052 0.047 
8/27/2010 -0.175*** 0.017 -0.134*** 0.019 0.165*** 0.053 -0.266*** 0.050 
9/21/2010 0.000 0.059 -0.002 0.057 -0.079 0.060 0.036 0.069 
10/15/2010 0.117** 0.055 0.156*** 0.051 0.088* 0.051 0.028 0.069 
11/3/2010 -0.055 0.044 -0.014 0.047 0.171*** 0.050 -0.152** 0.060 
8/9/2011 0.040*** 0.015 0.002 0.019 -0.122* 0.072 0.151** 0.060 
8/26/2011 -0.017 0.023 -0.032 0.029 -0.054 0.090 0.039 0.062 
9/21/2011 0.020 0.018 -0.024 0.020 -0.161** 0.075 0.161*** 0.057 
6/20/2012 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.017 -0.004 0.051 0.016 0.037 
8/22/2012 -0.048** 0.020 -0.061*** 0.023 -0.071 0.046 0.001 0.031 
8/31/2012 0.022 0.017 0.007 0.019 -0.061 0.039 0.061* 0.033 
9/13/2012 -0.046*** 0.016 -0.034* 0.020 0.047 0.040 -0.104*** 0.034 
12/12/2012 -0.026*** 0.010 -0.003 0.013 0.080** 0.032 -0.084*** 0.023 
5/1/2013 -0.010 0.016 -0.024 0.019 -0.040 0.035 0.020 0.026 
5/22/2013 0.068*** 0.017 0.091*** 0.024 0.074* 0.040 0.025 0.026 
6/19/2013 0.036 0.037 0.055 0.044 0.084** 0.041 -0.002 0.045 
12/18/2013 0.012 0.023 0.019 0.027 0.030 0.034 -0.001 0.028 
1/29/2014 -0.003 0.020 -0.022 0.025 -0.055* 0.032 0.029 0.027 
3/19/2014 0.045*** 0.017 0.053** 0.023 0.037 0.036 0.030 0.031 
4/30/2014 -0.024 0.037 -0.037 0.042 -0.020 0.035 -0.003 0.048 
5/7/2014 -0.026 0.046 -0.002 0.044 0.020 0.035 -0.063 0.053 
6/18/2014 0.009 0.031 0.005 0.033 -0.009 0.035 0.010 0.040 
7/15/2014 0.016 0.027 0.023 0.024 0.006 0.035 0.005 0.037 
7/30/2014 -0.106** 0.042 -0.091** 0.044 0.093** 0.035 -0.148** 0.059 
8/22/2014 0.009 0.050 -0.007 0.058 -0.028 0.036 0.046 0.058 
9/17/2014 0.008 0.041 0.015 0.046 0.017 0.039 -0.013 0.049 
10/29/2014 0.013 0.038 0.020 0.034 0.009 0.032 0.004 0.049 

t
TR  0.280*** 0.013       
1 tMR  -0.094*** 0.023 -0.004 0.023     
2 tMR  -0.032 0.020 -0.033 0.021     
3 tMR  -0.031 0.021 -0.052** 0.021     
4 tMR  -0.018 0.021 -0.044** 0.020     
5 tMR  -0.041* 0.021 -0.024 0.022     
6 tMR  -0.009 0.021 0.014 0.021     
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7 tMR  -0.037* 0.020 -0.048** 0.021     
1

t
TR      -0.044* 0.023   
2

t
TR      -0.041* 0.023   
3

t
TR      -0.028 0.023   
4

t
TR      -0.050** 0.023   
5

t
TR      -0.048** 0.023   
1 tSpread        -0.234*** 0.023 
2 tSpread        -0.056** 0.023 
3 tSpread        -0.033 0.023 
4 tSpread        -0.060** 0.023 
5 tSpread        -0.082*** 0.023 
6 tSpread        -0.062*** 0.022 
Variance 
Model 
        
2
1 t  0.084*** 0.016 0.103*** 0.015 0.039*** 0.006 0.047*** 0.000 
2
1 t  0.403* 0.211 0.249* 0.128 0.961*** NA 0.953*** NA 
2
2 t  0.513***  0.649***      
Quality of 
Model 
        
Log 
Likelihood 
3720.612  3484.149  2939.588  2950.285  
AIC -3.678  -3.442  -2.900  -2.910  
BIC -3.544  -3.311  -2.777  -2.784  
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in 3-day Windows  
We run four regressions (equation (6) to (9)) with 3-day event window (i.e., t= -1, 0, 1). The 
value and standard error (SE) of CAR for each QE event are reported. CAR is created by 
summing up the three ARs on days in a 3-day event window. All the ARs on days we concern can 
be found in Appendix, Table A2. Coefficient estimates and SEs of control variables and 
GARCH in regressions are also reported.  
 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Mortgage Rate(Not 
Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Treasury Rate Spread 
 Estimate/CAR SE Estimate/CAR SE Estimate/CAR SE Estimate/CAR SE 
Mean Model         
Intercept -0.001*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
11/25/2008 -0.149** 0.065 -0.202*** 0.077 -0.199 0.140 0.006 0.108 
12/1/2008 0.005 0.063 -0.098 0.076 -0.342** 0.132 0.274** 0.106 
12/16/2008 -0.146*** 0.053 -0.270*** 0.063 -0.387*** 0.121 0.150 0.097 
1/28/2009 -0.084 0.056 -0.020 0.062 0.265** 0.116 -0.284*** 0.097 
3/18/2009 -0.006 0.036 -0.037 0.036 -0.094 0.118 0.040 0.095 
8/12/2009 -0.065 0.043 -0.079 0.054 -0.070 0.115 -0.003 0.076 
9/23/2009 0.036 0.047 0.011 0.057 -0.060 0.101 0.090 0.073 
11/4/2009 0.029 0.057 0.076 0.066 0.164* 0.090 -0.105 0.079 
8/10/2010 -0.017 0.020 -0.035 0.022 -0.069 0.093 0.057 0.060 
8/27/2010 -0.127*** 0.023 -0.121*** 0.030 0.030 0.080 -0.134** 0.064 
9/21/2010 -0.140** 0.063 -0.177** 0.078 -0.138 0.091 -0.015 0.090 
10/15/2010 -0.007 0.075 0.037 0.085 0.128 0.079 -0.109 0.090 
11/3/2010 -0.014 0.065 0.010 0.078 0.070 0.074 -0.088 0.082 
8/9/2011 -0.057*** 0.017 -0.135*** 0.029 -0.282** 0.112 0.176*** 0.064 
8/26/2011 0.017 0.028 0.020 0.044 0.015 0.136 0.031 0.080 
9/21/2011 0.002 0.021 -0.111*** 0.031 -0.392*** 0.113 0.300*** 0.081 
6/20/2012 -0.001 0.022 0.003 0.028 0.022 0.078 -0.010 0.053 
8/22/2012 -0.118*** 0.023 -0.151*** 0.032 -0.112 0.071 -0.029 0.043 
8/31/2012 0.003 0.023 -0.014 0.029 -0.053 0.061 0.037 0.044 
9/13/2012 -0.080*** 0.020 -0.007 0.030 0.265*** 0.069 -0.272*** 0.041 
12/12/2012 -0.008 0.014 0.027 0.020 0.124** 0.050 -0.089*** 0.033 
5/1/2013 0.016 0.024 0.004 0.030 -0.034 0.055 0.029 0.039 
5/22/2013 0.114*** 0.025 0.131*** 0.037 0.046 0.062 0.088*** 0.034 
6/19/2013 0.246*** 0.051 0.290*** 0.065 0.165*** 0.063 0.129** 0.056 
12/18/2013 0.053 0.037 0.065 0.046 0.034 0.055 0.037 0.040 
1/29/2014 -0.016 0.031 -0.025 0.038 -0.016 0.054 -0.012 0.036 
3/19/2014 0.118*** 0.028 0.127*** 0.038 0.030 0.057 0.097** 0.040 
4/30/2014 0.020 0.054 0.000 0.066 -0.049 0.047 0.066 0.067 
5/7/2014 -0.127** 0.056 -0.092 0.063 0.046 0.051 -0.170* 0.067 
6/18/2014 0.019 0.039 0.037 0.046 0.065 0.053 -0.024 0.051 
7/15/2014 0.002 0.038 0.002 0.043 0.004 0.053 0.011 0.050 
7/30/2014 0.008 0.061 0.032 0.070 0.068 0.053 -0.042 0.079 
8/22/2014 0.042 0.074 0.014 0.089 -0.075 0.052 0.069 0.080 
9/17/2014 0.005 0.057 0.008 0.074 0.037 0.060 -0.035 0.072 
10/29/2014 -0.009 0.053 0.002 0.059 0.026 0.052 -0.029 0.070 

t
TR  0.280*** 0.013       
1 tMR  -0.098*** 0.023 0.000 0.023     
2 tMR  -0.031 0.020 -0.034 0.021     
3 tMR  -0.026 0.021 -0.054** 0.022     
4 tMR  -0.007 0.021 -0.039* 0.021     
5 tMR  -0.052** 0.021 -0.029 0.022     
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6 tMR  -0.011 0.021 0.013 0.021     
7 tMR  -0.044** 0.020 -0.055** 0.021     
1

t
TR      -0.040* 0.023   
2

t
TR      -0.045* 0.024   
3

t
TR      -0.030 0.024   
4

t
TR      -0.054** 0.024   
5

t
TR      -0.047* 0.024   
1 tSpread        -0.233*** 0.023 
2 tSpread        -0.042* 0.023 
3 tSpread        -0.032 0.024 
4 tSpread        -0.069*** 0.023 
5 tSpread        -0.090*** 0.023 
6 tSpread        -0.074*** 0.023 
Variance 
Model 
        
2
1t   0.087*** 0.016 0.105*** 0.016 0.036*** 0.006 0.039*** 0.008 
2
1t   0.268 0.170 0.176* 0.095 0.964***  0.961***  
2
2t   0.645***  0.718***      
Quality of 
Model 
        
Log 
Likelihood 
3795.506  3550.227  2982.218  3005.344  
AIC -3.683  -3.438  -2.873  -2.895  
BIC -3.352  -3.110  -2.553  -2.572  
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Table 6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) in 5-day Windows 
We run four regressions (equation (6) to (9)) with 5-day event window (i.e., t= -2, -1, 0, 1, 2). The 
value and standard error (SE) of CAR for each QE event are reported. CAR is created by 
summing up the three ARs on days in a 3-day event window. All the ARs on days we concern can 
be found in Appendix, Table A3. Coefficient estimates and SEs of control variables and 
GARCH in regressions are also reported. The CARs for two events with overlapped event 
windows on 11/25/2008 and 12/1/2008 are invalid and denoted as N/A.   
 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Mortgage Rate(Not 
Controlling for Treasury 
Rate) 
Treasury Rate Spread 
 Estimate/CAR SE Estimate/CAR SE Estimate/CAR SE Estimate/CAR SE 
Mean Model         
Intercept -0.002*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
11/25/2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N/A 
12/1/2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
12/16/2008 -0.090 0.067 -0.232*** 0.073 -0.484*** 0.137 0.253** 0.115 
1/28/2009 -0.082 0.067 0.020 0.079 0.367** 0.145 -0.358*** 0.109 
3/18/2009 -0.005 0.046 0.002 0.047 0.043 0.146 -0.051 0.107 
8/12/2009 -0.095** 0.047 -0.142** 0.062 -0.152 0.139 0.029 0.091 
9/23/2009 0.087* 0.050 0.050 0.059 -0.115 0.121 0.165* 0.086 
11/4/2009 -0.053 0.064 -0.003 0.071 0.185* 0.109 -0.179** 0.090 
8/10/2010 0.002 0.025 -0.028 0.026 -0.101 0.110 0.109 0.072 
8/27/2010 -0.133*** 0.029 -0.142*** 0.033 -0.018 0.095 -0.093 0.076 
9/21/2010 -0.104 0.079 -0.149* 0.090 -0.147 0.106 0.010 0.108 
10/15/2010 -0.073 0.086 -0.026 0.097 0.154* 0.090 -0.204** 0.104 
11/3/2010 -0.029 0.077 0.021 0.089 0.176** 0.086 -0.154 0.097 
8/9/2011 -0.108*** 0.019 -0.086** 0.035 0.067 0.143 -0.073 0.079 
8/26/2011 0.023 0.032 0.042 0.044 0.081 0.131 -0.005 0.085 
9/21/2011 -0.013 0.023 -0.130*** 0.032 -0.381*** 0.118 0.279*** 0.084 
6/20/2012 -0.008 0.026 0.010 0.033 0.066 0.097 -0.033 0.061 
8/22/2012 -0.067*** 0.024 -0.088** 0.036 -0.102 0.085 0.015 0.050 
8/31/2012 -0.010 0.021 -0.016 0.030 -0.015 0.072 -0.002 0.051 
9/13/2012 -0.045** 0.022 0.021 0.032 0.230*** 0.081 -0.208*** 0.046 
12/12/2012 0.009 0.018 0.035 0.025 0.100* 0.060 -0.063 0.039 
5/1/2013 0.039 0.030 0.074** 0.037 0.120* 0.063 -0.048 0.041 
5/22/2013 0.120*** 0.030 0.133*** 0.043 0.052 0.067 0.086** 0.037 
6/19/2013 0.361*** 0.064 0.448*** 0.078 0.296*** 0.075 0.152** 0.066 
12/18/2013 0.041 0.043 0.038 0.051 -0.021 0.064 0.056 0.047 
1/29/2014 -0.047 0.034 -0.049 0.041 -0.022 0.063 -0.028 0.041 
3/19/2014 0.121*** 0.031 0.127*** 0.041 0.015 0.064 0.110** 0.047 
4/30/2014 0.204*** 0.066 0.190*** 0.072 -0.066 0.053 0.232*** 0.076 
5/7/2014 -0.181*** 0.058 -0.149** 0.064 0.110** 0.055 -0.262*** 0.070 
6/18/2014 0.017 0.044 0.028 0.050 0.035 0.058 -0.003 0.055 
7/15/2014 0.296*** 0.040 0.270*** 0.045 -0.096* 0.052 0.352*** 0.054 
7/30/2014 -0.010 0.049 0.006 0.054 0.062 0.054 -0.047 0.066 
8/22/2014 0.011 0.075 0.015 0.092 -0.043 0.058 0.003 0.080 
9/17/2014 0.071 0.069 0.065 0.080 -0.022 0.067 0.062 0.075 
10/29/2014 0.023 0.063 0.041 0.072 0.057 0.061 -0.020 0.078 

t
TR  0.280*** 0.013       
1 tMR  -0.085*** 0.022 0.007 0.022     
2 tMR  -0.035* 0.020 -0.043** 0.021     
3 tMR  -0.023 0.021 -0.052** 0.022     
4 tMR  -0.005 0.020 -0.030 0.021     
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5 tMR  -0.073*** 0.022 -0.046** 0.022     
6 tMR  -0.004 0.022 0.020 0.022     
7 tMR  -0.048** 0.021 -0.065*** 0.021     
1

t
TR      -0.029 0.023   
2

t
TR      -0.046* 0.024   
3

t
TR      -0.031 0.024   
4

t
TR      -0.054** 0.025   
5

t
TR      -0.038 0.025   
1 tSpread        -0.220*** 0.023 
2 tSpread        -0.043* 0.023 
3 tSpread        -0.027 0.023 
4 tSpread        -0.060** 0.024 
5 tSpread        -0.099*** 0.024 
6 tSpread        -0.075*** 0.024 
Variance 
Model 
        
2
1t   0.080*** 0.017 0.099*** 0.018 0.036*** 0.007 0.039*** 0.009 
2
1t   0.309* 0.161 0.203* 0.106 0.964***  0.961***  
2
2t   0.611***  0.699***      
Quality of 
Model 
        
Log 
Likelihood 
3853.002  3608.316  3031.920  3062.150  
AIC -3.673  -3.429  -2.854  -2.884  
BIC -3.151  -2.910  -2.344  -2.370  
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 
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Table 7: Long Run Effects of QE Events 
The estimates and standard errors (SEs) of total abnormal returns (TARs) for 1-day window and total cumulative abnormal returns 
(TCARs) for 3-day window and 5-day window are reported in the table. SEs are asymptotic standard errors calculated by using Delta 
Method. The TCARs for two events with overlapped event windows on 11/25/2008 and 12/1/2008 are invalid and denoted as N/A. 
 
Date 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for Treasury Rate) 
Mortgage Rate 
(Not Controlling for Treasury Rate) 
1-day 3-day 5-day 1-day 3-day 5-day 
TAR SE TCAR SE TCAR SE TAR SE TCAR SE TCAR SE 
11/25/2008 -0.096** 0.038 -0.118* 0.062 N/A N/A -0.139** 0.044 -0.169** 0.073 N/A N/A 
12/1/2008 0.008 0.036 0.004 0.058 N/A N/A -0.044 0.037 -0.082 0.073 N/A N/A 
12/16/2008 0.031 0.034 -0.115* 0.050 -0.071 0.065 0.007 0.034 -0.225*** 0.061 -0.192*** 0.071 
1/28/2009 -0.052 0.034 -0.066 0.053 -0.064 0.065 -0.010 0.036 -0.017 0.059 0.016 0.076 
3/18/2009 0.050** 0.023 -0.005 0.033 -0.004 0.044 -0.004 0.022 -0.031 0.034 0.002 0.045 
8/12/2009 -0.022 0.025 -0.051 0.040 -0.074 0.046 -0.001 0.032 -0.066 0.052 -0.117* 0.060 
9/23/2009 0.041* 0.024 0.028 0.044 0.069 0.048 0.046 0.028 0.009 0.054 0.042 0.057 
11/4/2009 0.021 0.028 0.023 0.053 -0.041 0.062 0.039 0.032 0.063 0.063 -0.003 0.069 
8/10/2010 0.034** 0.014 -0.013 0.019 0.001 0.024 0.037** 0.019 -0.029 0.021 -0.023 0.026 
8/27/2010 -0.139*** 0.015 -0.100*** 0.021 -0.104*** 0.028 -0.112** 0.017 -0.101*** 0.028 -0.118*** 0.032 
9/21/2010 0.000 0.046 -0.110* 0.059 -0.081 0.077 -0.002 0.048 -0.148** 0.073 -0.123 0.087 
10/15/2010 0.092** 0.044 -0.006 0.070 -0.057 0.083 0.131** 0.043 0.031 0.081 -0.020 0.095 
11/3/2010 -0.044 0.035 -0.011 0.061 -0.023 0.074 -0.012 0.040 0.008 0.074 0.017 0.087 
8/9/2011 0.032*** 0.012 -0.045*** 0.016 -0.085*** 0.018 0.002 0.016 -0.112*** 0.027 -0.071** 0.034 
8/26/2011 -0.013 0.018 0.014 0.026 0.018 0.031 -0.027 0.024 0.017 0.042 0.035 0.042 
9/21/2011 0.016 0.014 0.002 0.019 -0.010 0.022 -0.020 0.017 -0.093*** 0.030 -0.107*** 0.032 
6/20/2012 0.012 0.013 -0.001 0.020 -0.006 0.025 0.012 0.014 0.002 0.026 0.008 0.032 
8/22/2012 -0.038** 0.016 -0.093*** 0.022 -0.052** 0.023 -0.051*** 0.019 -0.126*** 0.031 -0.073** 0.035 
8/31/2012 0.017 0.014 0.002 0.021 -0.008 0.021 0.006 0.016 -0.012 0.028 -0.013 0.029 
9/13/2012 -0.036*** 0.013 -0.063*** 0.019 -0.035* 0.021 -0.029* 0.017 -0.005 0.028 0.017 0.031 
12/12/2012 -0.020*** 0.008 -0.006 0.013 0.007 0.017 -0.003 0.011 0.022 0.019 0.029 0.024 
5/1/2013 -0.008 0.013 0.013 0.022 0.031 0.029 -0.020 0.016 0.004 0.029 0.061* 0.037 
5/22/2013 0.054*** 0.013 0.090*** 0.023 0.094*** 0.029 0.076*** 0.021 0.109*** 0.035 0.110*** 0.042 
6/19/2013 0.028 0.029 0.194*** 0.048 0.284*** 0.062 0.046 0.037 0.242*** 0.062 0.371*** 0.076 
12/18/2013 0.009 0.018 0.042 0.034 0.032 0.042 0.016 0.023 0.055 0.044 0.032 0.050 
1/29/2014 -0.002 0.016 -0.013 0.029 -0.037 0.033 -0.018 0.021 -0.021 0.037 -0.040 0.040 
3/19/2014 0.036*** 0.014 0.093*** 0.027 0.095*** 0.030 0.044** 0.020 0.106*** 0.036 0.105*** 0.040 
4/30/2014 -0.019 0.029 0.016 0.051 0.160** 0.064 -0.031 0.036 0.000 0.062 0.157** 0.071 
5/7/2014 -0.021 0.036 -0.100* 0.053 -0.142** 0.056 -0.001 0.037 -0.076 0.060 -0.123* 0.061 
6/18/2014 0.007 0.024 0.015 0.037 0.013 0.042 0.004 0.028 0.031 0.044 0.023 0.049 
7/15/2014 0.013 0.021 0.002 0.036 0.232*** 0.040 0.019 0.021 0.001 0.041 0.223*** 0.045 
7/30/2014 -0.084** 0.034 0.006 0.057 -0.008 0.047 -0.076** 0.037 0.027 0.066 0.006 0.052 
8/22/2014 0.007 0.040 0.033 0.069 0.009 0.071 -0.006 0.048 0.012 0.085 0.012 0.092 
9/17/2014 0.006 0.033 0.004 0.054 0.056 0.067 0.012 0.039 0.007 0.070 0.054 0.078 
10/29/2014 0.011 0.030 -0.007 0.050 0.018 0.061 0.017 0.029 0.002 0.056 0.034 0.070 
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(Table 7   Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 
 
 
Date 
Treasury Rate Spread 
1-day 3-day 5-day 1-day 3-day 5-day 
TAR SE TCAR SE TCAR SE TAR SE TCAR SE TCAR SE 
11/25/2008 -0.137* 0.078 -0.163 0.132 N/A N/A 0.001 0.051 0.004 0.097 N/A N/A 
12/1/2008 -0.181** 0.077 -0.281** 0.125 N/A N/A 0.134*** 0.050 0.178* 0.094 N/A N/A 
12/16/2008 -0.105 0.075 -0.318*** 0.115 -0.404*** 0.133 0.084* 0.050 0.097 0.088 0.166 0.109 
1/28/2009 0.177*** 0.064 0.218** 0.109 0.306** 0.142 -0.147*** 0.051 -0.184** 0.087 -0.235** 0.103 
3/18/2009 -0.197*** 0.061 -0.077 0.113 0.035 0.141 0.132*** 0.050 0.026 0.085 -0.033 0.100 
8/12/2009 0.070 0.061 -0.057 0.108 -0.126 0.135 -0.044 0.036 -0.002 0.068 0.019 0.085 
9/23/2009 0.005 0.052 -0.050 0.095 -0.096 0.117 0.035 0.034 0.058 0.065 0.108 0.082 
11/4/2009 0.069 0.045 0.135 0.085 0.154 0.105 -0.033 0.036 -0.068 0.071 -0.117 0.086 
8/10/2010 -0.010 0.051 -0.057 0.088 -0.084 0.107 0.034 0.031 0.037 0.054 0.071 0.067 
8/27/2010 0.136*** 0.044 0.024 0.076 -0.015 0.092 -0.174*** 0.034 -0.087 0.058 -0.061 0.070 
9/21/2010 -0.065 0.050 -0.114 0.086 -0.123 0.103 0.024 0.045 -0.010 0.081 0.007 0.101 
10/15/2010 0.073* 0.042 0.106 0.074 0.128 0.087 0.018 0.045 -0.071 0.081 -0.134 0.098 
11/3/2010 0.141*** 0.042 0.057 0.070 0.146* 0.084 -0.099** 0.040 -0.057 0.074 -0.101 0.091 
8/9/2011 -0.101* 0.059 -0.232** 0.104 0.056 0.141 0.099** 0.040 0.114** 0.058 -0.048 0.075 
8/26/2011 -0.045 0.075 0.012 0.129 0.068 0.126 0.026 0.041 0.020 0.072 -0.003 0.079 
9/21/2011 -0.133** 0.062 -0.322*** 0.107 -0.318*** 0.115 0.105*** 0.038 0.195*** 0.073 0.183** 0.078 
6/20/2012 -0.003 0.042 0.018 0.073 0.055 0.094 0.011 0.024 -0.006 0.047 -0.022 0.057 
8/22/2012 -0.059 0.038 -0.092 0.067 -0.085 0.083 0.001 0.020 -0.019 0.039 0.010 0.047 
8/31/2012 -0.050 0.032 -0.043 0.057 -0.012 0.070 0.040* 0.022 0.024 0.040 -0.001 0.048 
9/13/2012 0.039 0.033 0.218*** 0.065 0.191** 0.079 -0.068*** 0.022 -0.177*** 0.037 -0.136*** 0.044 
12/12/2012 0.066** 0.026 0.102** 0.047 0.084 0.058 -0.055*** 0.015 -0.057* 0.030 -0.041 0.036 
5/1/2013 -0.033 0.029 -0.028 0.052 0.100 0.062 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.034 -0.032 0.039 
5/22/2013 0.061* 0.033 0.038 0.059 0.043 0.065 0.017 0.017 0.057* 0.030 0.056 0.035 
6/19/2013 0.069** 0.033 0.136** 0.060 0.247*** 0.073 -0.001 0.030 0.084* 0.050 0.100 0.063 
12/18/2013 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.052 -0.018 0.063 0.000 0.018 0.024 0.036 0.037 0.044 
1/29/2014 -0.045* 0.027 -0.013 0.052 -0.019 0.061 0.019 0.018 -0.008 0.032 -0.019 0.038 
3/19/2014 0.030 0.030 0.025 0.053 0.013 0.062 0.020 0.021 0.063* 0.036 0.072 0.044 
4/30/2014 -0.017 0.029 -0.041 0.045 -0.055 0.052 -0.002 0.031 0.043 0.060 0.152** 0.072 
5/7/2014 0.016 0.029 0.038 0.048 0.092* 0.053 -0.041 0.034 -0.110* 0.060 -0.172** 0.067 
6/18/2014 -0.007 0.029 0.053 0.050 0.029 0.056 0.007 0.026 -0.016 0.046 -0.002 0.052 
7/15/2014 0.005 0.029 0.003 0.050 -0.080 0.050 0.003 0.024 0.007 0.045 0.231*** 0.051 
7/30/2014 0.077*** 0.029 0.056 0.050 0.052 0.052 -0.097** 0.039 -0.027 0.070 -0.031 0.061 
8/22/2014 -0.023 0.030 -0.062 0.050 -0.036 0.057 0.030 0.038 0.045 0.072 0.002 0.074 
9/17/2014 0.014 0.032 0.031 0.057 -0.018 0.065 -0.008 0.032 -0.023 0.065 0.041 0.071 
10/29/2014 0.007 0.027 0.021 0.049 0.047 0.059 0.003 0.032 -0.019 0.062 -0.013 0.073 
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Table 8: Cumulative Effects of QE Announcements on the Mortgage Rate and the Treasury 
Rate 
Row 1 reports the cumulative abnormal returns of the 30-year mortgage rate (from model of 
controlling for Treasury rate or not), the 30-year Treasury rate and the spread between them 
across all announcements in each round of QE with 1-day, 3-day and 5-day event windows from 
my estimation. As a comparison, the cumulative effects on mortgage rates and MBS yields found 
in other event study literature are reported. Although cumulative changes of the 30-year MBS 
yield and the 30-year Treasury rate are found in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) 
and Di Maggio et al. (2016), all other studies report cumulative changes of the 10-year MBS yield 
and the 10-year Treasury rate. Since we only focus on “easing” announcements, four events of 
decrease in purchases of assets are not used for calculation. In line with the events used in other 
studies, four events on 8/27/2010, 11/3/2010, 6/20/2012 and 12/12/201245 are excluded from my 
calculation.    
Study 
Event Window 
Size 
Round of 
QE 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling 
for Treasury 
Rate) 
Mortgage Rate 
(Uncontrolling 
for Treasury 
Rate) 
Treasury 
Rate 
Spread 
My Estimation 
 
1-day, 3-day, 
5-day 
QE1 -7, -38, -37 -23, -63, -56 -54, -76, -58 31, 19, 10 
QE2 4, -16, -10 4, -21, -18 -9, -21, -25 9, 4, 12 
OT 4, -4, -10 -5, -23, -17 -34, -66, -23 35, 51, 20 
QE3 -7, -20, -12 -9, -17, -8 -9, 10, 11 -4, -26, -19 
Tapering 5, 49, 107 10, 60, 124 22, 35, 48 -6, 21, 64 
Gagnon et al. 
(2011) 
1-day, 2-day QE1  -113, -115 -91, -105  
Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-
Jorgensen 
(2011) 
2-day for QE1, 
1-day and 2-
day for QE2 
QE1  -107 -73  
QE2  -9, -8 -9, -21  
Christensen 
and Rudebusch 
(2012) 
1-day QE1   -100  
Neely (2015) 1-day QE1   -100  
Altavilla and 
Giannone 
(2015) 
2-day 
QE1   -104  
QE2   -29  
OT   -43  
QE3   -4  
Tapering   40  
Bowman et al. 
(2015) 
2-day 
QE1   -99  
QE2   -28  
OT   -41  
QE3   -9  
Tapering   37  
Borrallo et al. 
(2016) 
2-day 
QE1   -104  
QE2   -29  
OT   -37  
QE3   -10  
Tapering   42  
                                                          
45 Events on 8/27/2010 and 11/3/2010 (both in QE2) are not picked by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011), and Events on 6/20/2012 (in OT) and 12/12/2012 (in QE3) are not picked by Bowman et 
al. (2015) and Borrallo et al (2016). In fact, as discussed in Part 5, these four events are also the events 
either contaminated by Economy report release or are already expected by the market. 
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Di Maggio et 
al. (2016) 
3-month,  
6-month 
QE1   -117, -140  
QE2   -37, -47  
OT   -46, -63  
QE3   -18, -32  
Tapering   26, -53  
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Figure 6: Cumulative Effects of QE Announcements on the Mortgage Rate and the Treasury Rate around Announcement Events 
In addition to Table 8, Cumulative abnormal returns of 30-year mortgage rate (from model of controlling for Treasury rate or not), 30-year 
Treasury rate and the spread between them across all announcements in each round of QE with 1-day, 3-day and 5-day event windows 
from my estimation are graphed.  
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Table 9: Abnormal Returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for Event 
Groups 
A total of 31 QE events are grouped by type of asset purchased, increase or decrease of purchase, 
and QE round. Event on 8/27/2010 is excluded since it is contaminated by better Economy report 
on the same day. Event on 11/3/2010, 6/20/2012 and 12/12/2012 are excluded given that these 
three events were well expected by the market. ARs are reported for 1-day window and CARs are 
reported for 3-day and 5-day window. The ARs used to calculate CARs are not reported for 3-day 
and 5-day window cases, but can be found in Appendix, Table A4.  
 
Panel A: 1-day window 
 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Mortgage Rate(Not 
Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Treasury Rate Spread 
 
Estimate/
AR 
SE 
Estimate/
AR 
SE 
Estimate/
AR 
SE 
Estimate/
AR 
SE 
Mean Model         
Intercept -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
QE1_MBS_Increase -0.095*** 0.033 -0.086 0.052 0.004 0.079 -0.130** 0.066 
QE1_T_Increase 0.010 0.046 -0.056 0.045 -0.223** 0.100 0.210*** 0.079 
QE1_Both_Increase 0.055** 0.024 -0.001 0.024 -0.198*** 0.060 0.164*** 0.057 
QE1_MBS_Decrease 0.038* 0.023 0.051** 0.025 0.045 0.041 0.000 0.041 
QE1_T_Decrease -0.027 0.032 -0.001 0.039 0.085 0.075 -0.069 0.054 
QE2_T_Increase 0.038* 0.021 0.038* 0.023 -0.050 0.044 0.047 0.040 
QE2_T_Decrease 0.117** 0.058 0.157*** 0.053 0.087 0.057 0.029 0.073 
OT_T_Increase 0.020 0.018 -0.023 0.021 -0.162** 0.077 0.161*** 0.058 
OT_Both_Increase 0.013 0.030 -0.014 0.021 -0.094 0.059 0.092* 0.054 
QE3_MBS_Increase -0.046*** 0.018 -0.034* 0.020 0.047 0.040 -0.104*** 0.035 
QE3_Both_Increase -0.019 0.031 -0.025 0.025 -0.066** 0.031 0.027 0.027 
Tapering 0.006 0.010 0.001 0.012 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.011 

t
TR  0.280*** 0.013       
1 tMR  -0.092*** 0.023 -0.001 0.023     
2 tMR  -0.035* 0.020 -0.030 0.021     
3 tMR  -0.028 0.021 -0.048** 0.021     
4 tMR  -0.021 0.021 -0.045** 0.020     
5 tMR  -0.043** 0.021 -0.023 0.021     
6 tMR  -0.011 0.021 0.015 0.021     
7 tMR  -0.035* 0.020 -0.044** 0.021     
1

t
TR      -0.047** 0.023   
2

t
TR      -0.040* 0.023   
3

t
TR      -0.018 0.023   
4

t
TR      -0.038* 0.023   
5

t
TR      -0.041* 0.023   
1 tSpread        -0.231*** 0.023 
2 tSpread        -0.055** 0.023 
3 tSpread        -0.027 0.023 
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4 tSpread        -0.052** 0.023 
5 tSpread        -0.079*** 0.023 
6 tSpread        -0.063*** 0.022 
Variance Model         
2
1t   0.092 0.016 0.107 0.015 0.041 0.007 0.050 0.008 
2
1t   0.372 0.179 0.253 0.122 0.959  0.950  
2
2t   0.536  0.640 NA     
Quality of Model         
Log Likelihood 3699.371  3699.371  2916.983  2930.683  
AIC -3.680  -3.680  -2.900  -2.913  
BIC -3.610  -3.610  -2.842  -2.851  
 
Panel B: 3-day window 
 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Mortgage Rate(Not 
Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Treasury Rate Spread 
 
Estimate/
CAR 
SE 
Estimate/
CAR 
SE 
Estimate/
CAR 
SE 
Estimate/
CAR 
SE 
Mean Model         
Intercept -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
QE1_MBS_Increase -0.116** 0.049 -0.101 0.072 -0.018 0.120 -0.178* 0.103 
QE1_T_Increase 0.004 0.067 -0.107 0.081 -0.358** 0.154 0.311*** 0.118 
QE1_Both_Increase -0.048 0.045 -0.082* 0.048 -0.268** 0.104 0.082 0.078 
QE1_MBS_Decrease 0.024 0.037 0.031 0.045 0.052 0.068 -0.013 0.061 
QE1_T_Decrease -0.064 0.042 -0.079 0.056 -0.068 0.120 -0.006 0.079 
QE2_T_Increase -0.025 0.023 -0.044* 0.026 -0.109 0.069 0.036 0.056 
QE2_T_Decrease -0.006 0.084 0.038 0.092 0.128 0.087 -0.108 0.101 
OT_T_Increase 0.004 0.025 -0.109*** 0.036 -0.393*** 0.119 0.299*** 0.086 
OT_Both_Increase 0.034 0.034 -0.021 0.051 -0.161* 0.095 0.114* 0.066 
QE3_MBS_Increase -0.079*** 0.023 -0.004 0.033 0.264*** 0.072 -0.271*** 0.044 
QE3_Both_Increase -0.066 0.046 -0.087** 0.039 -0.085* 0.049 0.004 0.035 
Tapering 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.009 0.017 0.028 0.018 

t
TR  0.280*** 0.013       
1 tMR  -0.092*** 0.023 0.000 0.023     
2 tMR  -0.032 0.020 -0.029 0.021     
3 tMR  -0.023 0.021 -0.048** 0.022     
4 tMR  -0.020 0.021 -0.045** 0.021     
5 tMR  -0.056*** 0.021 -0.030 0.022     
6 tMR  -0.013 0.021 0.015 0.021     
7 tMR  -0.042** 0.020 -0.049** 0.021     
1

t
TR      -0.042* 0.023   
2

t
TR      -0.043* 0.023   
3

t
TR      -0.019 0.023   
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4

t
TR      -0.040* 0.023   
5

t
TR      -0.045* 0.023   
1 tSpread        -0.225*** 0.023 
2 tSpread        -0.050** 0.023 
3 tSpread        -0.023 0.023 
4 tSpread        -0.054** 0.023 
5 tSpread        -0.088*** 0.023 
6 tSpread        -0.070*** 0.023 
Variance Model         
2
1t   0.094 0.016 0.109 0.016 0.040 0.007 0.047 0.008 
2
1t   0.356 0.159 0.259 0.122 0.960  0.953 NA 
2
2t   0.550  0.632      
Quality of Model         
Log Likelihood 3731.050  3492.913  2934.455  2954.603  
AIC -3.688  -3.450  -2.894  -2.913  
BIC -3.550  -3.316  -2.768  -2.784  
 
Panel C: 5-day window 
 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Mortgage Rate(Not 
controlling for 
Treasury Rate) 
Treasury Rate Spread 
 
Estimate/
CAR 
SE 
Estimate/
CAR 
SE 
Estimate/
CAR 
SE 
Estimate/
CAR 
SE 
Mean Model         
Intercept -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
QE1_MBS_Increase -0.115* 0.065 -0.050 0.087 0.220 0.154 -0.318*** 0.114 
QE1_T_Increase -0.049 0.089 -0.231** 0.108 -0.651*** 0.220 0.505*** 0.161 
QE1_Both_Increase -0.035 0.052 -0.035 0.053 -0.263** 0.130 0.066 0.100 
QE1_MBS_Decrease 0.010 0.053 0.012 0.054 0.031 0.084 -0.020 0.078 
QE1_T_Decrease -0.095* 0.048 -0.144** 0.066 -0.149 0.148 0.027 0.096 
QE2_T_Increase -0.005 0.028 -0.035 0.029 -0.132 0.085 0.083 0.069 
QE2_T_Decrease -0.066 0.101 -0.022 0.109 0.160 0.105 -0.203* 0.118 
OT_T_Increase -0.010 0.029 -0.127*** 0.039 -0.375*** 0.137 0.279*** 0.096 
OT_Both_Increase 0.011 0.040 0.000 0.052 -0.005 0.122 0.041 0.099 
QE3_MBS_Increase -0.042 0.029 0.024 0.040 0.230*** 0.088 -0.208*** 0.051 
QE3_Both_Increase -0.059 0.048 -0.067 0.043 -0.060 0.059 0.002 0.040 
Tapering 0.032* 0.019 0.028 0.024 0.000 0.022 0.034 0.022 

t
TR  0.280*** 0.013       
1 tMR  -0.092*** 0.023 0.002 0.023     
2 tMR  -0.032 0.021 -0.029 0.021     
3 tMR  -0.021 0.021 -0.046** 0.022     
4 tMR  -0.019 0.021 -0.043** 0.021     
5 tMR  -0.060*** 0.022 -0.031 0.022     
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6 tMR  -0.008 0.022 0.016 0.021     
7 tMR  -0.043** 0.020 -0.051** 0.021     
1

t
TR      -0.042* 0.023   
2

t
TR      -0.041* 0.023   
3

t
TR      -0.018 0.023   
4

t
TR      -0.039* 0.023   
5

t
TR      -0.047** 0.023   
1 tSpread        -0.226*** 0.023 
2 tSpread        -0.048** 0.023 
3 tSpread        -0.019 0.023 
4 tSpread        -0.050** 0.023 
5 tSpread        -0.092*** 0.023 
6 tSpread        -0.074*** 0.023 
Variance Model         
2
1t   0.095 0.017 0.112 0.016 0.039 0.007 0.046 0.009 
2
1t   0.368 0.160 0.251 0.118 0.961  0.954  
2
2t   0.537  0.637      
Quality of Model         
Log Likelihood 3741.609  3507.186  3507.186  2969.499  
AIC -3.674  -3.440  -3.440  -2.904  
BIC -3.469  -3.239  -3.239  -2.708  
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 
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Figure 7: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) on Days in a 5-day Window of the 
Grouped Event 
The CAR on each day inside a 5-day event window for grouped events are reported in the figure. 
Each CAR is calculated as a summation of abnormal returns from two days before the event day 
(t-2) to the day interested. The region between two dash lines in each graph is the 95% confidence 
interval of ARs. t indicates the event day. 
Panel A: CARs of the 30-year Mortgage Rate (Controlling for 30-year Treasury Rate) 
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Panel B: CARs of the 30-year Mortgage Rate (Not Controlling for 30-year Treasury Rate) 
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Panel C: CARs of the 30-year Treasury Rate 
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Panel D: CARs of the Spread between 30-year Mortgage Rate and Treasury Rate 
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Table 10: Coefficient Estimates of Additional Control Variables in Regressions 
The change of log unexpected CPI, the change of log unexpected Case-Shiller House Price Index 
(HPI), the change of unexpected unemployment rate (UER), and the lagged variables (two lags for 
each of these three variables) are added to each of the four models as independent variables. This 
table only reports the estimates and standard errors of coefficients associated with these newly 
added variables by using 1-day event window. ARs, CARs and coefficient estimates of other 
independent variables are not reported in this table since the values and significances of them are 
similar to the case without including these control variables. 
 Dependent Variable 
 _ 30tMR  _ 30tMR  _ 30tT  tSpread  
Control 
Variables 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
ln( )tCPI  -0.008 0.014 -0.012 0.015 0.013 0.026 -0.021 0.021 
1ln( )tCPI   0.013 0.012 0.019 0.014 0.026 0.024 0.033 0.021 
2ln( )tCPI   -0.003 0.012 0.006 0.014 0.014 0.022 0.011 0.022 
ln( )tHPI  -0.009 0.011 -0.012 0.012 -0.018 0.018 0.005 0.018 
1ln( )tHPI   -0.016 0.011 -0.022 0.014 0.013 0.021 -0.050** 0.020 
2ln( )tHPI   0.010 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.018 0.021 0.017 
tUER  -0.028 0.020 -0.020 0.027 0.026 0.032 -0.010 0.032 
1tUER   0.009 0.018 0.024 0.020 -0.019 0.031 0.022 0.030 
2tUER   0.031* 0.018 0.026 0.021 0.019 0.031 0.016 0.030 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
 
Table 11: Differences in Regression Results by Using 10-year Treasury Rate Instead of 30-
year Treasury Rate 
Values and standard deviations (SEs) for CARs of mortgage rate from regressions controlling for 
10-year Treasury rate and 30-year Treasury rate respectively are reported. 
 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for 10-year 
Treasury Rate) 
Mortgage Rate 
(Controlling for 30-year 
Treasury Rate) 
 CAR SE CAR SE 
QE1_MBS_Increase -0.124** 0.061 -0.115* 0.065 
QE1_T_Increase -0.024 0.082 -0.049 0.089 
QE1_Both_Increase -0.038 0.051 -0.035 0.052 
QE1_MBS_Decrease 0.010 0.047 0.010 0.053 
QE1_T_Decrease -0.044 0.042 -0.095* 0.048 
QE2_T_Increase 0.032 0.026 -0.005 0.028 
QE2_T_Decrease -0.059 0.094 -0.066 0.101 
OT_T_Increase -0.063** 0.027 -0.010 0.029 
OT_Both_Increase -0.011 0.040 0.011 0.040 
QE3_MBS_Increase -0.046* 0.027 -0.042 0.029 
QE3_Both_Increase -0.048 0.035 -0.059 0.048 
Tapering 0.022 0.017 0.032* 0.019 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Table A1: Dickey Fuller Unit Root Tests for Levels and Changes of Variables 
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests are performed without trend and drift. There are two lagged 
dependent variables in the models for testing, and the lag lengths are determined by AIC. The test 
statistics and three significances are reported in the table. 
Variable Level 
Change of Level  
(1st Difference) 
Change of Log Level 
30-Year Mortgage Rate -1.022 -31.71***  
30-Year Treasury Rate -0.866 -33.728***  
Mortgage-Treasury Rate 
Spread 
-1.309 -36.471***  
Unemployment Rate 0.001 -5.982***  
Case-Shiller HPI 0.148  -2.237** 
CPI 3.922***  -7.340*** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
 
 
Table A2: Abnormal Returns (ARs) for QE Events in 3-day Window Case 
The ARs are parameter estimates of event dummies in four regressions by using 3-day window. 
Each CAR in Table 5 is calculated by adding up three ARs in a 3-day event window. 
“Controlled” means the model is controlling for  tTR , while “Uncontrolled” means the model is 
not controlling for  tTR . 
 Dependent Variable 
  tMR  (Controlled)  tMR  (Uncontrolled)  tT   tSpread  
Date Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
11/25/2008 - 1day -0.020 0.039 0.002 0.042 0.069 0.084 -0.074 0.077 
11/25/2008 -0.118** 0.046 -0.163*** 0.045 -0.159* 0.084 0.004 0.073 
11/25/2008 + 1day -0.011 0.037 -0.042 0.047 -0.109 0.083 0.076 0.072 
12/1/2008 - 1day 0.037 0.037 0.006 0.048 -0.094 0.083 0.122* 0.072 
12/1/2008 0.012 0.036 -0.052 0.045 -0.213*** 0.074 0.187*** 0.071 
12/1/2008 + 1day -0.044 0.043 -0.051 0.039 -0.035 0.082 -0.034 0.074 
12/16/2008 - 1day -0.003 0.032 -0.037 0.040 -0.083 0.074 0.067 0.065 
12/16/2008 0.046 0.033 0.010 0.035 -0.114 0.075 0.119* 0.071 
12/16/2008 + 1day -0.188*** 0.034 -0.243*** 0.036 -0.190*** 0.071 -0.036 0.066 
1/28/2009 - 1day 0.003 0.038 -0.019 0.033 -0.097 0.070 0.066 0.069 
1/28/2009 -0.060* 0.035 -0.009 0.040 0.213*** 0.070 -0.211*** 0.068 
1/28/2009 + 1day -0.027 0.032 0.009 0.033 0.149** 0.069 -0.139** 0.065 
3/18/2009 - 1day 0.032 0.020 0.052** 0.021 0.087 0.078 -0.055 0.066 
3/18/2009 0.062** 0.025 -0.006 0.021 -0.246*** 0.068 0.248*** 0.067 
3/18/2009 + 1day -0.101*** 0.022 -0.083*** 0.022 0.065 0.068 -0.153** 0.065 
8/12/2009 - 1day 0.039* 0.024 0.021 0.032 -0.069 0.070 0.099* 0.052 
8/12/2009 -0.028 0.028 -0.001 0.034 0.093 0.069 -0.089* 0.053 
8/12/2009 + 1day -0.077*** 0.028 -0.100*** 0.027 -0.094 0.069 -0.014 0.052 
9/23/2009 - 1day -0.005 0.031 -0.028 0.036 -0.026 0.061 0.028 0.050 
9/23/2009 0.054* 0.028 0.056* 0.031 0.009 0.061 0.041 0.051 
9/23/2009 + 1day -0.014 0.029 -0.017 0.034 -0.043 0.061 0.020 0.050 
11/4/2009 - 1day -0.024 0.036 -0.003 0.040 0.081 0.055 -0.090 0.055 
11/4/2009 0.029 0.034 0.048 0.036 0.079 0.054 -0.032 0.056 
11/4/2009 + 1day 0.025 0.036 0.031 0.039 0.004 0.055 0.016 0.055 
8/10/2010 - 1day -0.069*** 0.013 -0.064*** 0.013 0.009 0.056 -0.061 0.041 
8/10/2010 0.048*** 0.012 0.043*** 0.013 -0.010 0.056 0.052 0.042 
8/10/2010 + 1day 0.005 0.012 -0.014 0.012 -0.069 0.056 0.065 0.041 
8/27/2010 - 1day 0.033** 0.015 0.020 0.018 -0.054 0.048 0.069 0.045 
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8/27/2010 -0.180*** 0.014 -0.134*** 0.017 0.170*** 0.048 -0.296*** 0.046 
8/27/2010 + 1day 0.019 0.013 -0.006 0.017 -0.086** 0.048 0.093** 0.042 
9/21/2010 - 1day -0.144*** 0.042 -0.146*** 0.043 -0.024 0.055 -0.104 0.065 
9/21/2010 0.016 0.039 -0.001 0.044 -0.076 0.055 0.050 0.063 
9/21/2010 + 1day -0.012 0.038 -0.030 0.049 -0.038 0.055 0.038 0.061 
10/15/2010 - 1day -0.057 0.051 -0.030 0.057 0.083* 0.045 -0.126** 0.062 
10/15/2010 0.128*** 0.040 0.155*** 0.045 0.085* 0.045 0.073 0.064 
10/15/2010 + 1day -0.078 0.048 -0.088* 0.046 -0.039 0.052 -0.056 0.062 
11/3/2010 - 1day 0.045 0.042 0.041 0.047 -0.063 0.045 0.053 0.060 
11/3/2010 -0.060 0.040 -0.015 0.044 0.174*** 0.045 -0.170*** 0.057 
11/3/2010 + 1day 0.001 0.040 -0.016 0.045 -0.041 0.045 0.029 0.055 
8/9/2011 - 1day 0.040*** 0.010 0.000 0.016 -0.143** 0.063 0.143*** 0.043 
8/9/2011 0.036*** 0.010 0.002 0.018 -0.117* 0.063 0.137*** 0.044 
8/9/2011 + 1day -0.133*** 0.011 -0.136*** 0.016 -0.022 0.075 -0.105** 0.044 
8/26/2011 - 1day 0.028 0.018 0.020 0.028 -0.020 0.082 0.034 0.055 
8/26/2011 -0.021 0.017 -0.034 0.023 -0.056 0.082 0.043 0.056 
8/26/2011 + 1day 0.011 0.017 0.034 0.027 0.092 0.082 -0.046 0.055 
9/21/2011 - 1day 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.020 -0.002 0.068 0.022 0.056 
9/21/2011 0.021* 0.012 -0.025 0.016 -0.154** 0.068 0.135** 0.056 
9/21/2011 + 1day -0.027* 0.014 -0.095*** 0.018 -0.236*** 0.068 0.143** 0.056 
6/20/2012 - 1day -0.014 0.013 0.005 0.015 0.063 0.049 -0.050 0.036 
6/20/2012 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.016 -0.006 0.043 0.026 0.036 
6/20/2012 + 1day -0.006 0.014 -0.016 0.018 -0.036 0.048 0.014 0.038 
8/22/2012 - 1day -0.053*** 0.015 -0.059*** 0.020 -0.018 0.043 -0.033 0.030 
8/22/2012 -0.041*** 0.013 -0.061*** 0.018 -0.069 0.043 0.008 0.030 
8/22/2012 + 1day -0.024* 0.014 -0.031* 0.018 -0.025 0.043 -0.003 0.029 
8/31/2012 - 1day -0.001 0.015 -0.005 0.016 -0.011 0.037 0.002 0.031 
8/31/2012 0.023* 0.013 0.005 0.019 -0.062* 0.036 0.071** 0.031 
8/31/2012 + 1day -0.019 0.015 -0.014 0.016 0.020 0.036 -0.036 0.030 
9/13/2012 - 1day 0.012 0.012 0.035** 0.016 0.088** 0.042 -0.049* 0.028 
9/13/2012 -0.045*** 0.013 -0.034* 0.018 0.036 0.041 -0.078*** 0.028 
9/13/2012 + 1day -0.047*** 0.012 -0.007 0.018 0.141*** 0.041 -0.145*** 0.028 
12/12/2012 - 1day -0.005 0.009 0.005 0.012 0.039 0.030 -0.031 0.023 
12/12/2012 -0.026*** 0.009 -0.004 0.012 0.077** 0.030 -0.083*** 0.023 
12/12/2012 + 1day 0.023*** 0.009 0.026** 0.011 0.008 0.030 0.025 0.022 
5/1/2013 - 1day 0.001 0.015 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.033 -0.006 0.025 
5/1/2013 -0.011 0.015 -0.024 0.018 -0.041 0.033 0.018 0.026 
5/1/2013 + 1day 0.027* 0.014 0.024 0.017 -0.001 0.033 0.017 0.028 
5/22/2013 - 1day 0.000 0.015 -0.010 0.021 -0.029 0.038 0.022 0.023 
5/22/2013 0.067*** 0.017 0.090*** 0.023 0.075** 0.038 0.012 0.024 
5/22/2013 + 1day 0.046*** 0.015 0.050** 0.020 0.000 0.037 0.054** 0.023 
6/19/2013 - 1day 0.042 0.031 0.039 0.037 0.000 0.038 0.042 0.039 
6/19/2013 0.029 0.032 0.053 0.039 0.081** 0.038 -0.030 0.039 
6/19/2013 + 1day 0.175*** 0.031 0.197*** 0.038 0.084** 0.038 0.117*** 0.038 
12/18/2013 - 1day -0.020 0.022 -0.023 0.031 -0.013 0.033 -0.014 0.028 
12/18/2013 0.011 0.021 0.018 0.025 0.030 0.033 -0.009 0.029 
12/18/2013 + 1day 0.062** 0.025 0.070*** 0.025 0.017 0.033 0.060** 0.027 
1/29/2014 - 1day -0.010 0.019 -0.008 0.024 0.010 0.036 -0.024 0.025 
1/29/2014 -0.001 0.019 -0.021 0.023 -0.057* 0.031 0.043* 0.025 
1/29/2014 + 1day -0.006 0.019 0.005 0.019 0.031 0.031 -0.032 0.025 
3/19/2014 - 1day 0.015 0.019 0.010 0.024 -0.012 0.034 0.020 0.027 
3/19/2014 0.043** 0.017 0.052** 0.021 0.037 0.034 0.017 0.028 
3/19/2014 + 1day 0.060*** 0.016 0.065*** 0.022 0.005 0.034 0.060** 0.028 
4/30/2014 - 1day 0.039 0.037 0.045 0.035 0.023 0.027 0.021 0.046 
4/30/2014 -0.027 0.032 -0.034 0.039 -0.017 0.031 -0.017 0.047 
4/30/2014 + 1day 0.008 0.032 -0.011 0.040 -0.055** 0.027 0.061 0.045 
5/7/2014 - 1day -0.112*** 0.032 -0.112*** 0.034 -0.025 0.027 -0.107** 0.046 
5/7/2014 -0.019 0.040 -0.001 0.038 0.022 0.032 -0.033 0.047 
5/7/2014 + 1day 0.005 0.032 0.022 0.039 0.049 0.032 -0.029 0.046 
6/18/2014 - 1day 0.055** 0.024 0.068** 0.027 0.042 0.032 0.024 0.035 
6/18/2014 0.007 0.026 0.004 0.028 -0.014 0.032 0.018 0.036 
6/18/2014 + 1day -0.043** 0.022 -0.035 0.027 0.036 0.032 -0.067* 0.035 
7/15/2014 - 1day 0.004 0.027 0.003 0.029 0.017 0.032 0.010 0.034 
7/15/2014 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.006 0.032 0.001 0.035 
7/15/2014 + 1day -0.021 0.022 -0.025 0.024 -0.019 0.032 0.000 0.035 
7/30/2014 - 1day 0.107*** 0.040 0.105** 0.044 -0.037 0.032 0.118** 0.054 
75 
 
7/30/2014 -0.118*** 0.035 -0.092** 0.037 0.094*** 0.032 -0.180*** 0.055 
7/30/2014 + 1day 0.019 0.038 0.019 0.041 0.010 0.032 0.020 0.055 
8/22/2014 - 1day 0.054 0.047 0.052 0.052 -0.031 0.033 0.048 0.055 
8/22/2014 0.007 0.048 -0.008 0.055 -0.025 0.033 0.042 0.056 
8/22/2014 + 1day -0.019 0.045 -0.031 0.050 -0.020 0.028 -0.021 0.054 
9/17/2014 - 1day -0.026 0.034 -0.029 0.043 0.027 0.036 -0.054 0.051 
9/17/2014 0.006 0.040 0.014 0.044 0.016 0.036 -0.008 0.052 
9/17/2014 + 1day 0.025 0.033 0.022 0.042 -0.006 0.037 0.027 0.048 
10/29/2014 - 1day -0.032 0.032 -0.022 0.036 0.029 0.031 -0.054 0.047 
10/29/2014 0.015 0.036 0.020 0.033 0.008 0.031 0.014 0.048 
10/29/2014 + 1day 0.008 0.031 0.004 0.034 -0.011 0.031 0.011 0.050 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Table A3: Abnormal Returns (ARs) for QE Events in 5-day Window Case 
The ARs are parameter estimates of event dummies in four regressions by using 5-day window. 
Each CAR in Table 6 is calculated by adding up five ARs in a 5-day event window. “Controlled” 
means the model is controlling for  tTR , while “Uncontrolled” means the model is not 
controlling for  tTR . Two dates included in parenthesis are overlapping days from two different 
windows. 
 Dependent Variable 
  tMR  (Controlled)  tMR  (Uncontrolled)  tT   tSpread  
Date Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
11/25/2008 - 2day -0.012 0.043 -0.006 0.047 0.045 0.081 0.008 0.074 
11/25/2008 - 1day -0.019 0.037 0.002 0.039 0.066 0.081 -0.075 0.075 
11/25/2008 -0.117*** 0.036 -0.162*** 0.039 -0.161** 0.080 0.003 0.070 
(11/25/2008 + 1day) -0.010 0.035 -0.039 0.038 -0.108 0.080 0.079 0.069 
(12/1/2008 - 1day) 0.038 0.035 0.007 0.038 -0.094 0.079 0.123* 0.068 
12/1/2008 0.013 0.034 -0.051 0.037 -0.217*** 0.077 0.183*** 0.068 
12/1/2008 + 1day -0.039 0.034 -0.053 0.036 -0.033 0.078 -0.024 0.067 
12/1/2008 + 2day -0.050 0.033 -0.049 0.035 -0.003 0.077 -0.040 0.066 
12/16/2008 - 2day 0.034 0.032 0.042 0.034 0.012 0.074 0.025 0.066 
12/16/2008 - 1day -0.007 0.036 -0.037 0.037 -0.081 0.064 0.056 0.063 
12/16/2008 0.046 0.031 0.009 0.033 -0.110* 0.064 0.122* 0.066 
12/16/2008 + 1day -0.195*** 0.036 -0.245*** 0.035 -0.187*** 0.064 -0.056 0.066 
12/16/2008 + 2day 0.033 0.030 0.000 0.031 -0.119* 0.063 0.106 0.065 
1/28/2009 - 2day -0.023 0.035 0.007 0.040 0.095 0.077 -0.100* 0.061 
1/28/2009 - 1day 0.004 0.036 -0.021 0.032 -0.102 0.076 0.088 0.065 
1/28/2009 -0.056* 0.033 -0.006 0.037 0.206*** 0.065 -0.210*** 0.062 
1/28/2009 + 1day -0.030 0.031 0.007 0.032 0.145** 0.066 -0.137** 0.060 
1/28/2009 + 2day 0.022 0.031 0.033 0.040 0.023 0.065 0.001 0.059 
3/18/2009 - 2day -0.009 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.119* 0.067 -0.103* 0.057 
3/18/2009 - 1day 0.032* 0.019 0.051** 0.023 0.081 0.075 -0.030 0.058 
3/18/2009 0.062*** 0.024 -0.007 0.020 -0.253*** 0.070 0.244*** 0.062 
3/18/2009 + 1day -0.102*** 0.023 -0.085*** 0.022 0.061 0.065 -0.142** 0.061 
3/18/2009 + 2day 0.012 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.034 0.074 -0.020 0.060 
8/12/2009 - 2day -0.002 0.023 -0.027 0.033 -0.074 0.068 0.048 0.051 
8/12/2009 - 1day 0.040* 0.023 0.022 0.025 -0.064 0.067 0.086* 0.052 
8/12/2009 -0.027 0.026 0.002 0.032 0.098 0.067 -0.089* 0.051 
8/12/2009 + 1day -0.074*** 0.022 -0.099*** 0.025 -0.090 0.067 -0.013 0.051 
8/12/2009 + 2day -0.032 0.022 -0.040 0.030 -0.022 0.067 -0.003 0.050 
9/23/2009 - 2day 0.075*** 0.024 0.073*** 0.025 -0.002 0.059 0.056 0.049 
9/23/2009 - 1day -0.013 0.026 -0.027 0.029 -0.024 0.058 0.012 0.052 
9/23/2009 0.051** 0.022 0.055* 0.028 0.013 0.058 0.041 0.049 
9/23/2009 + 1day -0.014 0.026 -0.022 0.028 -0.038 0.058 0.010 0.048 
9/23/2009 + 2day -0.012 0.025 -0.029 0.027 -0.065 0.058 0.045 0.047 
11/4/2009 - 2day -0.006 0.032 0.003 0.030 0.036 0.054 -0.024 0.053 
11/4/2009 - 1day -0.025 0.033 -0.003 0.035 0.080 0.053 -0.081 0.054 
11/4/2009 0.031 0.032 0.051 0.034 0.079 0.048 -0.031 0.053 
11/4/2009 + 1day 0.028 0.031 0.030 0.034 0.004 0.053 0.033 0.050 
11/4/2009 + 2day -0.081*** 0.030 -0.084** 0.033 -0.014 0.053 -0.075 0.048 
8/10/2010 - 2day 0.009 0.012 -0.006 0.012 -0.043 0.053 0.051 0.039 
8/10/2010 - 1day -0.071*** 0.014 -0.064*** 0.013 0.012 0.053 -0.074* 0.040 
8/10/2010 0.047*** 0.012 0.043*** 0.013 -0.008 0.053 0.053 0.039 
8/10/2010 + 1day 0.004 0.012 -0.013 0.012 -0.068 0.053 0.059 0.039 
8/10/2010 + 2day 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.005 0.053 0.019 0.041 
8/27/2010 - 2day -0.011 0.015 -0.009 0.016 0.021 0.046 -0.009 0.042 
8/27/2010 - 1day 0.034** 0.015 0.020 0.016 -0.054 0.046 0.071* 0.042 
8/27/2010 -0.179*** 0.013 -0.133*** 0.015 0.171*** 0.045 -0.296*** 0.042 
8/27/2010 + 1day 0.019 0.014 -0.006 0.015 -0.084* 0.045 0.087** 0.039 
8/27/2010 + 2day 0.005 0.014 -0.015 0.015 -0.073 0.045 0.054 0.043 
9/21/2010 - 2day 0.029 0.038 0.024 0.043 -0.008 0.047 0.010 0.060 
9/21/2010 - 1day -0.154*** 0.044 -0.153*** 0.040 -0.023 0.053 -0.111* 0.064 
9/21/2010 0.018 0.043 0.002 0.041 -0.074 0.052 0.053 0.060 
9/21/2010 + 1day -0.015 0.036 -0.033 0.039 -0.039 0.052 0.031 0.060 
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9/21/2010 + 2day 0.018 0.035 0.011 0.047 -0.004 0.052 0.027 0.061 
10/15/2010 - 2day -0.070* 0.042 -0.055 0.043 0.048 0.049 -0.128** 0.059 
10/15/2010 - 1day -0.053 0.046 -0.032 0.051 0.082* 0.042 -0.097 0.059 
10/15/2010 0.129*** 0.038 0.157*** 0.042 0.084** 0.042 0.071 0.059 
10/15/2010 + 1day -0.076* 0.044 -0.086* 0.049 -0.040 0.041 -0.053 0.058 
10/15/2010 + 2day -0.003 0.043 -0.010 0.041 -0.020 0.041 0.003 0.057 
11/3/2010 - 2day -0.105** 0.045 -0.101** 0.050 0.031 0.041 -0.101* 0.056 
11/3/2010 - 1day 0.057 0.037 0.041 0.040 -0.068 0.041 0.079 0.057 
11/3/2010 -0.060 0.037 -0.015 0.041 0.169*** 0.041 -0.172*** 0.053 
11/3/2010 + 1day -0.003 0.035 -0.013 0.039 -0.045 0.041 0.029 0.053 
11/3/2010 + 2day 0.082** 0.035 0.109*** 0.039 0.089** 0.041 0.012 0.055 
8/9/2011 - 2day -0.008 0.009 0.021 0.017 0.107 0.067 -0.048 0.042 
8/9/2011 - 1day 0.040*** 0.010 -0.002 0.017 -0.152** 0.068 0.156*** 0.042 
8/9/2011 0.037*** 0.009 0.000 0.016 -0.126* 0.067 0.137*** 0.042 
8/9/2011 + 1day -0.133*** 0.009 -0.138*** 0.014 -0.032 0.067 -0.099** 0.042 
8/9/2011 + 2day -0.043*** 0.009 0.032** 0.015 0.270*** 0.068 -0.219*** 0.045 
8/26/2011 - 2day 0.006 0.016 0.053** 0.021 0.163*** 0.056 -0.103** 0.048 
8/26/2011 - 1day 0.028* 0.015 0.022 0.022 -0.025 0.056 0.057 0.046 
8/26/2011 -0.021 0.016 -0.036** 0.018 -0.057 0.066 0.040 0.046 
8/26/2011 + 1day 0.011 0.016 0.031 0.021 0.095 0.066 -0.053 0.045 
8/26/2011 + 2day -0.001 0.016 -0.029 0.020 -0.095 0.066 0.054 0.048 
9/21/2011 - 2day -0.012 0.011 -0.044*** 0.014 -0.104* 0.057 0.069 0.047 
9/21/2011 - 1day 0.009 0.011 0.007 0.018 -0.003 0.057 0.008 0.048 
9/21/2011 0.021* 0.011 -0.024* 0.014 -0.154*** 0.057 0.136*** 0.048 
9/21/2011 + 1day -0.025** 0.011 -0.093*** 0.015 -0.237*** 0.056 0.157*** 0.044 
9/21/2011 + 2day -0.006 0.010 0.025* 0.014 0.117** 0.056 -0.090* 0.047 
6/20/2012 - 2day -0.001 0.014 -0.009 0.016 -0.027 0.047 0.025 0.034 
6/20/2012 - 1day -0.014 0.013 0.004 0.014 0.062 0.047 -0.055 0.035 
6/20/2012 0.019 0.013 0.014 0.015 -0.007 0.047 0.026 0.034 
6/20/2012 + 1day -0.005 0.012 -0.015 0.016 -0.038 0.046 0.024 0.034 
6/20/2012 + 2day -0.006 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.075* 0.045 -0.053 0.034 
8/22/2012 - 2day 0.054*** 0.012 0.063*** 0.017 0.013 0.042 0.050* 0.028 
8/22/2012 - 1day -0.059*** 0.013 -0.061*** 0.016 -0.019 0.041 -0.046 0.028 
8/22/2012 -0.042*** 0.012 -0.063*** 0.017 -0.071* 0.041 0.009 0.028 
8/22/2012 + 1day -0.027** 0.011 -0.035** 0.016 -0.027 0.041 -0.008 0.028 
8/22/2012 + 2day 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.018 0.001 0.041 0.010 0.028 
8/31/2012 - 2day 0.008 0.010 0.016 0.014 0.026 0.035 -0.011 0.028 
8/31/2012 - 1day -0.002 0.012 -0.006 0.016 -0.013 0.035 0.006 0.029 
8/31/2012 0.023** 0.010 0.005 0.013 -0.063* 0.035 0.069** 0.028 
8/31/2012 + 1day -0.018* 0.010 -0.015 0.013 0.018 0.034 -0.027 0.028 
8/31/2012 + 2day -0.020** 0.010 -0.016 0.013 0.018 0.034 -0.038 0.029 
9/13/2012 - 2day 0.020* 0.011 0.024 0.016 0.019 0.039 0.009 0.026 
9/13/2012 - 1day 0.010 0.010 0.034** 0.015 0.089** 0.039 -0.050* 0.026 
9/13/2012 -0.046*** 0.011 -0.035** 0.015 0.038 0.039 -0.077*** 0.026 
9/13/2012 + 1day -0.049*** 0.011 -0.008 0.015 0.143*** 0.039 -0.158*** 0.027 
9/13/2012 + 2day 0.020* 0.010 0.007 0.015 -0.059 0.039 0.067*** 0.025 
12/12/2012 - 2day 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.014 -0.004 0.029 0.003 0.022 
12/12/2012 - 1day -0.006 0.008 0.005 0.011 0.039 0.029 -0.032 0.022 
12/12/2012 -0.027*** 0.009 -0.004 0.011 0.078*** 0.029 -0.082*** 0.022 
12/12/2012 + 1day 0.022*** 0.008 0.025** 0.011 0.009 0.028 0.021 0.020 
12/12/2012 + 2day 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.011 -0.022 0.028 0.027 0.021 
5/1/2013 - 2day 0.000 0.015 0.007 0.018 0.017 0.031 -0.013 0.023 
5/1/2013 - 1day -0.001 0.017 0.002 0.019 0.006 0.030 -0.002 0.023 
5/1/2013 -0.011 0.014 -0.024 0.017 -0.044 0.030 0.018 0.023 
5/1/2013 + 1day 0.025* 0.015 0.023 0.016 -0.005 0.030 0.027 0.024 
5/1/2013 + 2day 0.026* 0.014 0.066*** 0.017 0.147*** 0.030 -0.078*** 0.022 
5/22/2013 - 2day 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.025 0.020 0.032 -0.003 0.020 
5/22/2013 - 1day 0.000 0.014 -0.008 0.018 -0.030 0.032 0.022 0.022 
5/22/2013 0.066*** 0.016 0.090*** 0.021 0.074** 0.032 0.012 0.022 
5/22/2013 + 1day 0.046*** 0.013 0.048*** 0.018 -0.001 0.032 0.053*** 0.020 
5/22/2013 + 2day -0.007 0.014 -0.010 0.019 -0.011 0.031 0.003 0.020 
6/19/2013 - 2day 0.017 0.032 0.039 0.038 0.074** 0.036 -0.033 0.036 
6/19/2013 - 1day 0.039 0.030 0.037 0.036 -0.005 0.033 0.048 0.037 
6/19/2013 0.029 0.030 0.051 0.036 0.075** 0.033 -0.030 0.037 
6/19/2013 + 1day 0.170*** 0.034 0.193*** 0.037 0.080** 0.038 0.106*** 0.039 
6/19/2013 + 2day 0.106*** 0.030 0.129*** 0.035 0.072* 0.038 0.060 0.037 
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12/18/2013 - 2day -0.008 0.021 0.000 0.025 0.025 0.032 -0.025 0.027 
12/18/2013 - 1day -0.019 0.021 -0.021 0.024 -0.012 0.031 -0.009 0.027 
12/18/2013 0.011 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.031 -0.008 0.027 
12/18/2013 + 1day 0.063*** 0.023 0.070*** 0.024 0.019 0.030 0.053** 0.025 
12/18/2013 + 2day -0.006 0.020 -0.030 0.023 -0.084*** 0.030 0.047* 0.026 
1/29/2014 - 2day 0.004 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.027 0.033 -0.017 0.022 
1/29/2014 - 1day -0.011 0.018 -0.008 0.019 0.010 0.033 -0.020 0.024 
1/29/2014 0.000 0.018 -0.021 0.022 -0.057** 0.029 0.043* 0.023 
1/29/2014 + 1day -0.004 0.015 0.004 0.017 0.032 0.028 -0.028 0.023 
1/29/2014 + 2day -0.037** 0.017 -0.044** 0.018 -0.034 0.028 -0.006 0.022 
3/19/2014 - 2day 0.014 0.015 0.027 0.019 0.038 0.031 -0.022 0.026 
3/19/2014 - 1day 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.020 -0.012 0.031 0.024 0.028 
3/19/2014 0.042** 0.017 0.052*** 0.019 0.039 0.031 0.017 0.026 
3/19/2014 + 1day 0.060*** 0.014 0.062*** 0.019 0.007 0.031 0.054** 0.026 
3/19/2014 + 2day -0.009 0.014 -0.026 0.018 -0.057* 0.030 0.038 0.026 
4/30/2014 - 2day 0.015 0.035 0.026 0.037 0.022 0.028 -0.020 0.043 
4/30/2014 - 1day 0.035 0.034 0.042 0.035 0.021 0.027 0.025 0.043 
4/30/2014 -0.030 0.033 -0.036 0.035 -0.017 0.024 -0.015 0.042 
4/30/2014 + 1day 0.002 0.033 -0.012 0.030 -0.056** 0.024 0.041 0.042 
4/30/2014 + 2day 0.181*** 0.029 0.171*** 0.030 -0.036 0.024 0.201*** 0.042 
5/7/2014 - 2day -0.059* 0.032 -0.050 0.033 0.045* 0.024 -0.080** 0.040 
5/7/2014 - 1day -0.112*** 0.027 -0.118*** 0.029 -0.026 0.023 -0.096** 0.039 
5/7/2014 -0.024 0.031 -0.013 0.028 0.021 0.028 -0.040 0.040 
5/7/2014 + 1day 0.003 0.026 0.018 0.027 0.050* 0.028 -0.039 0.040 
5/7/2014 + 2day 0.012 0.026 0.015 0.031 0.020 0.028 -0.006 0.037 
6/18/2014 - 2day -0.012 0.023 -0.016 0.025 -0.006 0.025 -0.003 0.032 
6/18/2014 - 1day 0.056** 0.022 0.067*** 0.024 0.043 0.028 0.024 0.032 
6/18/2014 0.006 0.022 0.004 0.024 -0.011 0.028 0.018 0.031 
6/18/2014 + 1day -0.044** 0.019 -0.034 0.023 0.039 0.028 -0.073** 0.030 
6/18/2014 + 2day 0.011 0.022 0.005 0.023 -0.029 0.028 0.032 0.031 
7/15/2014 - 2day 0.072*** 0.021 0.060*** 0.021 -0.038 0.024 0.088*** 0.030 
7/15/2014 - 1day -0.006 0.021 -0.001 0.022 0.020 0.025 -0.012 0.031 
7/15/2014 0.019 0.018 0.024 0.020 0.011 0.028 0.003 0.028 
7/15/2014 + 1day -0.025 0.020 -0.030 0.021 -0.015 0.023 -0.009 0.030 
7/15/2014 + 2day 0.237*** 0.019 0.217*** 0.020 -0.074*** 0.023 0.282*** 0.030 
7/30/2014 - 2day -0.127*** 0.026 -0.120*** 0.026 0.024 0.024 -0.141*** 0.038 
7/30/2014 - 1day 0.115*** 0.024 0.100*** 0.030 -0.037 0.023 0.150*** 0.036 
7/30/2014 -0.119*** 0.022 -0.093*** 0.023 0.095*** 0.026 -0.185*** 0.036 
7/30/2014 + 1day 0.016 0.026 0.022 0.023 0.011 0.027 0.005 0.036 
7/30/2014 + 2day 0.106*** 0.022 0.097*** 0.023 -0.031 0.028 0.123*** 0.038 
8/22/2014 - 2day -0.016 0.041 0.003 0.049 0.012 0.030 -0.040 0.045 
8/22/2014 - 1day 0.055 0.038 0.055 0.045 -0.031 0.030 0.059 0.046 
8/22/2014 0.007 0.034 -0.010 0.047 -0.026 0.030 0.042 0.045 
8/22/2014 + 1day -0.016 0.032 -0.028 0.038 -0.022 0.025 -0.006 0.043 
8/22/2014 + 2day -0.019 0.038 -0.006 0.039 0.024 0.025 -0.052 0.045 
9/17/2014 - 2day 0.049 0.037 0.047 0.042 -0.001 0.028 0.048 0.043 
9/17/2014 - 1day -0.030 0.030 -0.025 0.033 0.030 0.033 -0.065 0.044 
9/17/2014 0.000 0.036 0.009 0.040 0.018 0.033 -0.009 0.044 
9/17/2014 + 1day 0.022 0.034 0.021 0.037 -0.002 0.033 0.013 0.041 
9/17/2014 + 2day 0.029 0.034 0.015 0.033 -0.066 0.033 0.076* 0.042 
10/29/2014 - 2day 0.020 0.035 0.017 0.036 -0.001 0.029 0.024 0.044 
10/29/2014 - 1day -0.034 0.030 -0.023 0.033 0.029 0.029 -0.059 0.044 
10/29/2014 0.012 0.034 0.016 0.035 0.007 0.029 0.012 0.044 
10/29/2014 + 1day 0.007 0.029 0.004 0.031 -0.013 0.029 0.011 0.044 
10/29/2014 + 2day 0.019 0.028 0.026 0.034 0.034 0.029 -0.008 0.043 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Table A4: Abnormal Returns (ARs) for Grouped Events 
The ARs are parameter estimates for dummies of grouped events in four regressions by using 3-
day and 5-day window. Each CAR in Table 6 is calculated by adding up all ARs in an event 
window. Estimated intercept, parameter estimates of control variables, GARCH results and 
statistics for each regression are reported in Table 6.  
 
Panel A: the 3-day window case 
 3-Day Window 
 _30tMR  _30tMR  _ 30tT  tSpread  
Date AR SE AR SE AR SE AR SE 
QE1_MBS_Increase - 2days         
QE1_MBS_Increase - 1day -0.007 0.030 -0.011 0.032 -0.028 0.066 -0.002 0.063 
QE1_MBS_Increase -0.089*** 0.033 -0.076 0.052 0.004 0.078 -0.123* 0.068 
QE1_MBS_Increase + 1day -0.020 0.028 -0.014 0.034 0.005 0.071 -0.053 0.077 
QE1_MBS_Increase + 2days         
QE1_T_Increase - 2days         
QE1_T_Increase - 1day 0.037 0.039 0.004 0.052 -0.102 0.096 0.155* 0.082 
QE1_T_Increase 0.012 0.038 -0.055 0.044 -0.216** 0.088 0.183** 0.082 
QE1_T_Increase + 1day -0.044 0.046 -0.056 0.044 -0.040 0.095 -0.026 0.079 
QE1_T_Increase + 2days         
QE1_Both_Increase - 2days         
QE1_Both_Increase - 1day 0.020 0.022 0.028 0.030 -0.004 0.062 -0.006 0.056 
QE1_Both_Increase 0.057*** 0.022 -0.003 0.021 -0.192*** 0.060 0.190** 0.057 
QE1_Both_Increase + 1day -0.125*** 0.035 -0.107*** 0.034 -0.073 0.066 -0.101* 0.053 
QE1_Both_Increase + 2days         
QE1_MBS_Decrease - 2days         
QE1_MBS_Decrease - 1day -0.014 0.023 -0.018 0.026 0.027 0.041 -0.035 0.044 
QE1_MBS_Decrease 0.040* 0.023 0.051** 0.025 0.044 0.040 0.003 0.043 
QE1_MBS_Decrease + 1day -0.002 0.023 -0.002 0.028 -0.019 0.040 0.019 0.040 
QE1_MBS_Decrease + 2days         
QE1_T_Decrease - 2days         
QE1_T_Decrease - 1day 0.040* 0.024 0.021 0.034 -0.069 0.073 0.098* 0.054 
QE1_T_Decrease -0.028 0.028 -0.001 0.034 0.094 0.072 -0.090 0.055 
QE1_T_Decrease + 1day -0.076*** 0.027 -0.100*** 0.029 -0.093 0.072 -0.014 0.054 
QE1_T_Decrease + 2days         
QE2_T_Increase - 2days         
QE2_T_Increase - 1day -0.074*** 0.016 -0.069*** 0.016 -0.010 0.042 -0.074* 0.040 
QE2_T_Increase 0.045*** 0.015 0.040*** 0.015 -0.047 0.043 0.053 0.038 
QE2_T_Increase + 1day 0.004 0.012 -0.015 0.015 -0.053 0.040 0.058 0.037 
QE2_T_Increase + 2days         
QE2_T_Decrease - 2days         
QE2_T_Decrease - 1day -0.058 0.056 -0.031 0.061 0.083 0.051 -0.125* 0.070 
QE2_T_Decrease 0.129*** 0.046 0.156*** 0.049 0.085 0.050 0.072 0.071 
QE2_T_Decrease + 1day -0.077 0.054 -0.087* 0.050 -0.040 0.056 -0.055 0.069 
QE2_T_Decrease + 2days         
OT_T_Increase - 2days         
OT_T_Increase - 1day 0.009 0.015 0.009 0.022 -0.003 0.072 0.022 0.059 
OT_T_Increase 0.021 0.014 -0.024 0.020 -0.155** 0.072 0.136** 0.060 
OT_T_Increase + 1day -0.026 0.017 -0.094*** 0.021 -0.235*** 0.072 0.141** 0.059 
OT_T_Increase + 2days         
OT_Both_Increase - 2days         
OT_Both_Increase - 1day 0.036*** 0.011 0.004 0.016 -0.093 0.057 0.099** 0.047 
OT_Both_Increase 0.020 0.022 -0.015 0.021 -0.091 0.056 0.100** 0.049 
OT_Both_Increase + 1day -0.023 0.024 -0.010 0.043 0.024 0.057 -0.084** 0.040 
OT_Both_Increase + 2days         
QE3_MBS_Increase - 2days         
QE3_MBS_Increase - 1day 0.013 0.014 0.037* 0.019 0.088** 0.044 -0.049* 0.030 
QE3_MBS_Increase -0.045*** 0.015 -0.034* 0.019 0.036 0.044 -0.077** 0.030 
QE3_MBS_Increase + 1day -0.047*** 0.014 -0.007 0.020 0.141*** 0.044 -0.144*** 0.030 
QE3_MBS_Increase + 2days         
QE3_Both_Increase - 2days         
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Panel B: the 5-day window case 
QE3_Both_Increase - 1day -0.030 0.024 -0.032 0.021 -0.015 0.030 -0.017 0.024 
QE3_Both_Increase -0.014 0.035 -0.032 0.025 -0.065** 0.030 0.039 0.028 
QE3_Both_Increase + 1day -0.021* 0.012 -0.023 0.016 -0.004 0.029 -0.018 0.023 
QE3_Both_Increase + 2days         
Tapering - 2days         
Tapering - 1day 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.010 -0.002 0.010 -0.001 0.011 
Tapering 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.012 0.007 0.011 0.005 0.011 
Tapering + 1day 0.017 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.003 0.010 0.024* 0.013 
Tapering + 2days         
 5-Day Window 
 _30
t
MR  _30
t
MR  _ 30
t
T  
t
Spread  
 AR SE AR SE AR SE AR SE 
QE1_MBS_Increase - 2days -0.019 0.030 0.001 0.034 0.066 0.062 -0.058 0.057 
QE1_MBS_Increase - 1day -0.005 0.029 -0.012 0.031 -0.032 0.063 0.013 0.062 
QE1_MBS_Increase -0.088*** 0.032 -0.079 0.051 -0.002 0.078 -0.124* 0.065 
QE1_MBS_Increase + 1day -0.026 0.034 0.008 0.038 0.153* 0.089 -0.152** 0.068 
QE1_MBS_Increase + 2days 0.023 0.034 0.031 0.044 0.035 0.078 0.002 0.068 
QE1_T_Increase - 2days 0.012 0.052 -0.047 0.059 -0.260** 0.129 0.253** 0.103 
QE1_T_Increase - 1day 0.015 0.051 -0.025 0.061 -0.134 0.121 0.122 0.104 
QE1_T_Increase 0.014 0.038 -0.053 0.043 -0.213*** 0.082 0.187** 0.078 
QE1_T_Increase + 1day -0.041 0.037 -0.055 0.041 -0.036 0.092 -0.023 0.077 
QE1_T_Increase + 2days -0.049 0.037 -0.051 0.041 -0.010 0.091 -0.033 0.076 
QE1_Both_Increase - 2days 0.000 0.021 0.027 0.021 0.062 0.058 -0.050 0.057 
QE1_Both_Increase - 1day 0.020 0.022 0.028 0.030 -0.008 0.061 0.005 0.056 
QE1_Both_Increase 0.057*** 0.022 -0.004 0.020 -0.191*** 0.059 0.189*** 0.055 
QE1_Both_Increase + 1day -0.130*** 0.041 -0.104*** 0.030 -0.076 0.066 -0.105** 0.052 
QE1_Both_Increase + 2days 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.022 -0.049 0.060 0.027 0.057 
QE1_MBS_Decrease - 2days 0.034 0.032 0.038 0.031 0.017 0.040 0.013 0.042 
QE1_MBS_Decrease - 1day -0.017 0.023 -0.017 0.024 0.027 0.041 -0.038 0.045 
QE1_MBS_Decrease 0.041* 0.022 0.052** 0.024 0.045 0.040 0.003 0.043 
QE1_MBS_Decrease + 1day 0.001 0.023 -0.005 0.026 -0.017 0.039 0.022 0.039 
QE1_MBS_Decrease + 2days -0.049 0.030 -0.056** 0.028 -0.041 0.039 -0.021 0.045 
QE1_T_Decrease - 2days -0.002 0.024 -0.028 0.035 -0.075 0.072 0.049 0.054 
QE1_T_Decrease - 1day 0.040* 0.023 0.022 0.027 -0.065 0.071 0.085 0.055 
QE1_T_Decrease -0.027 0.027 0.001 0.033 0.099 0.071 -0.090 0.055 
QE1_T_Decrease + 1day -0.074*** 0.023 -0.099*** 0.026 -0.090 0.071 -0.014 0.055 
QE1_T_Decrease + 2days -0.032 0.022 -0.041 0.032 -0.019 0.071 -0.003 0.054 
QE2_T_Increase - 2days 0.009 0.013 -0.005 0.013 -0.028 0.040 0.040 0.039 
QE2_T_Increase - 1day -0.076*** 0.016 -0.069*** 0.015 -0.008 0.042 -0.084** 0.040 
QE2_T_Increase 0.045*** 0.015 0.040*** 0.014 -0.045 0.042 0.053 0.037 
QE2_T_Increase + 1day 0.003 0.014 -0.015 0.014 -0.052 0.039 0.052 0.037 
QE2_T_Increase + 2days 0.013 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.001 0.041 0.022 0.039 
QE2_T_Decrease - 2days -0.069 0.047 -0.055 0.050 0.051 0.055 -0.128* 0.068 
QE2_T_Decrease - 1day -0.051 0.054 -0.029 0.059 0.081 0.049 -0.096 0.067 
QE2_T_Decrease 0.131*** 0.045 0.159*** 0.049 0.084* 0.049 0.072 0.066 
QE2_T_Decrease + 1day -0.075 0.052 -0.085* 0.048 -0.039 0.049 -0.053 0.068 
QE2_T_Decrease + 2days -0.003 0.051 -0.011 0.047 -0.017 0.049 0.002 0.066 
OT_T_Increase - 2days -0.012 0.014 -0.043** 0.019 -0.103 0.066 0.069 0.055 
OT_T_Increase - 1day 0.010 0.014 0.007 0.019 0.000 0.066 0.008 0.056 
OT_T_Increase 0.022 0.014 -0.023 0.018 -0.154** 0.066 0.136** 0.055 
OT_T_Increase + 1day -0.025* 0.014 -0.093*** 0.018 -0.236*** 0.065 0.158*** 0.052 
OT_T_Increase + 2days -0.006 0.013 0.025 0.018 0.118* 0.065 -0.091* 0.054 
OT_Both_Increase - 2days -0.006 0.010 0.032* 0.019 0.132** 0.052 -0.074* 0.040 
OT_Both_Increase - 1day 0.037*** 0.011 0.004 0.015 -0.099* 0.054 0.115** 0.046 
OT_Both_Increase 0.021 0.022 -0.016 0.020 -0.099* 0.052 0.099** 0.048 
OT_Both_Increase + 1day -0.021 0.024 -0.011 0.039 0.019 0.054 -0.081** 0.039 
OT_Both_Increase + 2days -0.019 0.021 -0.009 0.023 0.042 0.069 -0.018 0.070 
QE3_MBS_Increase - 2days 0.022 0.015 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.042 0.010 0.029 
QE3_MBS_Increase - 1day 0.012 0.013 0.036* 0.019 0.088** 0.042 -0.051* 0.029 
QE3_MBS_Increase -0.046*** 0.015 -0.035* 0.019 0.039 0.042 -0.077*** 0.029 
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Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
 
 
QE3_MBS_Increase + 1day -0.049*** 0.015 -0.008 0.019 0.144*** 0.042 -0.157*** 0.030 
QE3_MBS_Increase + 2days 0.020 0.014 0.005 0.018 -0.059 0.042 0.068** 0.028 
QE3_Both_Increase - 2days 0.022 0.016 0.032* 0.017 0.018 0.029 0.014 0.025 
QE3_Both_Increase - 1day -0.036 0.024 -0.035 0.022 -0.016 0.029 -0.020 0.025 
QE3_Both_Increase -0.015 0.036 -0.032 0.025 -0.067** 0.029 0.039 0.027 
QE3_Both_Increase + 1day -0.022* 0.012 -0.025* 0.014 -0.005 0.029 -0.015 0.022 
QE3_Both_Increase + 2days -0.008 0.012 -0.006 0.014 0.010 0.028 -0.015 0.023 
Tapering - 2days 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.010 -0.014 0.011 
Tapering - 1day 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.010 -0.002 0.010 0.001 0.011 
Tapering 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.012 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.011 
Tapering + 1day 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.020 0.013 
Tapering + 2days 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.013 -0.024** 0.010 0.021 0.014 
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Figure A1: Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) 
of ln( )CPI , ln( )HPI  and UER  
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Figure A2: Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) 
of Residuals in ARMA Models Fitting ln( )CPI , ln( )HPI  and UER  
ARMA models are ARMA(3,2), ARMA(2,0) and ARMA(1,5) for ln( )CPI , ln( )HPI  and 
UER  respectively.  
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Chapter 2: QE Announcement Effects on the Mortgage Rate: 
A Recursive Structural VAR Approach 
 
1. Introduction and Literature Review 
In Chapter 1, I regress the change of 30-year mortgage rate on event dummies and use 30-
year Treasury rate as a control variable in the model to do event studies. However, the endogenous 
problem exists since the mortgage rate and treasury rate can have a casual relationship. The VAR 
model is an option to this problem by suggesting both the changes of the mortgage rate and the 
Treasury rate as endogenous variables. 
QE announcements might be thought as endogenous variables and rely on macroeconomic 
variables. Under this assumption, some researchers try to build the binary fact of QE 
announcements to the traditional VAR model. Dueker (2005) introduces the Qual VAR model to 
incorporate information from qualitative variables. In his model, a latent variable linked to binary 
dummies of economic recession is treated as an endogenous variable. Meinusch and Tillmann 
(2016) estimate the macroeconomic impact of QE shocks by using the Qual VAR model to build 
the binary behavior of the QE announcements into the model. Tillmann (2016) uses the same 
methodology to analyze the QE announcement spillovers to emerging economies. 
Some researchers incorporate other measures to quantify QE and consider them as 
endogenous variables in the VAR directly. Patrabansh et al. (2014) and Balatti (2016) use the 
quantity of assets bought by the Fed as the QE indicator. Huston and Spencer (2016) distinguish 
between Treasury purchases, MBS purchases and Operation Twist46, and they find different interest 
                                                          
46 Operation Twist is identified as the difference of Treasury holdings with greater than 5-year maturity and 
less than 5-year maturity. 
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rate responses to these three different events. White (2012) and Rogers et al. (2014) suggest the 
first principal component of yield changes as QE shocks in the VAR. 
In this paper, similar to Chapter 1, QE announcements are identified as dummy variables 
and are treated exogenously. In case of the contemporaneous effect of the Treasury rate on the 
mortgage rate, I use the recursive Structural VAR (SVAR) model to find the responses of both rates 
after QE announcements. I compare the results by using the VAR with the ones by using the 
GARCH in Chapter 1 for 1-day and 3-day windows. I also create the impulse responses of levels 
of both rates to QE events in a 30-day period and compare the long-run responses with the ones 
found in Chapter 1. In addition, the results in this paper are compared to the ones in other QE 
literature using the VAR. 
 
2. Model 
A correlation at 0.37947 between tMR and tTR suggests me to build the contemporaneous 
effects into the model. In that sense, I use the recursive SVAR model with exogenous event 
dummies in this paper. The structural representation is 
 
1 0
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
AY c AY B X  
 
     , (1) 
where tY is a column vector of endogenous variables, and here we have ( , )
T
t t tY MR TR   . tX is a 
column vector of exogenous dummy variables indicating k  QE announcements. Since one grouped 
event is associated with one dummy and most of the event windows are not overlapped, there is no 
lags for dummy variables. Thus, n equals to zero. As there is supposed to be a contemporaneous 
effect of the Treasury rate on the mortgage rate but no other way round, A is a2 2 upper triangle  
                                                          
47 The correlation between the levels of mortgage rate and Treasury rate is as high as 0.807. 
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matrix with the form (
1 −𝛼
0 1
). The iA ’s are 2 2 coefficient matrices for endogenous variables, 
and the jB ’s are 2 k coefficient matrices for exogenous variables.  
After pre-multiplying both sides of the equation (1) by 1A , we have the reduced-form 
VAR as 
  
 
    * * *
1 0
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
Y c A Y B X e , (2) 
where 
1
t te A 
 . So each structural shock ,i t can be transferred to a shock ,i te in the reduced-form 
VAR by using this equation. Based on AIC, the model with m equaling to 10 is best fit. 
The VAR model I am estimating here does not include Macroeconomic variables as 
controls. The reason is that those variables are not reported daily and are proved to only have trivial 
effects on the results in Chapter 1.  
 
3. Results 
First, we run the reduced-form VAR by using individual event dummies with 1-day and 3-
day window and the results are show in Table 1. Comparing to the GARCH results in Chapter 1, 
the magnitudes of the responses of both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate are similar48. 
However, the statistical significance of the responses for 1-day window mostly decrease due to the 
greater standard errors in the VAR model.  
To see the aggregate effects of QE announcements in each QE round, I add the responses 
of both rates for individual events to show the cumulative responses in Figure 1. Except for the 
responses of the Treasury rate in QE3, the responses of both rates in 1-day and 3-day windows 
were in same directions, and the magnitudes of responses with 3-day window were greater than 
                                                          
48 The model used for comparing the responses of the mortgage rate in Chapter 1 is the one without 
controlling for tTR . 
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those with 1-day window. In general, both rates cumulatively decreased during event days in QE1, 
QE2, OT and QE3, while they cumulatively increased during event days in Tapering period. The 
cumulative effects of QE announcements on both rates in QE1 were greater than in other rounds of 
QE. Compare to the cumulative responses found in Chapter 149, the magnitudes of the mortgage 
rate responses are similar to the results in the GARCH regression not controlling for the Treasury 
rate. The cumulative responses of Treasury rate in the VAR model were greater than those in the 
GARCH model. As a result, the values of responses in the VAR model are closer to the results of 
Gagnon et al. (2011) and Krishnamurthy and VIssing-Jorgensen (2011) for QE 1 and QE2 than in 
the GARCH model. 
Next, we put individual events into 12 categories with respect to the round and type as we 
did in Chapter 1, and then run the VAR by using grouped event dummies. Table 2 shows the 
responses of the mortgage rate and Treasury rate in 1-day window and 3-day window. We can see 
that most of the magnitudes and significances of interest rate responses are in line with the GARCH 
results in Chapter 1. There is one exception for the events of increase in Treasury purchases in QE2. 
During those events, although the mortgage rate barely decreased by 0.007 percent on event days, 
the aggregate decrease in 3-day window was as large as 0.134 percent. This large decrease of the 
mortgage rate violates the conclusion in Chapter 1 that the increase of Treasury purchases only 
largely reduced the Treasury rate but not the mortgage rate. 
The conclusions from the VAR analysis here are similar to the ones from the GARCH 
analysis in Chapter 1. The events of both asset purchases lowered both the mortgage rate and 
Treasury rate dramatically on event days and in 3-day event window. Distinctively, MBS purchase 
events reduced the mortgage rate more than the Treasury rate and Treasury purchase events reduced 
the Treasury rate more than the mortgage rate. For instance, MBS purchase events in QE1 and QE3 
                                                          
49 Comparing to Figure 6 in Chapter 1. 
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decreased the mortgage rate by 0.087 and 0.059 percent on event days and by 0.144 and 0.05 
percent in 3-day event window, while the same events actually increased the Treasury rate by 0.025 
and 0.021 percent on events days and by 0.036 and 0.278 percent during in 3-day event window. 
On the other hand, Treasury purchase events in QE1 and OT cut the Treasury rate by 0.236 and 
0.178 percent on event days and by 0.427 and 0.464 percent in 3-day event window, while those 
events only lower the mortgage rate by 0.031 and 0.032 percent on event days and by 0.05 and 
0.086 percent in 3-day event window. Owing to the different responses of interest rates to different 
events, the mortgage-Treasury rate spread varied differently. The spread narrowed during MBS 
purchase events and extended during Treasury purchase events. 
Moreover, the events of decrease in asset purchases decreased the interest rates in general, 
but the results are not consistent sometime. The events of decrease in MBS purchases in QE1 
increased both the mortgage rate and Treasury rate in slight amounts. However, the events of 
decrease in Treasury purchases in QE1 increased both rates on event days but decreased them in 3-
day event window. In QE2, the events of decrease in Treasury purchases lowered the Treasury rate 
and widened the spread a lot in 3-day window. The Treasury rate increased by 0.11 percent and the 
mortgage rate event decreased by 0.056 percent for those events in 3-day window. 
Although both the mortgage rate and Treasury rate increased at the beginning of Tapering 
period as shown in Figure 1 in Chapter 1, the effects of the Tapering events on both rates were 
trivial. The mortgage rate and Treasury rate only increased by 0.002 and 0.012 on event days and 
by 0.011 and 0.012 in 3-day window. 
Next, I calculate the 30-day accumulated impulse responses of the mortgage rate and 
Treasury rate to categorized events and show them in Figure 2 and Figure 3. From these two 
figures, we see that the QE announcement effects on both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate 
were permanent. After the announcements shocked both interest rates by a large amount on event 
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day or on next day, the rates would fluctuate and eventually stayed at a certain level in long run. 
This result is consistent with the conclusion in Chapter 1 that the long run effects of QE 
announcements were persistent and in the same directions of short run effects but with less 
magnitude. In line with the conclusion in Chapter 1, the confidence intervals widened in long run, 
which indicates the more volatility of long run effects than short run effects.  
Figure 2 shows that increasing MBS purchases decreased the mortgage rate dramatically 
in short run, however, the long-run responses of the mortgage rate diminished. On the other hand, 
increasing Treasury purchases decreased mortgage rate less in short run than in long run. The 
similar phenomenon did not work for the Treasury rate. In Figure 3, the purchase events of either 
asset decreased the Treasury rate more in short run than in long run. 
By comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3, we find different impulse responses of the mortgage 
rate and the Treasury rate. In Figure 2, the shocks to the mortgage rate happened on event day or 
on the next day. For some events when there was a shock on event day, the shock lasted to the next 
day and dissolved on the following day. In Figure 3, on the other hand, the shocks to the treasury 
rate happened only on event day and diminished on the next day. The lagged response of the 
mortgage rate suggests that the longer window is necessary for capturing the announcement effects. 
In addition, the faster movement of the Treasury rate than the mortgage rate suggests the Treasury 
rate affecting the mortgage rate recursively and using the recursive SVAR is necessary. 
It is hard to compare the impulse responses found in my model to the ones found in 
previous literature using the VAR. The reason is that the QE events are not grouped by type and 
the analyses are not based on daily data in previous studies. However, there is a consensus that 
effects of QE announcements on both the mortgage rate and the Treasury were persistent and the 
long-run effects were significantly different from zero. 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper uses the recursive SVAR model to estimate the effects of QE announcements 
on the 30-year mortgage rate and the 30-year Treasury rate. I find that for individual events and 
grouped events, 1-day and 3-day responses of both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate are 
similar to the results of the GARCH model in Chapter 1. The aggregate effect of QE announcements 
in each round of QE is consistent with the results in Chapter 1 and the previous literature. In general, 
increasing MBS purchases lowered the mortgage rate more than the Treasury rate and shrank the 
spread. 
After creating the impulse responses of interest rates in a long period, I find that other than 
the differences in magnitude, the effects of QE announcements on both rates were permanent. This 
phenomenon is in line with the results in the existing literature. In addition, the responses are more 
volatile in long run than in short run. I also find that the responses of the Treasury rate were 
prompter than the responses of the mortgage rate after a QE announcement. This phenomenon 
proves the necessity of longer event windows and a recursive relationship between the Treasury 
rate and the mortgage rate. 
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Tables and Graphs 
Table 1: Responses of  ∆𝑴𝑹𝒕 and ∆𝑻𝑹𝒕 to QE Announcement Shocks (Individual Events) 
This table reports the responses of tMR and tTR to QE announcement shocks on event days and 
in 3-day event windows estimated by the SVAR model expressed in equation (1). 
  tMR    tTR   
 1-day 3-day 1-day 3-day 
Event Date Value SE Value SE Value SE Value SE 
11/25/2008 -0.176*** 0.049 -0.233*** 0.086 -0.149** 0.060 -0.223*** 0.084 
12/1/2008 -0.033 0.049 -0.056 0.087 -0.235*** 0.060 -0.435*** 0.084 
12/16/2008 0.013 0.048 -0.230*** 0.085 -0.132** 0.059 -0.427*** 0.084 
1/28/2009 0.001 0.049 -0.063 0.085 0.199*** 0.060 0.256*** 0.084 
3/18/2009 -0.017 0.048 -0.035 0.084 -0.249*** 0.059 -0.118 0.084 
8/12/2009 0.019 0.048 -0.070 0.084 0.096 0.059 -0.053 0.084 
9/23/2009 0.057 0.048 0.013 0.084 0.007 0.059 -0.062 0.084 
11/4/2009 0.031 0.048 0.031 0.084 0.072 0.059 0.148* 0.084 
8/10/2010 0.023 0.048 -0.056 0.084 -0.013 0.059 -0.079 0.084 
8/27/2010 -0.108** 0.048 -0.144* 0.084 0.172*** 0.059 0.018 0.084 
9/21/2010 -0.037 0.049 -0.212** 0.085 -0.068 0.060 -0.149* 0.084 
10/15/2010 0.119** 0.048 -0.055 0.085 0.079 0.060 0.114 0.084 
11/3/2010 -0.011 0.048 -0.071 0.084 0.165*** 0.060 0.049 0.084 
8/9/2011 0.030 0.048 -0.115 0.085 -0.127** 0.060 -0.351*** 0.085 
8/26/2011 -0.017 0.048 0.020 0.085 -0.041 0.060 0.014 0.084 
9/21/2011 -0.032 0.048 -0.086 0.084 -0.178*** 0.059 -0.462*** 0.084 
6/20/2012 -0.014 0.048 -0.038 0.084 -0.022 0.059 -0.020 0.057 
8/22/2012 -0.078 0.048 -0.182** 0.084 -0.079 0.059 -0.131*** 0.041 
8/31/2012 0.001 0.048 -0.032 0.084 -0.070 0.059 -0.096** 0.045 
9/13/2012 -0.058 0.048 -0.049 0.084 0.037 0.059 0.282*** 0.041 
12/12/2012 -0.015 0.048 -0.009 0.084 0.071 0.059 0.108** 0.045 
5/1/2013 -0.031 0.048 -0.020 0.084 -0.047 0.059 -0.062 0.041 
5/22/2013 0.086* 0.048 0.108 0.084 0.069 0.059 0.024 0.044 
6/19/2013 0.041 0.048 0.233*** 0.084 0.068 0.059 0.125 0.090 
12/18/2013 0.004 0.048 0.022 0.084 0.021 0.059 0.011 0.106 
1/29/2014 -0.028 0.048 -0.037 0.084 -0.064 0.059 -0.035 0.105 
3/19/2014 0.049 0.048 0.096 0.084 0.034 0.059 0.019 0.104 
4/30/2014 -0.039 0.048 -0.046 0.084 -0.024 0.059 -0.064 0.105 
5/7/2014 -0.021 0.048 -0.144* 0.084 0.027 0.060 0.050 0.104 
6/18/2014 0.000 0.048 0.024 0.084 -0.012 0.059 0.059 0.104 
7/15/2014 0.009 0.048 -0.007 0.084 0.006 0.059 -0.006 0.104 
7/30/2014 -0.066 0.049 -0.028 0.084 0.099* 0.060 0.075 0.103 
8/22/2014 0.011 0.049 0.015 0.084 -0.026 0.060 -0.082 0.104 
9/17/2014 -0.005 0.048 -0.042 0.084 0.008 0.059 0.035 0.104 
10/29/2014 0.011 0.048 -0.035 0.084 0.003 0.059 0.007 0.105 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Effects of QE Announcements on the Mortgage Rate and Treasury 
Rate around Announcement Days 
Two graphs shows the cumulative responses of the 30-year mortgage rate and Treasury rate across 
announcements in each round of QE with 1-day and 3-day event windows respectively. As we only 
focus on “easing” announcements in QE1, QE2, OT and QE3, four events of decrease in asset 
purchases are not included. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 1, four events contaminated by 
Economy report release or already expected by the market are not included. 
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Table 2: Responses of  ∆𝑴𝑹𝒕 and ∆𝑻𝑹𝒕 to QE Announcement Shocks (Grouped Events) 
This table reports the responses of 
tMR and tTR to QE announcement shocks on event days and 
in 3-day event windows estimated by the SVAR model expressed in equation (1). The events are 
grouped by round and type of QE. “Increase” and “Decrease” indicate the increase and decrease of 
asset purchases. 
  tMR  tTR  
Round of QE Type of QE 1-day 3-day 1-day 3-day 
QE1 
MBS Increase -0.087** 
(0.034) 
-0.144*** 
(0.034) 
0.025 
(0.043) 
0.021 
(0.042) 
T Increase -0.031 
(0.049) 
-0.050 
(0.049) 
-0.236*** 
(0.061) 
-0.427*** 
(0.060) 
Both Increase -0.002 
(0.034) 
-0.135*** 
(0.034) 
-0.191*** 
(0.043) 
-0.277*** 
(0.042) 
MBS Decrease 0.044 
(0.034) 
0.022 
(0.034) 
0.041 
(0.042) 
0.042 
(0.042) 
T Decrease 0.018 
(0.049) 
-0.068 
(0.048) 
0.093 
(0.060) 
-0.058 
(0.059) 
QE2 
T Increase -0.007 
(0.035) 
-0.134*** 
(0.034) 
-0.039 
(0.043) 
-0.117*** 
(0.042) 
T Decrease 0.120** 
(0.049) 
-0.056 
(0.048) 
0.080 
(0.060) 
0.110* 
(0.060) 
OT 
T Increase -0.032 
(0.048) 
-0.086* 
(0.048) 
-0.178*** 
(0.060) 
-0.464*** 
(0.059) 
Both Increase 0.008 
(0.035) 
-0.044 
(0.034) 
-0.084** 
(0.043) 
-0.159*** 
(0.042) 
QE3 
MBS Increase -0.059 
(0.048) 
-0.050 
(0.048) 
0.036 
(0.060) 
0.278*** 
(0.059) 
Both Increase -0.038 
(0.034) 
-0.107*** 
(0.034) 
-0.074* 
(0.042) 
-0.116*** 
(0.042) 
Tapering 0.002 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1. 
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Figure 2: Accumulated Impulse Responses of ∆𝑴𝑹𝒕to the Shocks of Announcements 
The impulse responses of  ∆𝑀𝑅𝑡 are accumulated to show the responses of  𝑀𝑅𝑡 to the event shocks. 95% confidence intervals are created. 
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Figure 3: Accumulative Impulse Responses of ∆𝑻𝑹𝒕to the Shocks of Announcements 
The impulse responses of  ∆𝑇𝑅𝑡 are accumulated to show the responses of  𝑇𝑅𝑡 to the event shocks. 95% confidence intervals are created. 
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Chapter 3: Monetary Policy Instruments and Their Effects on 
the Stock Market in China 
 
1. Introduction 
It is commonly accepted that the monetary policy affects the financial markets. For most 
of the industrialized economies in the conventional periods, the monetary policy is carried out by 
central banks through adjusting the short-run interest rates. Although China’s economy is gradually 
being transformed from the central-planning economy to the market-oriented one, most of the 
commercial banks are still state owned. In that sense, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) is able 
to implement the monetary policy through a basket of instruments such as the short-run interest 
rate, the money supply, the credit and so on. The non-uniqueness of monetary policy instruments 
used by PBOC creates difficulty in estimating their effects on asset prices.  
In this paper, I analyze the responses of Shanghai A-share stock price index to the PBOC’s 
monetary policy. Two price-based instruments (the repo rate and the benchmark lending rate) and 
two quantity-based instruments (the M2 and the total loan) are discussed and their corresponding 
effects on the stock price are estimated in a structural VAR (SVAR) model. I incorporate two 
restriction schemes: (1) the short-run recursive and (2) the short-run and long-run combined, and 
compare the impulse responses under these two methods. Although both estimations confirm that 
a contractionary monetary policy lessens the stock price and appreciates the domestic currency, the 
later restriction approach gives us better estimation and more intuitive results. 
The reminder of my paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
in three aspects. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 introduces the SVAR model and 
identification methods. Section 5 presents the main results and discussions. Section 6 conducts 
several robustness checks of my results. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Monetary Policy Instruments of the PBOC 
Before the analysis of monetary policy effects on asset prices, we need to know the goals 
and instruments of the PBOC’s monetary policy. According to the “Law of People’s Republic of 
China on the People’s Bank of China”, the mandates for monetary policy in China include 
maintaining the stability of the currency, promoting economic growth and maintaining financial 
stability. Different from simply adjusting the short-run interest rates by open market operations in 
major developed economies, the PBOC employs a variety of tools to conduct the monetary policy. 
Based on the periods of their estimations, Xie (2004) and Geiger (2008) find four price-based 
monetary policy instruments of the PBOC, which are reserve requirements, lending rates, open 
market operations and central bank bills. Later, Zhang (2009) suggests that the PBOC follows both 
quantity (money supply) and price (interest rate) rules to implement the monetary policy. After 
building a DSGE model, she concludes that the price rules are more effective in stabilizing the 
economy than the quantity rules. Shu and Ng (2010) list 11 different monetary tools50 used by the 
PBOC and categorize them into market and non-market based, quantity and price based. He et al. 
(2013) suggest four major monetary policy instruments, which are open market operation (OMO), 
benchmark lending rate, window guidance and money supply (M2). Based on China’s monetary 
policy regime, they further state that the 7-day reserve repo rate and the total loan provided by 
financial institutions are considered as indicators of OMO and window guidance respectively. 
Using a factor-augmented VAR, they conclude that market-based instruments like the repo rate and 
the benchmark leading rate are less effective to macroeconomic variables than non-market-based 
instruments like the growth rates of total loan and M2. 
Some researchers try to synthesize various monetary policy instruments by calculating a 
                                                          
50 The 11 tools are Issuance size and rate of central bank bills, Targeted bill issuance, size and rate of 
repurchase and reverse repurchase arrangements, reserve requirement, benchmark leaning rate, special 
deposits from selected banks, foreign currency swap, credit control, regulation on changing market 
behavior. 
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composite index. Xiong (2012) constructs an index of the monetary policy stance, which captures 
various monetary policy information. Following the idea of Xiong (2012), Girardin et al. (2014) 
construct a new monetary policy index in monthly frequency to include the movements of both 
price-based and quantity-based instruments. They also mention that the PBOC implemented 
administrative “window guidance” to affect bank lending, and this instrument is not directly 
observable but needed to be put into consideration when evaluating monetary policy effects on the 
macro-economy. Sun (2015) generalizes the monetary policy instruments suggested by previous 
literature and creates a new composite index. 
Without consensus of ideas, it is hard to trust a single index for identifying the monetary 
policy and further use this index to conduct analysis. For this reason, I follow He et al. (2013) to 
consider four different monetary policy instruments of PBOC and their different effects on the stock 
market in my paper.  
 
2.2 Methods for Chinese Monetary Policy Analysis 
In previous studies, the analysis of monetary policy effects on stock prices are mostly based 
on the VAR model and event studies. Chen and Xie (2016) study the impact of a loosing monetary 
policy (i.e., events of lowering the interest rate and the reserve requirement) on the Chinese stock 
market in the first half of 2015. They observe the increase of stock prices during these events, and 
they find that the impact start to fade out in the third trading day. As PBOC conducts monetary 
policy via various instruments with non-binary movements, event studies cannot be used to 
estimate the effects in a long period. Thus, I choose the VAR over event studies in this paper.  
Koivu (2012) uses a structural VAR (SVAR) model with short-run restrictions to estimate 
the co-movements among the monetary policy, the asset prices, the household income and the 
consumption in China. He finds that although an expansionary monetary policy leads to higher 
asset prices in general, change of restrictions will lead to different responses of variables. However, 
Yao et al. (2013) estimate a bivariate SVAR to analyze the response of asset prices (i.e., housing 
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and stock market) to the monetary policy shock (i.e., interest rate and M2). Although they find that 
the stock index declines after a contractionary monetary policy shock, both short-run and long-run 
restrictions output the similar responses, which is contrary to the results in other literature. 
Hammoudeh et al. (2014) assess the monetary policy (i.e., interest rate and M2) effects on 
commodity prices in China by using a Bayesian SVAR. As using a Cholesky decomposition, they 
order the variables by relative exogeneity as “macroeconomic variables, monetary policy 
instruments, asset prices” (Christiano et al., 2005) and obtain the expected results. Berkelmans et 
al. (2016) uses a theoretical model to challenge the idea of treating the direct interest rate change 
as a monetary policy instrument in China, and they give the reason for ineffectiveness on deposit 
demand and exchange rate non-liberalization.   
If the monetary policy stance is viewed as a binary variable (i.e., either expansionary or 
contractionary), then it can be modeled as a dummy variable (exogenous) or linked into a latent 
variable (endogenous) in a VAR. For the later approach, Dueker (2005) introduces a Qual VAR 
model to account for the impacts of the economic recession. Meinusch and Tillmann (2016) and 
Tillmann (2016) use a Qual VAR to explain the effects of quantitative easing announcements. Chen 
et al. (2017) create the data of PBOC’s monetary policy stances via three variables- required 
reserves ratio, lending rate and deposit rate, and then they estimate a Qual VAR to analyze the 
responses of asset prices to tightening and easing shocks in China. One of the disadvantages for the 
Qual VAR is that the monetary policy shocks are hard to be quantified.  
As the liberalization of China’s economy is undergoing, some data series are short-spanned 
and the government polies are changing dramatically. In viewing of this situation, several 
researchers incorporate a factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) to assess the influence of Chinese 
monetary policy (He et al., 2013; Fernald et al., 2014; Tan et al., 2017). Although the FAVAR is 
claimed to be more suitable for the Chinese economy, it has the drawback for incapability of 
comparing the monetary transmission mechanism in China and in Western economies (Fernald et 
al., 2014). Thus, in my paper, I choose to use a traditional SVAR for estimation with the purpose 
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of comparing my results to the literature examining the US economy.  
 
2.3 Exogenous Variables Affecting Chinese Stock Market 
Spiegel (2005) states that the exchange rate reform announcement brings about 2.1% 
increase of the Chinese Yuan against the US dollar. Dickinson and Jia (2007) estimate VARs with 
the interest rate, the output, the price and the total deposit in different periods divided by structural 
breaks. After finding the different impulse responses to interest rate shocks, they conclude that 
structural changes need to be concerned when studying the monetary policy impact. Most recent 
structural changes in China’s financial market are non-tradable share reforms and the exchange rate 
reform in 2005. Beltratti et al. (2011) estimate the effects of non-tradable share reforms and 
conclude that the stocks benefit from these reforms especially the small ones. Mensi et al. (2014) 
discuss the correlation between the China’s stock market and the influential global factors by 
running a quantile regression. They find that the S&P500, the oil price, the gold price and the VIX 
are significantly related to the Chinese stock price index at the low or mid quantile.  In addition, 
the Fed’s quantitative easing policy is found to have enormous and widespread effects on the 
emerging economies (Chen et al., 2016). 
In this paper, I mostly follow Mensi et al. (2014) to include the global variables they find 
to affect the China’s stock market in the VARs as exogenous variables. I also add dummies 
indicating the structural changes in Chinese and global economies into the model for the better 
estimation. 
 
3. Data 
I use monthly data primarily compiled from Bloomberg Terminal. In general, the whole 
data set covers the period from January 1990 to December 2016. However, due to the different 
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availabilities of data series, the data used for analysis in my model are between October 200351 and 
December 2016. As suggested by He et al. (2013), the PBOC uses four major monetary policy 
instruments52, which are the open market operation, the interest rate targeting, the window guidance 
and the money supply control. Four indicators identifying these instruments are the 7-day reserve 
repo rate, the 1-year benchmark lending rate, the total loan53 and the M2 respectively. The top graph 
of Figure 1 shows that the benchmark lending rate and the 7-day repo rate followed the similar 
trend, but the repo rate were trading more frequently. The bottom graph of Figure 1 shows that the 
year-on-year (YoY) percentage changes of total loan and M2 closely followed the similar 
movement, although the change of total loan was more volatile. Both the total loan and the M2 
soared up enormously in 2009 due to the financial crisis and reached to peaks before slumping in 
2010. Then, they both dropped to the similar levels as before 2009 and then fluctuated around 15%. 
As an indicator of stock market price in China, Shanghai A-Share Stock Price Index is the 
weighted average of prices for the stocks traded in Chinese Yuan in Shanghai stock exchange. From 
the top graph of Figure 2, the index is volatile during the 2008 financial crisis and from 2015 to 
2016. It reached to the peak at around 6000 points and dropped promptly to under 2000 points 
within the year of 2008. The Bottom graph of Figure 2 displays the time series of real effective 
exchange rate (REER), which is calculated as “the geometric weighted averages of bilateral 
exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices” (BIS). Since each bilateral exchange rate is 
foreign currency/domestic currency rate, an increase in REER means an appreciation of domestic 
currency. The REER climbed substantially at the mid of 2008 and dropped promptly at the start of 
2009, then it increased sharply at the mid of 2015 and declined abruptly at the start of 2016. 
Although fluctuating through the period, the REER was clearly following a linear trend with 
                                                          
51 This is the earliest availability for 7-day repo rate. 
52 The PBOC also announced the required reserve ratio (RRR) and the rediscount rate (RDR) periodically. 
However, I did not include them in my model as alternative monetary policy instruments, since they were 
announced infrequently and moved similarly to the benchmark lending rate. 
53 The total loan is the total amount (denoted by US dollar) of loans made by all financial institutions in 
China. 
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upward sloping. To control for the trend, I add a trend term into my model as discussed later in my 
paper. 
In addition, there are three macroeconomic indicators in my model. The industrial 
production index estimates the productivity of the economy and serves as a good alternative to 
GDP54 . The consumer price index captures the dynamics of inflation. The commodity index is 
considered as a gauge of global demand as China is regarded as a major commodity importer. To 
adjust for the seasonality issue, all of these three variables are in YoY percentage change55. The 
summary statistics and original sources of data are reported in Table 1. The table also shows the 
summary of the exogenous variables which are discussed in part 3.3. 
 
4. Model and Identification 
I estimate a Structural VAR (SVAR) model with exogenous variables as follows 
 
1
m
t i t i t t
i
AY c AY BX t u

     , (1) 
where
tY is the column vector of endogenous variables at and tX is the column vector of exogenous 
variables at time t. t is a trend term to control for the linear trend within some exogenous variables 
(e.g., Industrial Production Index) and 
tu implies the structural shocks at time t. In order to estimate, 
I pre-multiply both sides of equation (1) with 1A to get the reduced-form VAR as 
 * * * *
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Y c A Y B X t 

     , (2) 
where 
t is the vector of disturbance and t tA u  . 
The Exogenous variables in tX are categorized into global factors and domestic factors. 
According to Mensi et al. (2014), oil price ( tOP ), gold price ( tGP ), S&P500 ( 500tSP ) and VIX 
                                                          
54 Industrial production index is chosen over GDP since the latter is only reported quarterly. 
55 An alternative method to control for seasonality is using levels of these three variables and creating a 
dummy for each month. However, as most of the literature use YoY % changes, I just choose the same 
approach in this paper. 
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index (
tVIX ) have direct effects on China’s stock price index. In addition to these global factors, I 
add the Federal Reserve’s QE announcement dummies (
tQEIncrease  and tQEDecrease  ) to my 
model to identify the spillover effect of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy on Chinese stock 
market (Bowman et al., 2015).
tQEIncrease takes the value 1 on the days of QE announcements 
indicating asset purchase increases and 0 on other days, while
tQEDecrease takes the value 1 on the 
days of QE announcements indicating asset purchase decreases and 0 on other days . Using the 
event days found in Chapter 1 of my dissertation, there are 13 months featuring increase events and 
16 months featuring decrease events.  
Some domestic factors affecting the Chinese stock market are controlled in the model. 
During the year of 2005, the Chinese government applied a series of reforms (i.e., three times in 
April, June and August) aiming to remove non-tradable shares, which were once held by the 
government or institutional investors only (Beltratti et al., 2011). I add three dummies ( 1tSMreform ,
2tSMreform  and 3tSMreform  ) to specify these three events in my model, since the reforms are 
believed to affect the supply side of the stock market. In addition, on July 21, 2005, the PBOC 
announced to end pegging Chinese Yuan to US dollar regime and to start relating Chinese Yuan to 
a “basket” of currencies. Since this event generated great impact on exchange rate and the Chinese 
stock market (Spiegel, 2005), I create a dummy (
tCreform ) to identify this event. 
For short run restrictions to identify the SVAR, I use a recursive scheme with the ordering 
of endogenous variables following Christiano et al. (2005), Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) and 
Hammoudeh (2014). Similar to these studies, the endogenous variables are partitioned as
( , , , , , )t t t t t t tY IP CPI CP MP REER RSP  . Then the relation between structural shocks and reduced 
disturbances is implied as 
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. (3) 
By using this ordering scheme, I assume that the macroeconomic indicators such as industrial 
production ( IP ), inflation ( CPI ) and commodity price ( CP ) do not respond contemporaneously 
to a monetary policy shock ( MP  ), while the asset prices such as real effective exchange rate 
( REER ) and real stock price ( RSP ) respond immediately to a monetary policy shock. According 
to Christiano et al. (1999), the responses of asset prices to the monetary policy shock (or reverse) 
will be unaffected to the ordering of the first three macroeconomic variables ( IP , CPI , CP ). As I 
want to see the immediate effects of monetary policy shock on asset prices, MP is placed above
REER and RSP . 
Given the neutrality of money, the monetary policy shock can have no effects on real 
variables in the long run. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) find strong proofs of money neutrality in the 
US economy. Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) claim that along with the money neutrality in the long 
run, the interaction between the monetary policy instrument and the asset prices in the short run 
should be concerned when creating restrictions in the model. They find that the results with this 
restriction scheme are largely difference from the ones by using only short-run restrictions. Yao et 
al. (2013) use a bivariate SVAR model with only long-run recursive restrictions to evaluate the 
reactions of asset prices to monetary policy shocks in China. However, they find that the impulse 
responses do not vary so much comparing the ones by using short-run restrictions.  
Following these ides, I use the short-run and long-run combined restrictions for 
identification. In the short-run, the relation between structural shocks and reduced disturbances is 
now changed to 
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Different from equation (3), we release three restrictions by assuming
45 0a  , 46 0a  and 56 0a  . 
Thus, both exchange rate and stock price respond to the monetary policy shock contemporaneously.  
Then I build the long-run restrictions proposed by Blanchard and Quad (1989). From 
equation (2), the accumulated responses to the reduced-form shocks are derived as * 1
1
(1 )
m
i
i
A 

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and the disturbances in the reduced VAR are expressed as 1
t tA u 
 . If we denote matrix 1C A  , 
then we have 
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In this scheme, I assume a recursive ordering between the real effective exchange rate and the real 
stock price (
56 0c  ), and they both respond with a lag to the monetary policy shock ( 45 0c  and
46 0c  ). A total of 15 zeros in equation (4) and (5) imply 15 restrictions and the model is fully 
identified56. 
 
5. Empirical Modeling and Results 
First, I run the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests to identify stationarity of the data 
series and the test results are reported in Table 2. For each of the variables, I plot the data series 
                                                          
56 An SVAR with six endogenous variables requires
2( ) / 2 15n n  restrictions to be identified. 
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first to see if a trend or a drift should be included in the equation. Except for the log real effective 
exchange rate, the log real stock price and the benchmark lending rate, all other endogenous 
variables have no unit root. Aside from the federal funds rate, all other exogenous variables have 
at least one unit root. However, the first differences of all variables are stationary.  
Given three non-stationary endogenous variables, I perform the Johansen tests to see if any 
cointergation exists and the test results are shown in Table 3. Since no integration is found among 
these three variables, we do not need to add error correction terms in VARs. Therefore, I choose to 
use the first differences of non-stationary variables and levels of stationary variables to run VARs. 
Next, I calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of the exogenous variables in my model 
to identify multicollinearity and the results are displayed in Table 4. No strong multicollinearity is 
found among these variables since all VIFs are less than 10. 
 
5.1 Short-run Restriction with Cholesky Decomposition 
First, I run the SVARs with recursive (Cholesky) ordering as discussed in Part 4. Figure 
3,4,5,6 show the impulse responses of six endogenous variables to a structural shock of monetary 
policy with 95% asymptotic error bands. Each figure incorporates the result of a separate VAR in 
which each of the four monetary policy instruments (i.e., the 7-day repo rate, the 1-year benchmark 
lending rate, the M2 and the total loan) is used. For comparison purpose, I introduce a 
contractionary monetary policy scenario, in which the repo rate and benchmark lending rate 
increase by one percent, while the M2 and total loan decrease by one percent. The number of lags 
for endogenous variables are determined by AIC. I also run LM and ARCH-LM tests on residuals, 
and find that no major autocorrelation or conditional heteroscedasticity exists. I use “output gap”, 
“annual CPI inflation” and “commodity price gap” to name YoY% of “industrial production”, “CPI” 
and “commodity price”. 
From Figure 3, we see that although a one percent increase in the repo rate leads to a small 
decrease of the exchange rate in the first month, it has no contemporaneous effect on the stock price. 
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In the following months, both the exchange rate and the stock price will increase to certain levels 
before decrease. Given that the stock market usually reacts to the interest rate shock 
contemporaneously, the Cholesky ordering does not give us a good estimation. Furthermore, the 
enduring increase of the stock price along with a contractionary monetary shock is much unlikely. 
This anomaly is notice by Bjornland and Leitemo (2009), whom find that the Cholesky ordering 
distorts the responses of the stock price to the interest rate shock in the US. 
When I use another price-based instrument - the benchmark lending rate as the monetary 
policy instrument to estimate the VAR, the results are similar. From Figure 4, a one percent increase 
of benchmark lending rate brings about no contemporaneous effects on the exchange rate and the 
stock price, while these two rates both increase to a certain level and then decrease over time. 
However, the benchmark lending rate has a larger aggregate effect on the stock price than the repo 
rate does. As the consequence of contractionary monetary policy, inflation and commodity price 
gap both decline gradually in long run.  
From Figure 5 and Figure 6, we see that the responses of the same variables to a decrease 
of the M2 or the total loan are similar. Again, no major contemporary changes of exchange rate and 
stock price follow a decrease of money supply. Following the contractionary monetary shock, the 
output gap, the inflation and the commodity price gap decrease gradually and then the effects 
diminish after several months. 
In summary, whatever the monetary policy instrument is used, the SVAR with short-run 
Cholesky ordering does not estimate the impulse responses to the monetary policy shock very well. 
Therefore, we need to use other restriction methods for better estimation. 
 
5.2 Exogenous Variables 
 To see the effectiveness of control variables, I report the coefficient estimates of the 
exogenous variables for reduced-form VARs in Table 5 and Table 6. As we are interested in how 
these variables are related to the asset prices, I only report the estimates from the equations in which 
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either the stock return or the exchange rate return is the left hand side variable. 
From Table 5, an increase of Federal funds rate is accompanied with an increase of stock 
return in China. The returns of S&P500 and gold price are positively related to Chinese stock return, 
while the returns of oil price and VIX are negatively related. QE announcements of both types and 
the exchange rate reform announcement lead to a decrease in stock return. The first stock market 
reform announcement lowers the stock return, while the later stock market reforms boost the stock 
return. Except for the Federal funds rate and the gold price return, most of the other coefficient 
estimates are statistically insignificant. 
From Table 6, an increase in Federal funds rate is associated with an increase in exchange 
rate return. The returns of S&P500, gold price and VIX are positively related to the exchange rate 
return, while the return of oil price is negatively related. QE announcements of both types and the 
exchange rate reform mostly enhance the exchange rate return. The first stock market reform 
announcement depreciates the Chinese Yuan, while the later stock market reforms appreciate the 
Chinese Yuan. Except for the return of oil price, most of the other coefficient estimates are 
statistically insignificant. 
To summarize, although most of the controls are statistically insignificant, increases of the 
Federal funds rate and the gold price return boost the Chinese stock return significantly. In addition, 
the old price return is the only significant factor and it is negatively related to the exchange rate 
return. The magnitudes in effects of the exchange rate reform and stock market reforms to the stock 
return are greater than to the exchange rate return. QE announcements of both types have little 
effect on both asset prices, part of the reason is that QE announcements are only effective in a short 
window (usually several days. However, I choose to include all the exogenous variables in my 
model for better estimation. 
 
5.3 Short-run and Long-run Restrictions Combined 
As discussed in Part 4, I combine the short-run and long-run restrictions to find the impulse 
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responses of six endogenous variables to a monetary policy shock. Figure 7, 8, 9, 10 show the 
impulse responses with 95% error bands when each of the four monetary policy instruments is used 
in a VAR respectively.  
From Figure 7, a one percent increase in repo rate lowers the stock price by about one 
percent and depreciates the Chinese Yuan by about 0.1 percent contemporaneously. However, both 
the stock price and the exchange rate will increase before the effects disappear in the end. Except 
for a stock price drop in less magnitude, this result is consistent with the literature for the Chinese 
Economy such as Lu (2015)57. Following a contractionary monetary policy shock, the output gap, 
the inflation and the commodity price gap all escalate in the first few months and then diminish to 
be negative. The increase of inflation can be explained by a “price puzzle” (Eichenbaum, 1992) 
that the financing costs increase for producers with higher interest rate thus the prices of products 
rises (Ravenna and Walsh, 2006; Chowdhury et al., 2006). The similar response of inflation is found 
and discussed in Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) as well. 
As shown in Figure 8, a one percent increase in the benchmark lending rate induces a more 
than 10% drop in the stock price contemporarily, and the drop is larger than in the previous case. 
The response of stock price is comparable with results found for the US economy by Rigobon and 
Sack (2004) and Bjornland and Leitemo (2009)58 . Different from the repo rate, the effect of 
benchmark lending rate surge on the stock price is persistent in long run, while the Chinese Yuan 
appreciates in long run. In addition, movements of the output gap, the inflation and the commodity 
price are due to the “price puzzle”. 
From Figure 9, a one percent decrease in the M2 reduces the stock price by 3 percent and 
appreciates the Chinese yuan by 0.4 percent simultaneously. Following the deflation created by the 
decrease in money supply, the output gap and the commodity price gap are both negative in most 
                                                          
57 Lu (2015) finds that 27 basis point increase in the loan rate cuts the Shanghai stock price by 2.2%. 
58 Rigobon and Sack (2004) find that a 25 basis point increase in interest rate leads to a 2.5% decrease in 
the Nasdaq index. Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) find that a one percent increase in federal funds rate 
results in 8% decline in S&P500 index in the same month. 
111 
 
of the time. However, the negativities are not persistent and the deflation will gradually dissolve as 
the exchange rate and the stock price come back to their original levels in long run. The “price 
puzzle” exists in the inflation but is in a minimum amount. 
Responses of the variables to one percent decrease in the total loan are similar to the case 
of decrease in the M2 from Figure 10. However, the stock price dropped by -5.5 percent 
contemporaneously which is greater than the M2’s case. In addition, the output gap is less volatile 
at the first few months after the monetary policy shock, which is similar to the results found by He 
et al. (2013). 
To sum up, by assuming the interaction between the monetary policy instrument and the 
asset prices and assuming the money neutrality, the short-run and long-run combined restrictions 
give us better estimations for the Chinese economy than the Cholesky ordering.  
 
6. Robustness Checks 
I first check the robustness by using quarterly data to run SVARs and therefore including 
more variables such as GDP, consumption and unemployment rate59. The impulse responses curves 
are smoother, but the shapes of the curves do not change so much. Then I estimating SVARs without 
exogenous variables. Other than fewer lags are determined for endogenous variables, no major 
variations of results are found. Moreover, I choose to evaluate the same model in different sub 
periods (e.g., before 2005 and after 2005 for stock market reforms), the results are still robust except 
for some minor variations. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Different from the interest rate policy implemented by some major developed economies, 
the monetary policy is carried out by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) through numerous policy 
                                                          
59 Unemployment rate is reported quarterly in China. 
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instruments. In this paper, I focus on four major monetary policy instruments (i.e., the 7-day repo 
rate, the 1-year benchmark lending rate, the M2 and the total loan) and their effects on the Shanghai 
A-share stock index. I build SAVR models with exogenous variables to for the estimation, and I 
use both short-run Cholesky restrictions and short-run and long-run combined restrictions for 
identification.  
From the results of impulse response analysis, I find that the Cholesky restrictions do not 
give us good estimation and can distort the responses. According to Bjornland and Leitemo (2009), 
the estimation inaccuracy is due to two reasons: (1) it ignores the contemporaneous interaction 
between the monetary policy instrument and asset prices; (2) it does not assume the neutrality of 
money in long run. However, the short-run and long-run combined restrictions do solve this 
problems and give us better estimation. 
In general, for China’s economy, a contractionary monetary policy identified by the 
increase in repo rate or benchmark lending and the decrease in the M2 or in the total loan will 
reduce the real stock price and appreciate the Chinese currency. However, the magnitude of the 
effect is greater when the benchmark lending rate or the total loan is used. Following a 
contractionary monetary policy, the output gap, the inflation and the commodity price gap decrease 
gradually. Nonetheless, due to the “price puzzle” (Eichenbaum, 1992), these three variables 
escalate in the first few months after the monetary policy shock.  
Further studies could be done by estimating the asymmetric responses of stock price to 
contractionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks. I can also discuss the monetary policy 
effects on stock prices with respect to different industrial portfolios. 
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Tables and Graphs 
 
Figure 1: The Movements of Monetary Policy Instruments of the People’s Bank of China 
 
 
Note: All data series are from Bloomberg.  
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Figure 2: The Movements of Stock Price and Foreign Exchange Rate in China 
 
 
Note: According to the BIS, “Real effective exchange rate” (REER) is the geometric weighted 
averages of bilateral exchange rates adjusted by relative consumer prices, and the bilateral 
exchange rate is foreign currency/domestic currency rate. Thus, an increase in REER means an 
appreciation of domestic currency. Both data series are from Bloomberg. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Min Max Mean SD Source 
Macroeconomic Variables      
YoY % change of industrial production index 2.24 23.2 12.407 4.651 IMF 
YoY % change of consumer price index -1.8 8.7 2.82 2.04 National Bureau of Statistics 
YoY % change of commodity price -8 10.3 1.75 5.29 National Bureau of Statistics 
Asset Prices      
Real effective exchange rate 81.89 130.99 102.847 14.961 BIS 
Shanghai A-share stock price index 1095.351 6114.061 2648.662 1004.062 Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Monetary Policy Instruments      
YoY % change of M2 10.1 29.74 16.405 4.139 PBOC 
YoY % change of total loan 12.4 33.86 16.678 4.476 PBOC 
7-day repo rate 0.94 6.64 2.721 1.075 PBOC 
1-year benchmark lending rate 4.35 7.47 5.773 0.774 PBOC 
Required reserve ratio* 7 21.5 15.24 5 PBOC 
Rediscount rate* 1.8 4.32 2.626 0.682 PBOC 
Exogenous Variables      
Federal funds rate 0.07 5.26 1.36 1.817 FRED 
S&P 500 757.13 2246.63 1439.339 369.839 FRED 
Oil price 30.32 133.93 72.238 24.162 West Texas Intermediate 
Gold price 378.92 1771.852 1029.85 411.603 London Bullion Market 
VIX 10.82 62.64 19.063 8.698 CBOE 
QE Increase (dummy) 0 1 0.082 0.275 Wang (2017) 
QE Decrease (dummy) 0 1 0.121 0.303 Wang (2017) 
Chinese currency reform (dummy) 0 1 0.006 0.079 PBOC 
First stock market reform (dummy) 0 1 0.006 0.079 Beltratti et al. (2011) 
Second stock market reform (dummy) 0 1 0.006 0.079 Beltratti et al. (2011) 
Third stock market reform (dummy) 0 1 0.006 0.079 Beltratti et al. (2011) 
Note: Required reserve ratio and rediscount rate are not used in my model. The variance inflation factors (VIF) of exogenous variables are calculated 
and no multicollinearity is found. 
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Table 2: Unit Root Test 
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests without trend and drift are performed. Lag lengths are chosen by AIC. The test statistics and significance levels are 
reported in the table. For a variable, once the unit roots are identified for the level, I run the unit root test for the first difference. 
 
 Level First Difference 
Variable Trend Intercept Lag t-Statistic Trend Intercept Lag t-Statistic 
YoY % change of industrial production Yes Yes 12 -3.639**     
YoY % change of CPI No Yes 12 -2.694*     
YoY % change of commodity price No No 1 -2.996***     
Log of real effective exchange rate No No 1 1.460 No No 1 -8.614*** 
Log of real stock price No No 4 -0.003 No No 3 -4.474*** 
YoY % change of M2 No Yes 6 -3.266**     
YoY % change of total loan No Yes 5 -3.298**     
7-day repo rate Yes Yes 4 -4.350***     
1-year benchmark lending rate No No 2 -0.518 No No 1 -5.612*** 
Federal funds rate No No 8 -2.152**     
Log of S&P 500 Yes Yes 6 -1.650 No No 5 -4.906*** 
Log of oil price No No 1 0.117 No No 2 -6.488*** 
Log of gold price No No 1 1.610 No No 1 -10.386*** 
Log of VIX No No 2 -0.446 No No 1 -10.556*** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Table 3: Johansen Cointegration Test 
I only test the three nonstationary endogenous variables. Johansen tests are based on traces of 
cointegration matrices. Linear deterministic trend and intercept are allowed for cointergration 
estimation. The lag lengths for VAR models are determined by AIC. 
 
Variable Lag Rank Test Statistic 
REER, RSP 2 0 15.495 
IR, REER, RSP 2 0 29.797 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
This table shows the values of VIFs for all exogenous variables in my model. The value of VIF 
greater than 10 means high multicollinearity. 
 
Variable VIF 
Federal funds rate 5.00 
Change in Log of S&P 500 2.69 
Change in Log of oil price 2.31 
Change in Log of gold price 2.14 
Change in Log of VIX 2.11 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (Repo Rate) with Cholesky 
Ordering 
The 7-day repo rate is used as the monetary policy instrument. AIC selects two lags for endogenous 
variables in the model. Accumulated responses are reported for the change of log REER and the 
change of log real stock price since we are interest in the responses of levels. The numbers in 
vertical axis are in percentage. 95% error bands are shown. 
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (Benchmark Lending Rate) with 
Cholesky Ordering 
The 1-year benchmark lending rate is used as the monetary policy instrument. AIC selects two lags 
for endogenous variables in the model. Accumulated responses are reported for the change of log 
REER and the change of log real stock price since we are interest in the responses of levels. The 
numbers in vertical axis are in percentage. 95% error bands are shown. 
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (M2) with Cholesky Ordering 
The YoY percentage change of M2 is used as the monetary policy instrument. AIC selects two lags 
for endogenous variables in the model. Accumulated responses are reported for the change of log 
REER and the change of log real stock price since we are interest in the responses of levels. The 
numbers in vertical axis are in percentage. 95% error bands are shown. 
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Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (Total Loan) Cholesky Ordering 
The YoY percentage change of total loan is used as the monetary policy instrument. AIC selects 
two lags for endogenous variables in the model. Accumulated responses are reported for the change 
of log REER and the change of log real stock price since we are interest in the responses of levels. 
The numbers in vertical axis are in percentage. 95% error bands are shown. 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates of Exogenous Variables in Stock Price Equations 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of exogenous variables in the reduced-form VARs. Only 
the estimates from the equations in which the change of log real stock price is the dependent 
variable. As indicated by column titles, I choose each of the four variables as the monetary policy 
instrument to run a separate VAR. 
 
 Monetary Policy Instrument 
Variable Name Repo Rate 
Benchmark 
Lending Rate 
M2 Total Loan 
Constant 2.509 
(2.135) 
-0.827 
(2.908) 
3.135 
(2.598) 
3.126 
(2.666) 
Trend -0.003 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
0.008 
(0.013) 
Federal Funds Rate 0.505*** 
(0.180) 
0.407*** 
(0.183) 
0.454*** 
(0.200) 
0.448* 
(0.227) 
ΔLog(S&P500) *100 0.206 
(0.250) 
0.227 
(0.250) 
0.243 
(0.253) 
0.260 
(0.251) 
ΔLog(Oil Price) *100 -0.042 
(0.066) 
-0.049 
(0.068) 
-0.041 
(0.067) 
-0.036 
(0.067) 
ΔLog(Gold Price) *100 0.271** 
(0.137) 
0.297** 
(0.138) 
0.271* 
(0.141) 
0.257* 
(0.139) 
ΔLog(VIX) *100 -0.063 
(0.051) 
-0.059 
(0.051) 
-0.055 
(0.052) 
-0.049 
(0.051) 
QE Increase -0.350 
(0.874) 
-0.542 
(0.875) 
-0.442 
(0.886) 
-0.499 
(0.883) 
QE Decrease -0.486 
(0.769) 
-0.740 
(0.800) 
-0.131 
(0.776) 
-0.143 
(0.769) 
Exchange Rate Reform -2.056 
(2.742) 
-2.192 
(2.744) 
-2.819 
(2.820) 
-2.870 
(2.810) 
Stock Market Reform 1 -0.930 
(2.818) 
-0.829 
(2.827) 
-0.904 
(2.876) 
-0.743 
(2.870) 
Stock Market Reform 2 0.427 
(2.742) 
0.351 
(2.746) 
0.05 
(2.844) 
0.193 
(2.837) 
Stock Market Reform 3 4.034 
(2.750) 
3.829 
(2.749) 
3.321 
(2.809) 
3.422 
(2.809) 
Adjusted R2 0.310 0.307 0.285 0.290 
F-Statistic 3.895 3.863 3.569 3.632 
AIC 4.922 4.925 4.957 4.950 
Log likelihood -358.909 -359.172 -361.672 -361.138 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates of Exogenous Variables in Exchange Rate Equations 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of exogenous variables in the reduced-form VARs. Only 
the estimates from the equations in which the change of log real effective exchange rate is the 
dependent variable. As indicated by column titles, I choose each of the four variables as the 
monetary policy instrument to run a separate VAR 
 
 Monetary Policy Instrument 
Variable Name Repo Rate 
Benchmark 
Lending Rate 
M2 Total Loan 
Constant -0.142 
(0.456) 
-1.086* 
(0.609) 
-0.149 
(0.536) 
-0.024 
(0.550) 
Trend 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
Federal Funds Rate 0.027 
(0.039) 
0.015 
(0.038) 
0.034 
(0.041) 
0.023 
(0.047) 
ΔLog(S&P500) *100 0.019 
(0.053) 
0.024 
(0.052) 
0.035 
(0.052) 
0.026 
(0.052) 
ΔLog(Oil Price) *100 -0.031*** 
(0.014) 
-0.027* 
(0.014) 
-0.030** 
(0.014) 
-0.032*** 
(0.014) 
ΔLog(Gold Price) *100 0.025 
(0.029) 
0.033 
(0.029) 
0.019 
(0.029) 
0.027 
(0.029) 
ΔLog(VIX) *100 0.009 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
QE Increase 0.012 
(0.187) 
-0.047 
(0.183) 
0.067 
(0.183) 
0.079 
(0.182) 
QE Decrease 0.240 
(0.164) 
0.148 
(0.167) 
0.238 
(0.160) 
0.245 
(0.159) 
Exchange Rate Reform 0.049 
(0.586) 
0.100 
(0.575) 
0.172 
(0.581) 
0.126 
(0.580) 
Stock Market Reform 1 -0.285 
(0.602) 
-0.218 
(0.592) 
-0.372 
(0.593) 
-0.419 
(0.592) 
Stock Market Reform 2 0.951 
(0.586) 
0.940 
(0.575) 
1.055* 
(0.586) 
0.934 
(0.585) 
Stock Market Reform 3 0.365 
(0.588) 
0.384 
(0.576) 
0.416 
(0.579) 
0.326 
(0.580) 
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.140 0.139 0.143 
F-Statistic 1.778 2.054 2.046 2.080 
AIC 1.835 1.798 1.799 1.794 
Log likelihood -118.162 -115.247 -115.329 -114.970 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
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Figure 7: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (Repo Rate) with Short-Run and 
Long-Run Combined Restrictions 
The 7-day repo rate is used as the monetary policy instrument. AIC selects two lags for endogenous 
variables in the model. Accumulated responses are reported for the change of log REER and the 
change of log real stock price since we are interest in the responses of levels. The numbers in 
vertical axis are in percentage. 95% error bands are shown. 
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (Benchmark Lending Rate) with 
Short-Run and Long-Run Combined Restrictions 
The 1-year benchmark lending rate is used as the monetary policy instrument. AIC selects two lags 
for endogenous variables in the model. Accumulated responses are reported for the change of log 
REER and the change of log real stock price since we are interest in the responses of levels. The 
numbers in vertical axis are in percentage. 95% error bands are shown. 
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (M2) with Short-Run and Long-
Run Combined Restrictions 
The YoY percentage change of M2 is used as the monetary policy instrument. AIC selects two lags 
for endogenous variables in the model. Accumulated responses are reported for the change of log 
REER and the change of log real stock price since we are interest in the responses of levels. The 
numbers in vertical axis are in percentage. 95% error bands are shown. 
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Figure 10: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock (Total Loan) with Short-Run and 
Long-Run Combined Restrictions 
The YoY percentage change of total loan is used as the monetary policy instrument. AIC selects 
two lags for endogenous variables in the model. Accumulated responses are reported for the change 
of log REER and the change of log real stock price since we are interest in the responses of levels. 
The numbers in vertical axis are in percentage. 95% error bands are shown. 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20 25 30
Output Gap
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
5 10 15 20 25 30
Annual CPI Inflation
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20 25 30
Commodity Price Gap
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
5 10 15 20 25 30
Total Loan
 
 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20 25 30
Exchange Rate
-8
-4
0
4
5 10 15 20 25 30
Stock Price
 
 
